

MIGRATION
STRATEGY GROUP
ON GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS



Framework Paper

TRIPLE-WIN MIGRATION -
CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES

Steffen Angenendt, January 2014

ABOUT THE MIGRATION STRATEGY GROUP

The **Migration Strategy Group on Global Competitiveness** (MSG) was launched by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the Robert Bosch Stiftung in 2013. The Migration Strategy Group brings together key policy-stakeholders and decision-makers from the public and private sector, across different ministries and political departments from migrant-sending and receiving countries on both sides of the Atlantic. The aim is to develop a common understanding of designing and implementing coherent policies that unlock the full potential of migration. It is based on the premise that demographic change, growing global competition for an increasingly mobile workforce, and development of migrant-sending countries demand holistic and attractive migration and integration policies that create triple win situations (for the receiving country, the sending country, and the migrant). In 2013-2014, the activities of the Migration Strategy Group will focus on a case study for potential triple win labor migration frameworks between Germany and Morocco.

Activities include **regular interdisciplinary working group meetings** for policymakers, issue experts, and private sector representatives assessing current labor migration frameworks, and the strengths, weaknesses, and transferability of concrete triple win policy models and case studies; **study tours for relevant stakeholders** to gain first-hand experience of migration and development issues in migrant sending countries; **publication of policy briefs** by senior advisors to provide an analytical framework for policy experts and decision-makers; and a **plenary workshop** to summarize findings and share insights more broadly and feed into other policy fora like the Global Forum on Migration and Development.

In its first year, the Migration Strategy Group is chaired by **Tobias Billström**, minister for migration and asylum policy in Sweden and current chair of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). Senior advisors are **Steffen Angenendt**, senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and **Tamar Jacoby**, president and CEO of ImmigrationWorks USA. Associated Advisors are **Manjula Luthria** and **Yann Pouget** at The World Bank, Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) and **Michael Clemens** at the Center for Global Development.

The project is coordinated by Astrid Ziebarth, director for immigration and integration, and Jessica Bither, program coordinator, at GMF, and Ottilie Bälz, head of section society and culture, and Melanie Dense, program officer, at the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

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SUMMARY

The “triple-win” concept is a hotly debated topic in contemporary migration policy. Adherents claim that it is possible to design and implement migration programs that are mutually beneficial for migrants, sending countries, and destination countries, while critics say that this expectation is naïve because they see insurmountable practical obstacles or generally believe migration to be a zero-sum game. However, the interest in a triple-win perspective has not emerged by accident: in fact, it is a reflection of profound changes in global migration patterns, with traditional South-North flows becoming more diversified, and with temporary and circular migration replacing unidirectional and permanent flows. In addition, the international debate on the relationship between migration and development has gained political momentum. There is a growing consensus that migration reduces poverty on an extraordinary scale, that well-managed migration is one of the most powerful enablers of development, and that migration should be more systematically included in national, bilateral, and international development strategies.

This Migration Strategy Group framework paper critically assesses the triple-win idea, analyzing its potentials and weaknesses as well as some practical experiences. It proposes that triple-win concepts should be more systematically incorporated in migration policies, especially supported through additional pilot projects.

1. INTRODUCTION

In October 2013, the Second UN General Assembly’s High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (HLD) revealed a broad consensus among the UN member states that well-managed migration can have positive outcomes for all (three) stakeholders involved: for countries of origin, countries of destination, and for migrants themselves. This is a remarkable shift compared to the first HLD held in 2006, when many developing countries were rather critical with regard to the impact of migration on their economic, social, and human development. Now even these countries express a positive view, acknowledging “the important contribution made by migrants and migration to development in countries of origin, transit, and destination” and considering migration “a key factor for sustainable development.”¹ Apparently the idea of migration as a “triple win” has gained political momentum.

Although the migration-development nexus has been discussed for decades, the notion of a triple win is relatively new to the international debate. Since 2006, the World Bank has promoted this concept to describe the development impact of remittances and managed

migration.² But up to now, it has mainly been used as a cipher or a catch phrase to express the general expectation that a mutually beneficial management of migration flows is desirable and feasible. Yet, the idea has not been fully implemented in national strategies or international programs. To date, there are only a few concrete national and regional pilot projects.

