


A GLOBAL SYSTEM IN FLUX

Pursuing Systems Change for
Locally-Led Peacebuilding



**CONDUCTIVE SPACE
FOR PEACE**

This report was developed by Conducive Space for Peace as part of a collaboration to support the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH in its global work on locally-led peacebuilding. It is one piece of a larger endeavour to analyse the ecosystem for locally-led peacebuilding. The analysis is based on CSP's experiences and knowledge development related to locally-led peacebuilding which has been supported by among others Humanity United over the past 5 years.

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Main authors

Mie Roesdahl, Director, Conducive Space for Peace

Jasper Peet-Martel, Programme Officer, Conducive Space for Peace

Sweta Velpillay, Senior Advisor, Conducive Space for Peace

Additional contributors

Nina Søråa, Programme Assistant, Conducive Space for Peace

Tess Thurøe, Programme Officer, Conducive Space for Peace

Maria Fernanda Cantor, Student Intern, Conducive Space for Peace

Christian Cito Cirhigiri, Programme Adviser, Conducive Space for Peace

Stephen Gray, Co-Founder and Director, Adapt Peacebuilding

Isabella Jean, Independent Expert

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List of acronyms

A4EP	Alliance for Empowered Partnerships
AfP	Alliance for Peacebuilding
BLM	Black Lives Matter Movement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Conducive Space for Peace
CSPPS	Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDD	Doing Development Differently
DFID	Department for International Development
EPLO	European Peacebuilding Liaison Office
EU	European Union
FCDO	Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office
GFA	Global Fragility Act
GPI	Gender Promotion Initiative
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
HU	Humanity United
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IEP	The Institute for Economics and Peace
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
LLPB	Locally-led Peacebuilding
LNOB	Leave No One Behind principle
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability and Learning
NEAR	Network for Empowered Aid Response
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NWOW	New Ways of Working
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
PD	Peace Direct
P/CVE	Preventing and countering violent extremism
PSFG	Peace and Security Funders Group
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SP4P	Shift Power for Peace
TWP	Thinking and Working Politically
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United National Development Programme
UNPBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
YPI	Youth Promotion Initiative
WPHF	Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund

Executive Summary

Conflict prevention and **peacebuilding is needed** more than ever. Violent conflict is at historic highs, with record numbers of people displaced globally as a result. However, recurrence of violent conflicts may truly be our worst enemy. Violent conflicts recur at alarmingly high rates despite global efforts to prevent conflict and build peace. These dynamics increasingly demand an answer to the question: how do we as a global community best counter these trends and develop a much more sustainable approach to building peace?

One of the answers to this question is crystalising around the fundamental insight that sustainable peacebuilding must hold local leadership at its core and that **local efforts to build peace are the linchpin** to sustainable development. With a global system in flux, it is **paramount that international support to peacebuilding makes itself relevant to the needs of local actors**.

From the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States to the more recent Grand Bargain and the Sustaining Peace agenda of the UN Secretary General, many of the world's largest institutions have spoken out and developed **policies that call for a rethink of international cooperation** in a way that better supports local actors and sustainable peacebuilding. But global trends such as geopolitical shifts, nationalist and populist tendencies in donor countries, and 'new public management' **have negatively impacted the ability of these institutions to enable locally-led peacebuilding**.

While the normative recognition of the importance of local leadership and equitable partnership has increased, a significant **gap between rhetoric and reality persists** within the global system. Realisation of global commitments continue to fall short. The latest figures show a decline in development and humanitarian aid to local and national civil society from 3.5 percent in 2016 to 2.1 percent in 2020, a far cry from the Grand Bargain's aspirations of 25 percent by 2020. Although this pertains to the broader development field, peacebuilding is embedded within the broader aid infrastructure, and there is no indication that the institutions and funding mechanisms focusing on peacebuilding are faring any better.

Beyond funding commitments, **strengthening equitable and reciprocal partnership approaches** and deeper explorations to address questions of power requires more attention and action. Global structures for support continue to exhibit systemic dysfunctions that restrict the ability to address local needs and support local leadership. The international community's insufficient capacity to operationalise its commitments to local leadership beg the question: **What needs to change within the global peacebuilding system and in particular within the international institutions, and how can such change happen?**

It is increasingly clear that for the global peacebuilding system to overcome these challenges and truly provide an enabling environment for locally-led peacebuilding, it is essential to take on a **systems change lens and approach** to the global peacebuilding system. Systems change is however a complex endeavour, and it is important to understand the **different types of actors and institutions** that work in interconnected ways and have **different capacities for change**. Recognition of the critical role that bilateral donor agencies play is important, on the one hand in providing the majority of funds for peacebuilding globally, and on the other hand in creating enabling conditions, or not, for locally-led peacebuilding. The conditions are shaped by technocratic and political dynamics that often emphasize donor priorities, puts upward accountability before local accountability, allow international technical knowledge to override local knowledge and wisdom, and so on.

Another critical role in systems change is held by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) as they are well placed to both understand the dynamics of the global institutional framework that comprises the global peacebuilding system and the needs of local peacebuilders. INGOs often serve as intermediaries in support of locally-led peacebuilding and can navigate and negotiate changes in the system within this mandate and sphere of influence. Their ways of **influencing change in the 'upstream' chain of power, in combination with innovation in meeting the needs of locally-led peacebuilding**, is critically important for systems transformation to create a much more enabling environment for locally-led peacebuilding than what is the case today. As local actors and their needs are at the core of the change process, it is of course critically important that their perspectives take center-stage, however, it would be unreasonable to place the responsibility for change in international institutions on the shoulders of the people who are best placed to focus on peacebuilding rather than necessarily on global systems change.

A key characteristic of current approaches to systems change is that they are typically piece-meal **systems innovation efforts** undertaken in a particular context or a particular donor mechanism, and they **rarely translate into broader systems transformation**. If the different layers of an institutional framework or broader system do not support a particular kind of change – as for example in the case of developing innovative local accountability mechanisms – the change will remain peripheral and the mainstream way of working will continue. Thus, while there are multiple examples of promising approaches to systems innovation, the majority of the funding for peacebuilding is still channeled through mechanisms that are not providing a sufficiently enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding.

Sustainable actions to transform the global system of support will require complementary change among diverse actors in all layers of the system. It must build on the **complementarities of different approaches to systems change and take the leap into a broader transformational process**. Promising practices such as grant making mechanisms that ease bureaucratic red tape and enable small and medium sized flexible grants to locally-led peacebuilding efforts offer concrete examples of tried and tested approaches. Good practices also abound that unlock mutual learning and collaborative possibilities between local and global peacebuilding actors. Knowledge and leadership by local actors is created and claimed to accelerate our understanding of best practices of peacebuilding itself. At the international institutional level, new structures, principles and policies for support to locally-led peacebuilding lay a path to redefine concepts such as 'inclusion' and 'participation', additionally offering clear technocratic solutions to how international actors can enable locally-led peacebuilding. This diverse range of approaches, old and new, outline a **new era of promising practices** and underscores the current growing momentum to shift the current system of support to peacebuilding and the fundamental insight that at the core of sustainable peacebuilding is local leadership.

We offer a **fresh perspective on systems change that links innovative ways of direct support to locally-led peacebuilding with broader systems change efforts**. The latter must focus on structural, practice-oriented, and normative change within and among the institutions of the global peacebuilding system. By applying the Dragonfly Model previously developed by Conducive Space for Peace, we make an attempt to capture the complexity of systems change in a dynamic model that encompasses the embeddedness of different levels of systems change.

It depicts different but highly interrelated systems (at national and global levels), as well as the importance of focusing both at changing the current system while being able and willing to look to the future. As **the world is in flux** it will require equal attention to what a '**reimagined**' **peacebuilding system** would look like if local leadership in peacebuilding is at the core. The change process within the current system should be cross-fertilised by such future-oriented perspectives and approaches.

It is paramount that the international community seize this critical moment for change, seek complementarities with each other to align initiatives in pursuit of systems change and focus both on systems innovation within the current global system as well as on providing space for reimagining alternative structures and practices of collaboration to build and sustain peace. What we know is that things will change no matter what we do as peacebuilders, and the question is how we as systems change agents can best play a role in influencing these broader change dynamics in a direction that strengthens locally-led peacebuilding and thus a greater capacity to build and sustain peace.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Objective and overall content of report

This analysis is a snapshot of a global system in flux where momentum for change to shift power to local actors and provide better support for locally-led peacebuilding is gaining ground. With violent conflict at record high levels globally and conflict recurrence alarmingly high, the need to re-examine global approaches to peacebuilding and conflict prevention is ever more pressing.

This report offers a contribution to discussions on how the global system of support to locally-led peacebuilding can transform in such a way as to provide more enabling support to locally-led peacebuilding and thus better contribute to sustainable peace. The report provides an analysis of key organisations and actors that comprise the global peacebuilding system and examines how they either influence the environment for locally-led peacebuilding or hold the potential to do so.

Taking an explicit systems lens, the focus of analysis is the actors within the global peacebuilding system and their approaches of engagement; the who and the how rather than the what of peacebuilding. It is about how to support those who know what types of peacebuilding efforts are required in a given context, and how to understand what is required from international actors to provide a more enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding. The report aims to unpack ways of working that respect and enable such a space, including funding mechanisms that give flexibility and ownership to local peacebuilders, and programming processes that holds the knowledge of local peacebuilders at the core. By providing a snapshot review of approaches to support of locally-led peacebuilding, we hope to expand the scope for strategic dialogue on the multiple entry points for change and the imperative and potential to create complementarities between these different entry points so as to better enable a shift of power to locally-led peacebuilding.

Drawing on an analysis of actors and approaches in addition to a review of trends in the wider field of peace and development, we propose a call to action with key insights for the broader peacebuilding field. We offer these insights with the hope of supporting and encouraging actors within the global peacebuilding system who wish to pursue this change agenda.

This report draws on the analysis developed as part of creating a basis for the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH in developing a strategy for its global efforts to create a more enabling environment for locally-led peacebuilding.

The analysis begins in Chapter 2 by providing an overview of the status and trends in peacebuilding and specifically locally-led peacebuilding. This chapter unfolds a non-exhaustive review of the current key frameworks and policies that underpin the global peacebuilding system as we know it today, as well as providing an overview of key challenges and outlining some of the most common systemic dysfunctionalities of the current global system of support for locally-led peacebuilding.

Chapter 3 then builds on this analysis and takes a wider perspective on some of the emerging societal and geopolitical global trends within which the peace and development system operates, seeking to illuminate key areas to track which are likely to have an impact on systems change for locally-led peacebuilding.

Chapter 4 takes a deep dive into the global peacebuilding system, its structures, key actors, their potential for change and the critical importance of their interlinkages as it relates to support for locally-led peacebuilding. The importance of looking beyond institutional entities and to the change agents within and outside these entities is furthermore discussed.

Chapter 5 pivots to an analysis of a spectrum (nested paradigm) of different approaches of direct support to locally-led peacebuilding to broader systems change in the service of local peacebuilding. Furthermore, organisational approaches, or ways of working, that align with the values of and enable locally-led peacebuilding are discussed.

Chapter 6 provides some concluding remarks and a call to action charting out key insights on how to work towards systems change to increasingly enable the space for locally-led peacebuilding.


1.2 Analytical framework and methodology

Our analysis of the global peacebuilding system draws on a desk review and interviews conducted between November 2020 and February 2021, coupled with the collective institutional experiences and insights held by Conducive Space for Peace and its partners. Limitations to this should be noted, with the timeframe of the data collection and analysis being relatively limited, and the analysis conducted at a time when a lot of changes in the global peacebuilding system are taking place, in part due to the COVID-19 crisis as well as broader geopolitical changes (see Chapter 3). The analysis is thus a snapshot of the context of support to locally-led peacebuilding at this particular time, but we base the analysis on experiences of engaging in the global peacebuilding system in the past 25 plus years.

The report includes the following five analytical components (see Figure 1):

- Overview of the status of support to locally-led peacebuilding.
- Analysis of trends that influence locally-led peacebuilding.
- Examination of systems change and an analysis of international actors supporting locally-led peacebuilding.
- Overview of types of approaches to supporting locally-led peacebuilding including leverage points and complementarities among actors, approaches for systems change and ways of working.
- Call to action for the broader system of support to locally-led peacebuilding.

Figure 1: Analytical Framework



1.3 Use of key terms

The report builds on an understanding of **locally-led peacebuilding** as an approach in which the people involved in, and most affected by, violent conflict work together to create and enact their own solution to prevent, reduce, and/or transform the conflict, with the support they desire from outsiders. This approach to peacebuilding aims to amplify local ownership of conflict transformation. The understanding is based on the definition of Purdue University Peace Project. This publication also recognises the critical distinction between peacebuilding initiatives that are locally-led and owned, locally managed or locally implemented.¹

Peacebuilding is here understood as long-term processes to address the causes of violent conflict including structural violence, support of reconciliation and strengthening relations that create resilience to violence, and promotion of mechanism and processes for dealing with and transforming conflicts peacefully. These dimensions of peace are furthermore captured in the 8 Pillars of Peace as developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).² Peacebuilding is thus a process that aims to create sustainable or ‘positive’ peace rather than a seemingly stable situation, or ‘negative’ peace, where the underlying causes and polarised relations are brewing just below the surface.