Given this growing interest in the development impact of transnational migration, it is worth analyzing the driving forces behind the paradigmatic shift from critical to more positive assessments and to describe some of the practical attempts to implement “triple-win thinking.” This paper argues that the growing interest in migration and development is fuelled by changing patterns of international migration toward increased transnational mobility and temporary and circular flows, also between developing countries. On the other hand, this discussion has also been boosted by new insights concerning the development impacts of migration, especially of remittances and skills circulation. Hence, expectations are high, and sometimes critical issues are not fully taken into account.

2. BACKGROUND: SHIFTING GLOBAL MIGRATION PATTERNS

Generally, international migration is expected to continue to grow in scope, complexity, and impact.³ With regard to the development impact of migration, shifts in geographical and structural patterns are of specific interest.

Concerning the geographical aspects, the number of international migrants more generally has sharply increased. Globally, their numbers have increased from 155 million in 1990 to an estimated 232 million in 2013 (3.2 percent of world population).⁴ All in all, migrants currently represent a share of 11 percent of the popula-

tion of developed countries, while the share of migrants in developing countries stands at only 2 percent.

Nevertheless, these global figures obscure significant regional shifts. As recent data on countries of origin and destination indicate, in 2013, about 82.3 million international migrants who were born in developing countries (“global South”) were still residing in the South — a number slightly higher than the number of international migrants born in the South and living in developed countries (“global North”).

¹ Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly on October 4, 2013, New York.

² World Bank (2007), *Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*, Washington, DC.

³ UN General Assembly (2013), *International Migration and Development. Report of the Secretary-General*, New York, 25 July 2013 (A/68/190)

⁴ United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda (2013), “Realizing the future we want for all.” Report to the Secretary-General, New York 2012 (A/67/254).

Thus, a more detailed analysis of current flows reveals that although South-North migration has been the main driver of global migration trends since 1990, more recent trends have made South-South migration the largest category.⁵ Therefore, it is to be expected that in the future, the development impacts of flows will gain additional political importance.

The second important shift in global migration patterns is more difficult to assess due a general lack of data: the shift from permanent to temporary and circular (repeated) types of migration. Generally, migration statistics in developed as well as in developing countries are extremely weak in providing knowledge concerning the duration of migration, making international statistics and comparison difficult. In industrialized countries, the data originate mainly from population registers, census and micro-census data, and visa and labor market statistics. Some countries without population registers, such as the U.K., record entries and exits at the state borders. All survey methods have specific disadvantages that complicate the identification of national trends and international comparisons, especially of temporary migration flows.

The lack of knowledge about return migration is particularly problematic because there are high expectations for return migration's positive effects on development in the country of origin. In fact, the existing data on return migration indicate a heterogeneous picture, with return rates, for example, between the United States and Mexico oscillating between 3 and 50 percent over the last three decades. In addition, recent International Organization for Migration data indicate that even if return migration from the global North in response to the economic and financial crisis has likely been exaggerated by the media, increased levels of return can be seen in migrant-sending countries experiencing strong growth, for example Brazil, China, and Mexico.⁶

All EU countries are experiencing data shortages in this respect. So far, not a single member state's sta-

tistics provides sufficient information on the scope and structure of temporary and circular movements. Addressing this deficit, some EU member states have recently introduced new additional sources of information to improve their knowledge base. They have, for example, established new methods to gain additional information from population registers (Austria), conducted specific surveys (Spain), or introduced personal identification numbers for migrants (Netherlands). The first comparative study was initiated by the European Commission, showing for instance that in Austria the immigrants from former Yugoslavia are much more prone to circular migration than immigrants from other countries. In this context, Spain also asked migrants about their intentions to stay and return, finding out that in 2007, 62.5 percent of the temporary migrant workers had repeatedly returned to their country of origin during their stay; they usually returned to visit their family, while only a very small proportion (1.4 percent) returned for work purposes. Similar numbers were reported for Sweden.⁷

Despite the general lack of reliable national and international data, there is broad consensus in contemporary migration research that temporary and circular migration will constitute a growing share of international migration, at the expense of permanent flows.