The **global peacebuilding system** is understood as the various actors and institutions that influence the environment for locally-led peacebuilding and their ability to unfold their potential and promote sustainable peace. This includes community level and sub-national, national, regional, and international actors and institutions. In this report the focus will be on **international actors** and networks that influence locally-led peacebuilding beyond the national context. International actors include funders, INGOs, think tanks, and networks, many of which operate in the intersection between the different levels of engagement (please see Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the global peacebuilding system and the different actors within this system).

Local actors are here defined as civil society actors, state actors, and other actors within the national context with a role in promoting sustainable peace. Both community based civil society organisations (CSOs) and CSOs with a national outreach belong to this category of actors as well as government officials. The focus in this report is primarily on local civil society as it is predominantly these actors who face systemic challenges that infringe on their potential to promote sustainable peacebuilding. This analysis recognises that government entities hold a key

role in sustainable peacebuilding efforts, however they tend to operate in a different ecosystem of international support that holds different challenges and pathways for change which private foundations have much less scope to influence.

1.4 Who is behind this report?

Conductive Space for Peace (CSP) is an international NGO with its main office in Denmark. Its core mandate is to transform the global peacebuilding system to better enable locally-led peacebuilding, with the main aim of shifting power to local peacebuilders. CSP focuses on building momentum for change, supporting change agents in coming together to catalyse change, and engaging in systems innovation that can lead to transformative change. This for example entails co-creating a ‘reimagining peacebuilding’ process and facilitating a systems innovation platform with local peacebuilders, as well as developing conceptual frameworks and analysis that can inspire new ways of leveraging change.

The Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH is one of the major European foundations associated with a private company. It works in the areas of health, education, and global issues. With its charitable activities, it contributes to the development of viable solutions to social challenges. For this purpose, the Foundation implements its own projects, enters into alliances with partners, and supports third-party initiatives. Under the topic “Peace”, the Foundation will support locally-led peace efforts in selected regions while committing itself to a medium to long-term engagement. Furthermore, the Foundation wants to contribute to the sustainability of peace through shaping debates and activities within the international field of peacebuilding that support local actors and enhance locally-led approaches.

” In this report, we hope to expand the scope for strategic dialogue on the multiple entry points for change and the imperative and potential to create complementarities between these different entry points so as to better enable a shift of power to locally-led peacebuilding.

Chapter 2: Status and trends of support to locally-led peacebuilding

This chapter seeks to make an assessment of the current trends in the global peacebuilding ecosystem and their effects on the system of support to locally-led peacebuilding. While not exhaustive, this assessment captures important dynamics and sets of actors interacting in a rapidly changing space.

2.1 Peacebuilding in today's global conflict context

Peacebuilding is more important than ever, with 23 percent of the world's population currently living in fragile and conflict affected contexts and violent conflict at higher rates globally than at any time in the past 30 years.³ Since 2014, the increasing number of violent conflicts has led to a record high number of refugees, alongside increased trends in intercommunal violence, gender-based violence, and organised crime. Consequently, this interlinks with an increased level of structural violence and shrinking civic space in conflict affected contexts. Compounding these global political challenges and underlying drivers of conflict are the growing pressures from climate change and resource scarcity as seen in regions such as the Sahara, Lake Chad and Mozambique, where intensity of natural disasters is forcing increased displacement and inter-group tensions.⁴ Adding to this challenge, approximately half of all violent conflict episodes between 1989 and 2018 recur, with 20 percent recurring three or more times.⁵ The Global Peace Index also reflects such trends, showing that the level of global peacefulness deteriorated in 2020 for the ninth year in a row.⁶

” The unprecedented global COVID-19 crisis has sent shockwaves throughout conflict affected contexts and has further reaffirmed the importance and need for communities to be resilient and hold access to relevant and adequate international conflict prevention and peacebuilding support.

Meanwhile the implications of the COVID-19 crisis continue to unfold, already compounding these pre-existing multidimensional challenges in conflict affected contexts. The COVID-19 crisis, with the widely

unanswered calls for a global ceasefire,⁷ has led to the escalation of existing armed conflicts in regions across the globe⁸, further marginalisation, displacement, inequality and unemployment, alongside a rise in gender-based violence and closing of civic space.⁹ These immediate impacts of the COVID-19 crisis on peace and security are outlined in part by a reported global increase in state oppression by 30 percent and in certain regions by a marked increase in armed violence against civilians by state actors during the pandemic.¹⁰ As these trends indicate, the unprecedented global COVID-19 crisis has sent shockwaves throughout conflict affected contexts and has further reaffirmed the importance and need for communities to be resilient and hold access to relevant and adequate international conflict prevention and peacebuilding support.

With such global and local challenges to preventing conflict and sustaining peace, the global consensus recognising the importance of sustainability and prevention has increasingly crystallised. This growing consensus has been fuelled by a momentum to take stock of liberal peacebuilding approaches and development shortcomings, alongside a recognition for the need to rethink current ways of building peace in order to pursue sustainable and long-term prevention outcomes.¹¹ Funding for peacebuilding remains in a precarious state, as the peacebuilding community relies on a small number of donors thus leaving it uniquely vulnerable to shifts in aid priorities.¹² As a result, crises such as COVID-19 and other geopolitical shifts, may prompt shifts in donor interests at the expense of the communities that support to peacebuilding is intended to serve. Although many of these more existential challenges are well-known in the peacebuilding field and long predated COVID-19, these trends may be further exacerbated.

Nonetheless, the international community has come together to work towards a collective understanding of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, acknowledging its role as a central pillar of sustainable development and global collaboration. One of the most notable markers that highlights this shift is the UN's sustaining peace agenda, formalised by the twin 'peacebuilding resolutions' adopted in the UN General Assembly and Security Council in 2016 (A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282).

The sustaining peace agenda, the following resolutions on Youth Peace and Security (S/RES/2250 (2015) and S/RES/2535 (2020) as well as recent work such as the joint UN-World Bank 2018 study *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, present a clear call to action for inclusive peacebuilding, local leadership and engagement.¹³ Albeit critical elements of the inclusion discourse in these initiatives often lack nuance, particularly regarding questions on power and accountability. Other multilateral actors have followed suit with the European Union (EU) in its 2017 European Consensus on Development and the 2018 EU Council conclusions on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises, calling specifically for a further strengthening of conflict resolution capacities and support to local peace actors.¹⁴ More recently the EU has finalised adoption of the next Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, a completely restructured funding approach, that to the concern of some has done away with more targeted instruments such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) as well as other instruments focused on human rights.¹⁵ The EU Neighbourhood and International Development Cooperation Instrument aims to be more strategic and hold greater flexibility under the 'Stability and Peace' thematic pillar.¹⁶

” **Crises such as COVID-19 and other geopolitical shifts may prompt shifts in donor interests at the expense of the communities that funding for peacebuilding is intending to serve.**

Other international development actors are also increasing their calls for the explicit red thread of preventive action in all development cooperation efforts. The OECD-DAC highlighted this in their February 2019 *DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus* stating, “prevention always, development wherever possible, humanitarian action when necessary.”¹⁷ The OECD States of Fragility 2020 report builds on this notion, stressing that while peacebuilding is a field in its own right, preventing conflict and building peace is everyone’s responsibility. These reflections go on to further highlight the need for DAC members to double down on efforts to better prioritise prevention and peacebuilding in a manner that truly seeks to support long-term local capacity to address root causes of conflict.¹⁸ Peacebuilding and conflict prevention has also

now firmly been recognised by key international financial institutions as exhibited by the World Bank Group’s first ever specific *Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence 2020 – 2025*, which underscores yet again the essential role peacebuilding plays in the attainment of the SDGs. The inextricable link between peacebuilding and meeting the SDGs is continuously being reaffirmed. This is supported by the increasing evidence bearing out the widening gap in progress for key SDGs between fragile and non-fragile contexts.¹⁹ This trend is likely to continue throughout the forthcoming decade, and one that peacebuilding interventions will be critical in addressing.

Specific bilateral donors have also continued to cement their commitments to peacebuilding and conflict prevention in recent years. Germany, an increasingly prominent actor in the peacebuilding field, specifically underscored its commitment to peacebuilding in the 2017 guidelines on ‘preventing crises, resolving conflicts, building peace’,²⁰ and continues to act on these commitments as seen for example in leading support for the UN Peacebuilding Fund.²¹ Sweden, a long-committed donor to peacebuilding, whose adamant policy support dates back to the 2001 Gothenburg Summit, has remained a steadfast donor in support of a people-centred and inclusive peacebuilding policy with their continued commitment articulated in their 2017 Strategy for Sustainable Peace.²² The United States, a top peacebuilding donor,²³ has similarly taken recent strides in recognition of the importance of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, passing the Global Fragility Act (GFA) in 2019 which seeks to take a multisectoral integrated approach to ensure peacebuilding and conflict prevention are at the centre of a “comprehensive government approach to prevent global conflict”.²⁴ On the other hand, The United Kingdom (UK), a long-time peacebuilding donor, has shown trends to jeopardise its peacebuilding commitments with formerly independent Department for International Development (DFID) now merged into the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). The merger, finalised in 2020, leaves many open questions and has raised significant concerns among leading peacebuilding INGOs and experts who say this may constrain the ability of the UK to contribute to an effective, long-term response to violent conflict, potentially diminishing support to civil society and local communities working to build peace.²⁵

Private foundations have also moved with greater purpose into the peacebuilding space, increasing their profile and

expressing significant interest in global commitments to both prevention and peacebuilding support.²⁶ Foundations such as Humanity United, the Ford Foundation and the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH, in addition to funders groups such as the Peace and Security Funders Group (PSFG) have increasingly come forward with strong endorsements in support of peacebuilding and specifically locally-led peacebuilding to achieve sustainable peace and meet the SDGs.²⁷

2.2 Global momentum for locally-led peacebuilding

With sustainable peacebuilding firmly on the global development agenda, the international community has taken significant strides to begin to unpack what sustainability truly means, increasingly recognising the central role local actors need to hold to take forward sustainable peacebuilding and conflict prevention. A series of specific initiatives and dialogues have converged on systems change for locally-led peacebuilding centred on a core understanding of the need to rethink systemic approaches. Recently established funds focused on flexibility and meaningful local actor support highlight this continued growing attention by the international community to seek out approaches to overcome core challenges to funding in more equitable ways conducive to local peacebuilding.²⁸

Although currently growing rapidly, this normative and policy recognition for local leadership in development and peacebuilding is by no means new, with key debates on ownership by conflict affected countries dating back to the First High Level Forum (Rome, 2002) and the *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the New Deal)*, adopted at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, now having taken place over a decade ago. The adoption of the *Sustainable Development Goals* in 2015 has likewise given significant recognition of the centrality of local leadership in the development and peacebuilding space specifically through Goal 16 (*Peace, Justice and Strong institutions*), Goal 17 (Partnerships) and Goal 10 (*Reduced Inequalities*). This is underscored by the Leave no one behind (LNOB) principle,²⁹ a promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals that seeks to tackle discrimination and rising inequalities within and amongst countries. More recently the 2018 and later the 2020 UN Secretary General reports on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace have specifically outlined that

community engagement through local civil society actors is a central component of peacebuilding and sustaining peace and has called for wide ranging efforts to strengthen this work. These analyses additionally continue to reaffirm the understanding that peace is more sustainable when peacebuilding efforts are locally owned, led and implemented.

” **There is global recognition for the need to adopt stronger normative approaches to explicitly place dignity and local leadership at the forefront.**

The broader development system has proved equally fertile for such frameworks, with some of the most prominent and recent frameworks including the Agenda for Humanity (2016), the Grand Bargain (2016), New Ways of Working (2017), the Charter for Change (2015), the Core Humanitarian Standard (2014), and the Busan Partnership (2008), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the Paris Declaration (2005), alongside unofficial institutional frameworks such as Doing Development Differently (DDD) and Thinking and Working Politically (TWP). Through a focus on the policy practices of donors and other key actors in the aid system, these frameworks aim to reshape the top-down humanitarian, peacebuilding, and development system into one that is locally driven and led, and designed around equitable, dignified and accountable partnership.