3. THE TRIPLE-WIN IDEA: ASSUMPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

For many decades, the migration and development debate — as well as the development policy debate in general — has repeatedly oscillated between optimism and pessimism.⁸ However, critical assessments have usually outweighed the optimistic ones, stressing the risks of migration. The development impact of migration was often considered low to negligible, and migrants were not perceived as stakeholders. The predominant perception was that migration is a “problem” induced by a lack of development, and that emigration from developing countries would only exacerbate underdevelopment. Now, as described above, this perception is increasingly replaced by the conviction that migration can contribute to poverty reduction and development, both in origin and destination countries.⁹ One reason is that knowledge on the development impact of migration has improved. The following section analyzes some of the main findings, assumptions, and expectations of developed and developing countries on the impact of migration.

REMITTANCES

Most governments of migrant-sending countries now share the view that remittances are important for their economic development. This has been mainly fuelled by World Bank research on the scope and structure of remittances, which found that remittances to developing countries (estimated \$414 billion in 2013) are currently at least three times as high as the official development assistance, and the upward trend is expected to continue.¹⁰

Indeed, many studies show that remittances can reduce the level and extent of poverty and stabilize economies and households. With regard to poverty reduction, there has been strong evidence that households receiving remittances experience a significant rise in their income and that their poverty rate is much lower than that of similar families who do not send migrants. In addition, evidence from several developing countries shows that

remittances are often invested in the education of family members, especially in their secondary education, or they are saved and used as an insurance against unexpected economic downturns.

Recent research also points out that remittances can foster rural economic development by offering additional capital and increasing the creditworthiness of the recipients, thus facilitating investment in agriculture and self-employment. Remittances are often used to purchase more effective seeds and fertilizers, and they foster local economic development, for example through the purchase of locally produced or traded goods.¹¹ Remittances are also increasingly used to set up small local enterprises.

In addition, many remittances-receiving governments are now considering remittances in their national development strategies, expecting that they would contribute to a more favorable balance of payments. balanced payment balances.

On the other hand, there are also critical voices warning about painting too positive a picture of remittances. They point especially to the fact that since remittances are private money, they are always vulnerable to taxes or fees in the destination country. They are also not reliable forms of income, because they might decrease during a recession and the disposition of migrants to send money back home might diminish over time. In addition, remittance flows alone cannot cause significant changes, and functioning local level institutions and policy interventions are needed as well.¹² Nevertheless, despite such limits and unpredictability, most countries of origin perceive transnational remittances as a main enabler of development and try to increase them by lowering the transfer costs and by appealing to their migrants abroad to send more money home.

⁵ UN Population Division (2013), *International Migration 2013: “Migrants by origin and destination,”* in: Population Facts, No. 2013/13, New York, September.

⁶ International Organization for Migration (2013), *“World Migration Report 2013.”* Migrant well-being and development, Geneva.

⁷ European Migration Network (2011), *“Temporary and circular migration: empirical evidence, current policy practice, and future options in the EU member states,”* Brussels.

⁸ Ninna Nyberg-Sorensen, Nicholas Van Hear, and Poul Engberg-Pedersen (2002), *“The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options,”* International Organization for Migration (IOM Migration Research Series 8), Geneva; and Hein de Haas (2010), *“Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective,”* in: International Migration Review, No. 1, p. 227 – 264.

⁹ United Nations, International Organization for Migration, and UNFPA (2013), *“Towards the 2013 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.”* Final Report of the High-Level Dialogue Series, Geneva 2013.

¹⁰ World Bank (2013), *“Migration and Remittance Flows: Recent Trends and Outlook 2013-2016,”* Migration and Development Brief, No. 21, October 2013.

¹¹ Dilip Ratha and Sanket Mohapatra (2011), *“Impact of migration on economic and social development: A review of evidence and emerging issues.”* World Bank Policy Research Paper 5558, Washington, DC.

¹² Tasneem Siddiqui (2012), *“Impact of migration on poverty and development,”* University of Sussex Migration Out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium, Working Paper 2, Brighton.

DIASPORAS

In addition to remittances, many countries of origin also value the development contribution of their diasporas in the form of direct investments and social remittances. There is now a far-reaching consensus in migration research about the fact that diasporas can deepen the relationship between home and host countries by supporting development processes, inter alia, through direct investments in small or medium businesses in their home countries, as has been frequently reported in the case of financial investments from U.S.-Chinese diaspora members in China.¹³ In addition, it is assumed that diasporas can also contribute to the improvement of infrastructures, support the transfer of knowledge and technology, facilitate foreign direct investment, and attract workers for new companies in their home countries.¹⁴ Some countries of origin also try to encourage diaspora members to support hometown associations and contribute to community welfare at home.