The evidence base that grounds our empirical understanding of the effectiveness of locally-led peacebuilding has also continued to grow, reaffirming and adding depth to the conventional wisdom that locally-led peacebuilding is an essential element of global conflict prevention and peacebuilding practice.³⁰ Furthermore, such evidence indicates that greater adaption and support for locally-led peacebuilding practices would lead to more effective and sustainable peacebuilding processes.³¹ These findings underscore the fact that sustainable and therefore effective peacebuilding is not to be imposed by internationals, but must be driven by people and institutions in a given context.³² This is due to the fact that local actors are best placed to understand the causes, drivers and the most effective and creative opportunities to find solutions to root causes of conflict. Local actors have legitimacy, convening power and the capacity to mobilise a society's resources and can see these long-term strategies through, providing the sustained efforts over time that are required.

Such findings do not point to an irrelevance of international actors or a romanticisation of the 'local'. Local organisations in conflict affected countries are as prone to the challenges of politisation, competition, insufficient accountability structures, etc. as organisations elsewhere, and these must be taken into consideration when developing support structures and partnerships. However, the above findings indicate that to best support sustainable peace there is a critical need for the international community to ask; how best to create a conducive space for collaboration and genuine complementarity that provides adequate and relevant support for local actors to lead efforts to build sustainable peace? Such engagement will therefore be most relevant in promoting sustainable peacebuilding if it addresses the imbalances of power between internationals, elites, and local actors both nationally and at the community level.

2.3 Rhetoric and Reality: Shortcomings of the international system to support locally-led peacebuilding

Despite the global commitment to prevent conflict and build peace, the key trends outlined earlier show that the world remains highly challenged in building sustainable peace writ large.³³ Key indicators underpinning this persistent challenge of achieving sustainable peace become evident with the increasingly widening fragility gap over the past decade. In addition, key metrics of the SDGs in conflict affected contexts currently indicate little progress or a backsliding in achievement of the goals relating to peacebuilding, partnerships and inequality.³⁴

There are no doubt many reasons why the world is incredibly challenged in effectively building sustainable peace in conflict affected contexts. However, one reason for such peacebuilding challenges overshadows the rest. The main barrier to building sustainable peace relates to how the international system of support to peacebuilding currently does not support local agency and power as well as it could, specifically with regards to locally-led peacebuilding. The gap between rhetoric and reality remains significant. For example, the 2016 Grand Bargain commitment of 25 percent of humanitarian aid funding to be channelled as 'directly as possible' has shown discouraging results. In the period between 2016 and 2020, the share of direct funding to local and national actors has in fact declined from 3.5 percent in 2016 to 2.1 percent in 2020.³⁵ Recognition of the importance of 'locally-led' has gained particular momentum starting in

the early 2010s, with the 'local' followed by the 'pragmatic' turn in peacebuilding. This notion was highlighted both in policy and in scholarly debates recognising the existential challenges faced by internationally-driven approaches, combined with market liberalisation and democracy, which called for a re-engagement with local actors and peacebuilding.³⁶

Regardless of the growing list of comprehensive international policy frameworks, locally-led peacebuilding remains highly 'under-operationalised' within the global peacebuilding system with its support remaining tenuous. A June 2020 report by Conducive Space for Peace found that during COVID-19 local peacebuilders were almost twice as likely to have suspended their activities in contrast to their international NGO colleagues, highlighting the drastic power and resource disparities that continue to persist.³⁷ As a local peacebuilder expresses: "As local peacebuilders often rely on project-oriented funding, and in the current context of the pandemic much of this work cannot be continued, local peacebuilders do not have the flexibility or the funding to adjust and respond to the critical needs affecting their communities."³⁸

” There is currently a lack of documentation on what proportion of funding goes to local peacebuilders.

While it remains clear that the international system of support to locally-led peacebuilding continues to fall short in its normative commitments to support to locally-led peacebuilding, it is also falling short regarding availability and quality of funds. Although it is difficult to present an accurate measure of the size of global peacebuilding expenditures, calculations show that in 2016 only approximately 1 percent of total aid went to peacebuilding,³⁹ and while humanitarian spending went up by almost 70 percent between 2012 and 2017, the increase in peacebuilding spending was much lower (approximately 25 percent). Yet, we know that 80 percent of humanitarian needs are driven by conflict. Specifically, institutional funding and lack thereof has been pointed to as being a key destabilising factor for local peacebuilding organisations, further exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis. A 2020 survey conducted by the UN Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund (WPHF) found that 44 percent of the local women's organisations surveyed are at risk of not being able to sustain themselves because of limited institutional funding.⁴⁰ Adding to these numbers, it is

documented that peacebuilding is cost-effective both if measured on peacebuilding outcomes and the impact on the global economy, by a ratio of 1:16.⁴¹

There is currently a lack of documentation on what proportion of funding goes to local peacebuilders. The OECD-DAC data does not allow a registration of the amount of funding that reaches local organisations. Only few studies have tried to uncover the amount of funding that ‘trickles’ down to local organisations, often only focusing on specific contexts in their scope. In the peacebuilding field the only example known to this inquiry is among US-based foundations self-reporting on these numbers, thus no hard evidence is available on a global scale.

2.4 Unpacking the current dysfunctions of the global peacebuilding system

While the global system of support to peacebuilding struggles to provide adequate, clear on-the-ground support, impacts are felt everyday by locally-led peacebuilding initiatives. Presented below are a summation of some of the most common and constricting dysfunctions of the current system of support as experienced by local peacebuilders. These trends are a result of research and consultations conducted by Conducive Space for Peace over the past five years.

Transactional, one-sided power relationships rather than actual partnership: Technical experts and technocratic approaches override the knowledge of local experts who have strong contextual knowledge and local networks. The majority of funding is provided through a discourse of ‘partnerships’ yet such relationships tend to lack equity and are transactional, with donors holding key decision-making powers. Such dynamics limit opportunities for two-way learning, and for local and national actors to directly own and represent their work and to shape and steer the work as the changes in context require, instead often most focused on meeting pre-set priorities and policy directions.

Lack of downwards accountability: Donors and implementing organisations are characterised by large global bureaucracies with ‘field’ offices, led by expatriates who rotate frequently, which is not conducive for continuity and long-term peacebuilding efforts. The peacebuilding funding and support priorities are often influenced by foreign policy imperatives of donors rather than the needs of local actors and context. Processes of upward accountability often overrides accountability to local communities and actors.

Disconnect between policies and practices: despite the many global peacebuilding policy statements to promote inclusive and locally driven peacebuilding efforts, and institutional policies to support them, there is a significant gap between these policies and peacebuilding support in practice. Furthermore, local participation in policy-making or decision-making processes at the global level is often tokenistic or extractive, therefore lacks genuine inclusion and participation.