BRAIN DRAIN VS. BRAIN GAIN

Besides remittances and diaspora engagement, a third important aspect is a changing debate on brain drain. The current discourse addresses the complexity of this issue much more thoroughly than past discussions did.¹⁵ While it is still beyond dispute that a permanent emigration of skilled workers may cause brain drain, decrease productivity, and worsen economic conditions, such effects are expected only if these workers were originally employed according to their knowledge and skills in their country of origin. If they had had no access to the labor market at all, or if the jobs offered did not correspond to their skill level, negative implications are expected to be small.

This also applies in countries where more experts are trained than needed, with the intention of “exporting” them to more developed countries (as practiced, for example, by the Philippines). This is also the case when migration takes place in the context of development-oriented temporary or circular migration programs, for

example in EU Mobility Partnerships. Return migration of migrants who could upgrade their skills abroad can even turn the brain drain into a “brain gain.”

In addition, it is empirically proven that migration can enhance human capital formation in the home country, for instance through the investment of remittances in education and health. Children of migrants have — at least in some countries of origin — significantly greater chances of achieving a high school diploma. In addition, it has been demonstrated that higher prospective returns to human capital in a foreign country impinge favorably on human capital formation decisions at home and therefore increase investments in education.¹⁶

IMPLICATIONS FOR DESTINATION COUNTRIES

As far as developed countries are concerned, there is overwhelming evidence from various countries that economic and fiscal benefits of immigration are substantial. Correspondingly, there is a growing consensus that especially high skilled and skilled migrants can drive innovation and fill structural labor market shortages, and that low-skilled migrants can also contribute to a more competitive economy. In addition, in some developed countries experiencing rapid demographic change, immigration is already perceived as the single most important tool to cope with quickly aging and shrinking work forces.

But empirical research also suggests that immigrant labor may, under certain conditions, decelerate economic modernization and prohibit efficiency gains of countries of destination, that additional labor may reduce wages of low-skilled natives, and that there might be substantial negative social impacts of migration both on the migrants themselves as well as on host societies. It is argued that this is especially the case if natives feel threatened by larger and rapid inflows of migrants, if discrimination and racism exists, and if the social and economic integration of immigrants fails.

In addition, the impact of immigration on receiving countries in the global South is still not clear. Here, many immigrants will work only in the informal sector, concentrate in urban areas, increase local disparities and might be exposed to exploitation and human rights violations. This is especially true for female migrants.¹⁷

TEMPORARY AND CIRCULAR MIGRATION

The migration and development debate is also driven by high hopes on the development impact of temporary and circular migration — not at least with regard to relieve the pressure on the labor markets of developing countries that are temporarily unable to offer sufficient work opportunities to their citizens. This is often the case in countries experiencing a large youth bulge.¹⁸ Similar to the idea of a triple win, circular migration is also not a new concept. Originally employed by anthropologists and ethnologists to describe migration patterns in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,¹⁹ it has since been used occasionally to categorize migration flows and to analyze transnational migration networks. Like the triple-win notion, the term circular migration made its way into the international migration policy debate only in recent years, triggered mainly by international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the World Bank, and the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). The influential 2005 GCIM report strongly promoted the idea that circular migration could bring about triple-win situations.²⁰

The European Commission introduced the concept in Europe in 2005, pointing out that circular migration is “a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries.” In the Commission’s view, the value of this kind of migration for development policy lies in the transfer of knowledge between destination country and country of origin, which could potentially reduce the negative effects of brain drain. Furthermore, circular migration could help the members of a diaspora to

invest in their home countries and create employment. Since releasing this Communication,²¹ the Commission has reaffirmed this understanding of circular migration in a number of subsequent statements. The European Parliament endorsed the Commission’s positions and suggested that the European Union and its member states should promote this form of migration.

Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that there were different ideas of what circular migration should mean. While the Commission and Parliament were interested in promoting international mobility in order to foster development, the member states’ ministers of justice and interior hoped to better control and limit migration. For the latter, circular migration should mainly serve as a management tool that allows the introduction of specific national labor migration quotas. These quotas should not be set at the European level, however, but should instead — as should labor migration in general — remain under national authority. According to the ministers, the economic situations and labor market needs within the EU differ so widely that member states need significant flexibility to react quickly and appropriately to changes. Nevertheless, the member states were expected to report these quotas voluntarily to the Commission, which then should use them in its negotiations with non-EU-countries on the readmission of illegal immigrants. Obviously, from this perspective, circular migration programs should be used as a tool to convince countries of origin to reduce irregular immigration. Although the ministers also cited development policy goals, these were clearly subordinate.

So far, these positions indicate that several fundamental questions with regard to circular migration and its triple-win effects still remain unresolved. Apparently, this is not only the case for the European, but also for the international debate. The confusion is partly due to the numerous forms this type of migration can take and the highly diverse experiences with circular migration

¹³ See for example Alan Smart and Jinn-yuh Hsu (2004), “The Chinese Diaspora, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China,” in: *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol.3, No.4, pp. 544 — 566.

¹⁴ International Organization for Migration and Migration Policy Institute (2012), “Roadmaps to Engaging the Diasporas,” Washington, DC.

¹⁵ Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport (2011), “Globalization, Brain Drain and Development,” IZA Discussion Paper 5590, Bonn, March; and John Gibson and David McKenzie (2010), “The Economic Consequences of ‘Brain drain’ of the Best and Brightest: Microeconomic Evidence from Five Countries,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Washington, DC.

¹⁶ Oded Stark and C. Simon Fan (2007), “Losses and Gains to Developing Countries from the Migration of Educated Workers: An overview of recent research, and new reflections,” in: *World Economic*, Vol 8, No. 2, April—June, pp. 259-269.

¹⁷ United Nations, International Organization for Migration, and UNFPA (2013), “Toward the 2013 High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development.” Final Report of the High-Level Dialogue Series, Geneva.

¹⁸ Steffen Angenendt and Silvia Popp (2013), „Jugendüberhang. Entwicklungspolitische Risiken, Chancen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten,” SWP-Studie 2013/S12, Berlin.

¹⁹ Steven Vertovec (2007), “Circular Migration: the way forward in global policy?” University of Oxford IMI Working Papers, No. 4; Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland (2007), “Circular Migration and Development: Trends, Policy Routes, and Ways Forward,” Migration Policy Institute Policy Briefs, Washington, DC.

²⁰ Global Commission on International Migration (2005), “Migration in an interconnected world. New directions for action.”

²¹ European Commission (2007), “On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries,” Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Brussels, 16.5.2007, COM(2007) 248 final.

programs, including the experience that “there is nothing more permanent than temporary foreign workers.”²²

Generally, a review of the existing circular migration programs reveals that basically three types of programs exist, for 1) seasonal, low-skilled workers, 2) non-seasonal, low-skilled workers, and 3) professionals and entrepreneurs. The largest group — and therefore also the circular migration type with which governments obviously have the most practical experience — are seasonal, low-skilled workers. During recent decades, several traditional (United States, Canada, and New Zealand) as well as non-traditional immigration countries (Germany, U.K., and Spain) have relied heavily on this type of circular migration, primarily to fill labor shortages in agriculture, construction, and services. Germany, for example, has taken between 300,000 and 350,000 seasonal workers annually during the last decades, despite the 1973 recruitment stop for foreign labor, which has only recently been replaced by an opening up of the German labor market for high skilled and skilled migrants.²³ All in all, these temporary program’s outcomes with regard to circularity are difficult to assess due to the usual insufficiency of national entry-exit data, but these outcomes vary greatly, with a high number of returnees from Germany and the U.K. in particular, and substantially lower numbers from Spain.

Some countries also have experience organizing non-seasonal, low-skilled, and semi-skilled migration. The Gulf States and some East Asian countries have become highly dependent on this type of labor migration. To enforce circularity, they have either used a rigid and often discriminatory migration regime or offered poor working conditions and wages, thus reducing the incentives for migrants to stay.²⁴ In contrast, the former guest worker recruitment countries in Europe have been more reluctant to use this type of circular migration, given their experience with a substantial number of temporary migrants putting down roots and becoming permanent

immigrants. Nevertheless, before the current recession took place, some countries with a huge labor demand — for example, Spain and the U.K. — had begun to implement new programs for non-seasonal, low-skilled, and semi-skilled migrants.