Local organisations (with specific knowledge on what it takes to promote peace in a specific context) face difficulty accessing funds: Donors often set funding requirements in ways that do not align with local actors’ capacity, for example, proposals required in non-native language, and cumbersome administrative processes to qualify for funding.

Local peacebuilders seen as implementers: Due to the patterns listed above, and due to donors themselves having limited capacity to administer small funds, peacebuilding funds are often dispensed through larger consortia models favouring international organisations, resulting in local peacebuilders being sub-contracted as implementers and service providers, rather than being leaders, partners and central stakeholders.

Current requirements for programming constrain collaboration: Requirements for program management, procurement, budgeting, and monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) constrain opportunities to develop programs in collaboration with and under the leadership of local partners, tailor them to the context, and jointly apply lessons learned to ongoing implementation practices.

Donor requirements on fiscal compliance and risk mitigation: Fiscal compliance and risk mitigation requirements required by a large share of donors in addition to those regarding programming greatly restrict access to donor funding even when such funding is earmarked for local organisations. Such challenges are increasingly addressed through dialogue on ‘shared risk’ and ‘transfer of risk’ that explore more creative solutions, such as ‘risk pooling’.

Results based management inhibits flexibility, adaptation and innovation: Requirements for pre-defined frameworks that steer implementation processes make it more difficult to take advantage of windows of opportunity, adaptation to changing conditions, testing of innovative approaches and joint learning.

Lack of funding predictability and timeframes not fit for purpose: It is difficult to secure reliable funding for long-term peacebuilding processes. Short-term and transitional programmes often present a mismatch between timeframes of such efforts and the time needed to see impact in that context. Programmes are often not designed to adequately address the complex socio-political dynamics present in those contexts.

Chapter 3: Societal trends that influence support to locally-led peacebuilding

This section seeks to examine the broader system that surrounds it as well as the structures and norms that create the conditions within which the global peacebuilding system operates.

3.1 The COVID-19 crisis

The COVID-19 crisis has brought forth a new level of critique and concern for the future of peacebuilding. This includes a recent overall drop by bilateral donors in their aid commitments by 17 percent between 2019 and 2020 overall,⁴² while concerns persist regarding increasingly constrained civic space and exacerbated conflict dynamics. Funding for development aid must increasingly defend itself against what some analysts worry is a zero-sum approach to division of aid budgets where peacebuilding funding, like all thematic funding areas, now rely on their respective advocates, “to clearly demonstrate how investments in their sector can contribute to avoiding or mitigating the impact of the next pandemic threat or otherwise risk losing access to funding if ODA budgets remain flat or decrease”.⁴³ The COVID-19 crisis pulls back the curtain on this emerging trend of politicisation of aid and peacebuilding and may only be the tip of the iceberg, where aid must increasingly align itself and justify its ends explicitly through specific donor country foreign policy aims. This trend is not new as the development and peacebuilding sectors have had to grapple with framing their work around key foreign policy concerns such as terrorism and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) framings popularised in the 2000s.

On the operational side, the more immediate shifts in funding have also highlighted an all too frequent practice where thematic funding shifts based on priority adjustments often are made at the donor HQ level. This leaves local actors in conflict affect countries to make the case for their work in a new policy context led by HQ priorities and not the on-the-ground realities. Such exacerbation of systemic disqualification, with regards to support for peacebuilding and development, are likely to have significant long term consequences for local peacebuilders and their capacity to sustain their work.

3.2 Anti-racism and decolonisation

Over the past decade global discussions on racism and decolonisation of aid have increasingly come to the forefront, not least in the development sector. However, within the past year these discussions have taken an ever-increasing turn to call out and explicitly recognise the underlying power dynamics inherent in the current global ‘order’ and ways of working. While not new to the institutional actors who have examined systemic challenges, questions of accountability, knowledge generation, and inclusion, these discussions rarely broached the explicit topic of systemic racism. However, this rapidly evolved following the May 25th, 2020 killing of George Floyd in the United States, spurring a global reckoning on racism, most prominently linked to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. As the BLM movement fuelled global discussions, a flurry of intra-organisational and powerful public facing discussions have begun to unpack policy jargon and euphemisms that characterised the lack of space to discuss such problems openly.⁴⁴ Such discussions have increasingly led the development community to come face-to-face with their dark past of colonialism and the deeply persistent veins of racism that continue to thrive in society and within the aid sector to this day.⁴⁵ More broadly, these emerging global discussions on systemic racism no doubt hold a central role in navigating a path towards a bolder and more just future of global aid.

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What this emerging trend means for the peacebuilding and wider development system remains an open question. However, signs indicate that there will be repercussions that may significantly impact the how and the who of development support globally. As the majority of these implications begin to filter down through international policy, certain institutions such as the EU have begun to acknowledge the problem of racism within European institutions. As demonstrated through a new EU anti-racism action plan for 2020-2025, it is acknowledged that “[r]acism is a global problem and it is important that the internal and external actions of the EU to

prevent and combat racism are coherent and mutually reinforce each other,” stating that “the Commission and the High Representative will seek to further strengthen partnerships with key international, regional and bilateral partners towards a new revitalised approach to the anti-racism agenda”.⁴⁶ There is a tendency that governments in Western donor countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom may undergo a change in political culture. This may well hold potential for significant shifts yet may continue to disappoint activists given the slow pace and often non-transformative inclinations of such institutional actors.

Private foundations can and have moved much more rapidly. Candid reports that more than 200 funders have pledged \$5 billion in grants for racial equity (this being primarily in the US) since the resurgence of the BLM movement, a figure that is greater than what foundations granted for racial equity in the previous 11 years combined.⁴⁷ The decolonising aid and anti-racist agenda provides a new opportunity to gain greater clarity on how support to peacebuilding is inextricably linked to and furthers other work around equity and social justice. This is a notion that may be critical to attracting increased funding from private sector actors including private philanthropic organisations whose institutional incentives may be more accommodating to such drivers.⁴⁸