A completely different method of policy-setting is used to regulate the third type of circular migrants: professionals, academics, and entrepreneurs. Most industrialized countries are eager to attract more of these migrants and have already developed strategies to cope with the increasing international competition for these highly skilled workers. Ironically, the receiving and sending countries switch positions with regard to these migrants, with destination countries being more interested in fostering permanent immigration, and countries of origin more interested in limiting the brain drain by promoting circularity.²⁵ Thus, for receiving countries, the circularity of these migrants is the lesser of two wishes: they develop such programs for highly skilled migrants as well, mainly because they hope that this will provide an additional incentive to immigrate.

In summary, temporary and circular migration programs were designed to fulfil specific economic or political goals, and triple-win thinking played only a minor role. In practice, there are few examples of more systematic approaches that do. For example, since the 1980s, France has developed a concept and some projects of “co-développement,” and more recently, the Netherlands implemented (and then cancelled) a triple-win pilot project.²⁶

4. RECENT TRIPLE-WIN EXPERIENCES: SELECTED EXAMPLES

The following section briefly presents two more recent practical approaches: the EU Mobility Partnerships as a general framework for triple-win projects and the German triple-win approach as an example how to implement triple win in national development policy.

MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS

The concept of mobility partnerships was introduced by the European Commission in May 2007.²⁷ In the context of increases in irregular migration, mainly from Northern Africa, this new instrument was intended to support partner countries in strengthening border controls, prohibiting document fraud, reducing irregular migration flows, and strengthening migration management capabilities more generally. In turn, EU countries are to offer opportunities for legal labor migration, preferably through temporary or circular programs, thus fostering development in the regions of origin. EU member states may participate in such mobility partnerships on a voluntary basis, and the Commission coordinates the implementation of these partnerships. Generally, participation is open to all interested member states. This flexible form of cooperation is intended to ensure that the partnerships can be adapted to the changing needs of the partners. Ultimately, mobility partnerships can be seen as institutionalized dialogue processes in which objectives, methods, and reviews must be constantly renegotiated.

According to the European Commission, mobility partnerships are going to play a key role in future EU migration policy. They are intended to ensure greater policy coherence, to strengthen the external dimension of this policy, and to create triple-win situations by offering legal opportunities to migrants, supporting the development of countries of origin, and supplying the EU countries with much needed, skilled labor. So far, pilot mobility partnerships have been established with

Cape Verde, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Morocco, and new partnerships, primarily with Tunisia, are in preparation.

Generally, the concept foresees obligations for the respective partner countries as well as for the participating EU countries. The partner country’s government is expected to undertake substantial efforts to prevent irregular migration to the EU. It is supposed to readmit its own nationals as well as third-country nationals who have used the partner country as a transit country. The partner country is especially expected to carry out information campaigns to discourage irregular migration and improve border controls, particularly through closer cooperation with Frontex, the European border agency. Furthermore, the partner country is expected to improve the security of travel documents, fight smuggling and human trafficking, and actively reduce migration push-factors by improving the country’s economic and social conditions.

With regard to EU member states and the European Union, the catalogue of possible obligations and contributions is far more specified than of the partner country. It covers five areas: legal migration, migration management, mitigation of brain drain, promotion of circular migration, and facilitation of short-term visas. These five policy fields are the core of mobility partnerships. In technical terms, a task force of representatives from the member states and the Commission is responsible for the coordination and evaluation of the partnerships. Embassies and EU delegations are working within the framework of so-called collaborative platforms together with partner countries, thus ensuring the implementation in the praxis. The mobility partnerships are supported by a system of indicators. This “scoreboard” contains permanently updated information on the initiatives, partners, contact points, evaluation indicators, deadlines, and the funding available.

²² Philip Martin (2001), “There Is Nothing More Permanent Than Temporary Foreign Workers,” Center for Immigration Studies Background, April 2011, Washington, DC.

²³ Steffen Angenendt (2013), “Unfinished Business. Immigration Reform in Germany,” in: IP Journal, 30/10/2013 <https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/article/24535/print>.

²⁴ International Organization for Migration (2008), “World Migration 2008. Managing Migration in the Evolving Global Economy,” Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2008.

²⁵ Newland, Kathleen, Doreen Rannveig Agunias, and Aaron Terrazas (2008), “Learning by Doing: Experiences of Circular Migration,” MPI-Insight, September 2008.

²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and H.I.T Foundation (2011), “Toward Sensible Labour Migration Policies. Lessons Learned and Recommendations,” Amsterdam.

²⁷ Commission of the European Communities (2007), “Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries,” Brussels, May 16, COM(2007) 248 final.

Particularly in view of the upheavals in the Arab world and potentially increasing inflows from that region, the Commission emphasized in May 2011 that it was of urgent importance to develop a comprehensive and coherent migration policy and establish additional mobility partnerships. A partnership has been signed with Morocco, and negotiations have begun with Tunisia and Egypt. Nevertheless, a critical review of the experiences with existing pilot mobility partnerships²⁸ reveals some shortcomings of the pilot partnerships with regard to the selection of partner countries (which has more or less been accidentally), the hierarchy of political targets (which was often unclear), the content of the partnerships (rather arbitrary and not deriving from proper triple-win thinking) including a serious weakness with regard to offering legal migration opportunities, and, finally, a lack of monitoring and evaluation.

Overall, it must be concluded that the partnerships — despite all deficits — have strengthened the cooperation in migration and development affairs in at least three ways.

- › **First**, they have improved the cooperation among EU countries, in particular through the establishment of contact points in all relevant institutions, regular progress reports, and a review of the political priorities of the member states.
- › **Second**, establishing the EU Task Force and central points of contact has fostered the cooperation between the member states and the EU Commission.
- › **Third**, the constitution of local cooperation platforms and annual mobility partnership meetings has intensified exchanges between the EU Commission and the partner countries — which is extremely important to adjust the programs to changing economic and labor market conditions in countries of origin and destination.

In practice, a multiplicity of activities has been established within the framework of the existing partnerships, including facilitation of return migration and reintegration of migrants in their home communities.

TRIPLE-WIN APPROACHES IN GERMANY

Referring to the international debate on migration and development and especially to the findings of the Global Commission on International Migration and the 2006 UN Global Migration Dialogue, the German ministry for development cooperation introduced the triple-win approach in policy planning in 2008,²⁹ based on the assumption that skillful management and multilateral cooperation can turn international labor migration into an enduring triple-win situation for all stakeholders concerned.

Core areas are measures for diasporas and returnees, such as offering them advice in establishing communication structures. Moreover, German development cooperation tries to improve the potential of migration for sustainable economic development. This includes the financial system, the conditions on the labor market, and the business and investment climate. In addition, another target is to foster the consideration of migration in the respective national poverty reduction and employment strategies.

Since 2008, several pilot projects were implemented. A current main activity is the recruitment of foreign nurses from third countries to Germany, on the basis of bilateral agreements between the labor market authorities in Germany and the respective partner countries. In 2013/2014, 2,000 nurses are to be recruited from Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Philippines, and Tunisia. An important prerequisite is to meet the World Health Organization's (WHO) demand that the countries of origin would not suffer from a critical shortage of health care personnel³⁰ and that qualification levels would match with German labor market needs.

Within the framework of this project, the nurses usually receive a pre-departure language and skills training, in which they are supposed to acquire the language certificate B1 of the Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR). In addition, professional training courses are offered, mainly on national German care, hygiene, and documentation standards, but also on career opportunities. German development cooperation helps employers integrate the nurses after they arrive. In addition, the project assists the nurses have their professional qualifications recognized. Employers pay about €3,700 for the professional and linguistic preparation and for integration assistance.

This current project was preceded by a pilot project with 80 nurses. Project monitoring demonstrates that the selected professionals were highly qualified and the rec-

ognition of their qualification took an average of seven months. In addition, employers expressed a high level of satisfaction with the project, and the migrants claimed that this opportunity helped broaden their professional and personal perspectives. Nevertheless, against the background of recent changes in German migration policy toward a far less restrictive approach and with regard to increasing intra-EU labor mobility due to the economic crisis in other EU countries, German employers have now more choices to recruit from abroad. This might reduce their disposition to accept the relatively high costs intrinsically tied to triple-win programs. Besides, the pilot project indicates how critical it is for the success of such programs that employers are willing to actively foster the integration of their new employees, and that reliable and efficient procedures to recognize the qualification of the migrants must exist.