With regard to the peacebuilding and development sector, the potential of impacting dimensions such as partnerships and ways of working are becoming increasingly apparent due to their linkages and opportunities to amplify pre-existing discussions on power and inequality. In addition, discussions on partnerships and ways of working hold significant relevance to locally-led peacebuilding support. The #ShiftThePower movement and more technocratic policy agendas such as the ‘localisation’ agenda⁴⁹ are also key examples of clear inroads to further trends of change that will continue to expand in the development and peacebuilding space alongside the decolonise aid discussions. Continued momentum behind such discussions holds significant potential to effect key parameters such as the levels of structural accommodation for diversity held within organisations. Furthermore, this trend may lead to a more critical assessment of to what degree external facing approaches to support for peacebuilding and development adhere to or deviate from principles such as dignity and equity. Some of the large INGO confederations are already signalling their intent to address such challenges⁵⁰ amidst the broader existential crisis INGO confederations already are finding themselves in as they work to adapt to a new global context.⁵¹ Partnerships are also already being re-examined with momentum from broader societal discussions where principles of trust are

hailed as essential cornerstones to how actors can engage with dignity and equity.⁵² These trends are all likely to have concrete implications for international actors including a decrease in expatriate ‘field presence’, a trend identified also prior to the COVID-19 crisis.⁵³

3.3 Evolving domestic political and bureaucratic cultures in donor countries

Over the past decade the marked rise in populism, particularly in donor countries as well as globally, has dramatically shifted the political landscape promulgating an often nativist vision of the world locked in conflict with outsiders and establishment elites. Such a trend has manifested itself in a series of European governments such as Italy, Germany, the UK, Sweden and Poland as well as in countries like the United States, Brazil, India and Indonesia to name a few. An analysis from 2018 reported over 20 ‘populist leaders’ holding executive office worldwide,⁵⁴ part of what now is firmly established as a global trend of democratic backsliding.⁵⁵ Such tendencies impact the global development and peacebuilding system as the anti-establishment and socio-economic forms of populism arising within the public constituencies of key donor countries place significant pressure on government institutions to direct their work towards more explicitly nationalist aims.

In such a context development cooperation sits precariously. Given the peacebuilding system's tendency to lean on principles of multilateralism and global cooperation, these underlying principles are finding themselves increasingly litigated in the domestic political space to justify its existence. Sweden has proved an apt case study of such phenomena, demonstrating a shift on the political spectrum in the run up to the 2018 elections. Here the right-wing party the Sweden Democrats were able to shift the political debate away from economic and public service focused discussions, pressuring other parties to exhibit less forgiving law, order, and immigration focused policies. Stricter migration and asylum policies bear out in exemplifying how paradigm shifts on such issues can evolve rapidly as a result.⁵⁶

” **Bureaucratic procedures around compliance, risk mitigation and results-based management inhibits flexibility, contextualisation, adaptation and innovation in support to locally-led peacebuilding.**

Such trends among public consistencies have furthermore had profound effects on fundamental components of bureaucratic cultures in donor countries, none perhaps

more significant than that of New Public Management. This practice has rapidly increased in the past decade in the global development system. It has raised new critical questions about the transformational impact of such changes – both in relation to local accountability, sustainability and effectiveness – particularly as they intersect with an increasingly professionalised, technocratic field of development and peacebuilding. Bureaucratic procedures around compliance, risk mitigation and results-based management thereby inhibits the flexibility, contextualisation, adaptation and innovation that would be favourable in supporting locally-led peacebuilding.

More recent public debates are explicitly recognising the challenges reinforced by a value for money lens that often mimics private sector practices emphasising a financial ‘bottom line’ and ‘efficiencies’. Public servants, academics and policy makers alike have increasingly begun to question these dynamics, recognising that complex topics require different and more adaptive ways of working.⁵⁷

3.4 Geopolitical shifts and a multi-polar world

When looking beyond domestic political cultures in donor countries, it is evident that the current geopolitical order is in flux. A multi-polar world where the conceptualisation of the ‘Western-led’ international order is being challenged while rules-based and multilateral approaches are being questioned. Recent events in the Global North including the Trump era in the United States, Brexit in the UK coupled with a rising China and assertive Russia, have underscored this evolving landscape and raise existential questions for the multilateral rules-based world within which much of the global development system resides.⁵⁸ Such geopolitical trends have demonstrated wavering commitments to flagship multilateral institutions such as the World Health Organisation and multilateral agreements and commitments like the Paris Climate Accord. It is stress testing the legitimacy and resilience of multilateralism⁵⁹ with critical implications for the wellbeing of multilateral development and peacebuilding institutions and the durability and relevance of recent key commitments such as the New Deal and the Sustainable Development Goals.

One particularly intriguing angle to these geopolitical developments of autocratisation and democratic backsliding is the increasing space for new types of mutual-learning based partnerships among nations that hold shared goals. New unfolding dynamics seen in the Global North with clear affronts to core democratic values

is in part also fostering an understanding of the many shared common challenges among democratic nations globally, both in the Global South and North.⁶⁰ This will surely be a space to watch as this has already been playing out in contexts such as European Union and African Union partnership negotiations where the directional ‘aid’ relationship is increasingly litigated.⁶¹

Climate change, one of the most significant global crises of our time, must additionally be recognised for its interplay with not only conflict dynamics, but with greater global collaboration efforts. While tensions are arising relating to the unequal impact climate change will have on countries in the Global South, the climate crisis has presented unique opportunities and inroads into critical debates on the interplay between power structures and climate crisis resilience, furthermore fostering climate resilient peace.⁶² The implications of such discussions are nascent, however may present the climate change policy space as a growing field to place increasing pressure on global governors to confront and be compelled to address global inequality more directly in partnerships and multilateral fora.

3.5 Developments in digitalisation and information and communication technology

Developments in digitalisation and information and communication technology continue to have profound effects across society, economies, conflict systems and on the global development system in profound ways. Perhaps none more significant than on the ways of working and collaborating, offering seemingly profound opportunities for innovation and free exchange of information, knowledge, and ideas. The rapid rise of high-speed internet access, social media platforms and the relentless uptake of digital collaboration and communication tools across the globe presents a critical turning point in the digital space for conflicts and the ways they can be resolved.

” **Developments in digitalisation and information and communication technology continue to have profound effects across society, economies, conflict systems and on the global development system in profound ways.**

In the global development and peacebuilding space, this has meant discussions on impacts of digitalisation on inclusion and participation, recognising the seemingly boundless possibilities yet high degree of risks to

exacerbating existing power relations. This increasingly well documented digital divide falls all too often along the lines of socio-economic class and gender.⁶³ Enticing new opportunities for inclusion and dialogue have however clearly presented themselves as potentially game changing, with for example local peacebuilders briefing the UN Security Council from a refugee camp in Uganda,⁶⁴ and increasing ease to hold consultations with hundreds of peacebuilders from across the globe on key emerging peacebuilding issues.⁶⁵ Additionally, there is much potential to explore possibilities of transcending not just geographic but also linguistic boundaries, unlocking greater trans-local learning and sharing between communities across their respective country contexts or around the globe.