5. PERSPECTIVES ON EMBEDDING TRIPLE WIN IN COHERENT MIGRATION POLICIES

The recent international debates in the UN framework and other international and regional processes illustrate the degree to which “triple-win” thinking has been “mainstreamed” in the current migration and development debate. A far more positive assessment of development outcomes of migration prevails these days, replacing outdated and too-simplistic assumptions about the negative impacts of migration, especially on countries of origin. This paradigmatic change could serve as a strong driver toward more realistic and pragmatic migration policies. It may also become an incentive to better use the immense potential of well-managed migration for poverty reduction and sustainable development.

Nevertheless, the migration and development debate generally seems to swing back and forth between gloominess and embellishment — and this recent paradigmatic shift stands on weak ground: there is still a significant shortage of solid and comparative data and a lack of implemented triple-win projects.

Such experience can only be gathered from additional projects. Therefore, the main conclusion with regard to the triple-win debate so far is to develop and implement more pilot projects. Such projects are complex, and they require the political will of all stakeholders involved, in sending and receiving countries, including employers. They also need specific management capacities and sufficient funding. More importantly, triple-win projects

should not be misunderstood as a tool to provide employers with cheap labor. Generally, at least five lessons learned from previous projects should be taken into account:

- › **First**, triple-win projects should have a bilateral and regional framework securing a fair consideration of the interests of all actors involved, including those in sending countries. Only fair and balanced agreements will secure the necessary compliance of partner countries. It will be of crucial importance not only to follow a rights-based approach and to ensure the social, economic, and human rights of migrants, but also to assure that the migration programs enhance the economic and social development of the source countries and do not foster brain drain. Mainstreaming development aspects in labor migration policies is not a dilution of economic migration goals — it is a vital precondition for any future coherent, effective, and sustainable migration policy.
- › **Second**, mobility must be fostered, and unrealistic political assumptions should be avoided, for example, that the time limits of temporary migration programs can be fully enforced. It should be mentioned that individual migration strategies may change over time. Employers might be interested in keeping temporary migrants in their companies, or economic conditions in the country of origin may worsen, making return migration difficult or impossible. Therefore, migra-

²⁸ Commission of the European Communities (2009), Commission Staff Working Document, “Mobility partnerships as a tool of the Global Approach to Migration,” SEC(2009) 1240, Brussels, September 18; Commission of the European Communities (2012), “Assessment of the first generation of tools under the Global Approach to Migration,” Brussels; Anne Sofie Westh Olsen (2012), EU Presidency Report. “Member States’ Views on Mobility Partnerships with the Southern Mediterranean Countries,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen, January.

²⁹ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2008), “Migration and Sustainable Economic Development,” Discussion Paper, Berlin.

³⁰ World Health Organization (2010), “Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel,” http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/code_en.pdf.

tion programs should be flexible with regard to the duration of workers' stay, and temporary migration schemes should always provide opportunities for a permanent residence.

- › **Third**, integration measures should always be included — even in temporary migration programs. For instance, a lack of integration policies turned out to be the main failure of Germany's former guest worker recruitment.
- › **Fourth**, future partner countries must be selected carefully. In the past, the choice of such countries has been more or less accidental. However, any coherent recruitment strategy must take a broad variety of aspects into account: not just economic and labor market issues (matching of qualifications and work experience), but also security aspects (document fraud and visa processing facilities), economic factors (economic ties and emerging markets), foreign
- › **Fifth**, as far as the private sector is concerned, employers should be aware that the recruitment of qualified migrants is neither a cheap nor a simple way to fill short-term labor demands. A sustainable migration-related human resources strategy needs substantial and enduring engagement and cooperation with labor market authorities at home and abroad. Generally, joint planning processes involving employers, public authorities and other stakeholders are vital for all triple-win projects and may help to avoid challenges such as those related to integrating new immigrants in the workplace.

policy viewpoints (political importance and reliability of partner governments), and development aspects (diaspora networks, risks of brain drain, remittances dependence rate, etc.).

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