” There is much potential to explore possibilities of transcending not just geographic but also linguistic boundaries, with unlocking greater trans-local learning between communities.

The dark side of digital ‘inclusion’ and participation have however also increasingly become apparent. This has raised broader questions of legitimacy, where online participation for example in state-led public consultations becomes a box-ticking exercise when those in power have their camera off and control the mute button, and holds the power to directly monitor the space.⁶⁶ Another broader power relations concern brought on through digitalisation is that it places increasingly significant power with private sector actors who are often on the front lines of regulating this space and lack any direct accountability to their users. This leads to key questions on the role such actors can play in peacebuilding and their interrelation with the agency and power of local peacebuilders.

Increasing digitalisation of communication has furthermore led to increased concern that digital communication can have a significant potential to directly impact conflict dynamics and civic space, increasing polarisation in communities and at the national level. From hate speech to political disinformation campaigns as seen from Rakhine State in Myanmar all the way to the United States Capitol in Washington D.C. Such worrying trends of increased polarisation and conflict in the digital space itself begs to question the role and potential digital peacebuilding holds.⁶⁷ To what degree can digital communication strengthen relations and build trust, and what will the implications of these tools and approaches for local leadership and power in peacebuilding be?⁶⁸ Particularly for the entirety of 2020, where planned face-to-face engagement for peacebuilding processes was almost completely replaced by digital communication both at local, national, regional, and global levels due to COVID-19, it remains to be seen what long-term effects this shift to digital tools will have for future relations and communication practices in peacebuilding.

Taking stock of some of the most prominent geopolitical, social, and economic dynamics and trends that comprise the broader landscape within which locally-led peacebuilding is embedded, it is evident that this is a time for global change which can both create opportunities and barriers for change. What we know is that things will change, and the question is how change agents can best play a role in influencing these broader change dynamics in a direction that strengthens locally-led peacebuilding.

Chapter 4: Types of actors and their potential for change

In order to unpack the dynamics underlying the ability of international actors to provide sufficiently adequate and relevant support to locally-led peacebuilding, it is critical to take a systems perspective. Unpacking the overall roles, capacities and linkages among different types of actors within the global peacebuilding system is key to understanding the underlying challenges and opportunities to providing the most enabling support for locally-led peacebuilding. As depicted in figure two the global peacebuilding system is comprised of bilateral donor agencies, multilateral institutions, regional institutions, private foundations, think tanks, INGOs, governments, state institutions, national NGOs and local peacebuilders in addition to a range of other actors.

4.1 Types of key actors in the global peacebuilding system


This sub-section walks through a series of key actors in the system outlining the roles they hold in either inhibiting or enabling locally-led peacebuilding. The following sub-section will explain the logic of considering diverse actors

within the global peacebuilding system holding influence, either positive or negative, on creating an enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding. This section does not aim to elaborate the entirety of actors relevant in creating an enabling environment for locally-led peacebuilding, but homes in on those actors who hold a critical role in the chains of global support. The point is not to identify who is better or better placed to facilitate change but rather how different types of institutions (and change agents within these institutions) can complement one another for broader systems change.

4.1.1 Bilateral donors

Bilateral donors, primarily defined here as ministries and state agencies focused on aid and development cooperation including peacebuilding, are the largest upstream actors in the global peacebuilding system. It is through these entities that over 90 percent of peacebuilding funding tagged Official Development Assistance (ODA) is channelled through.⁶⁹ Bilateral donors manage some of the largest funds, and due to the institutional and human resource changes over the past ten years typically

Figure 2: Key actors in the global peacebuilding system



lack capacity to manage smaller funds. To a degree this is a conscious choice to do away with in-house support for fund management mechanisms, outsourcing this to private firms and contractors, increasing efficiency in their ability to distribute funds, however creating a dynamic where preference sits with giving large grants versus many smaller ones. Such an approach to minimise in house support has not always been the case but has gradually become the norm. Within the ‘chain of influence’ of the current global peacebuilding system (see section 4.2), they are nonetheless under significant pressure from their respective constituencies, members of parliament or congress and the general population who over the past years have applied increasing pressure on the donor agency to document impact, hold to a minimum level of financial ‘risk’, and pursue national (donor) interests through their funding mechanism.

The immediate outlook for bilateral donor funding for peacebuilding is complex, however most recent projections paint a relatively bleak picture. ODA for peacebuilding in the past ten years has increased 76 percent between 2009 to 2018, compared with 23 percent for peace and security and 45 percent for total aid. Despite this recent steady increase in ODA for peacebuilding, the actual amount of peacebuilding aid is significantly lower than other sectors. Peacebuilding aid is particularly vulnerable to donor trends that reprioritise funding away from areas that demand long-term engagement and hold challenges in documenting tangible results. This trend has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis.⁷⁰ Rising geopolitical tensions and evolving political cultures in donor countries and rising populism, coupled with continued domestic events in donor countries linked to migration and violent extremism are all predicted to influence bilateral donors’ support for peacebuilding as peacebuilding risks are becoming ‘securitised’.⁷¹

Peacebuilding aid is particularly vulnerable to donor trends that reprioritise funding away from areas that demand long-term engagement.

Beyond peacebuilding specific funding, trend predictions for broader aid is expected to be significantly impacted in the short and medium term by COVID-19 related reprioritisation, as it has already been reported that bilateral donors decreased their aid commitments by 17 percent between 2019 and 2020 overall.⁷² A drop of such a nature will entail cancellation of new grants and funding opportunities while bilateral donors explore options and political priorities. These trends have direct implications for the sustainability and way of working of international, national, and sub-national and community-based NGOs. Additionally, decreased ODA will likely lead to a further decrease in the ability of such donors to administer smaller funds that can reach small local organisations, thus shifting funding to larger organisations such as INGOs and multilateral donors, with capacity to manage larger grants, a trend that already exists and is likely to

grow. These trends reflect the broader systemic shifts that have taken place within development cooperation over the past 10 years that have entailed a marked reduction in donor capacity to manage the types of grants - and their modalities of managing risks, accountability, results-monitoring, and partnership relations to name a few - that would be more likely to reach and benefit locally-led peacebuilding.⁷³

An increasing number of donors have developed ‘departments’ or programmes with the aim of exploring and potentially supporting innovative funding mechanisms and support modalities for locally-led peacebuilding.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, bilateral donors have increasingly ‘streamlined’ their development and peacebuilding support around New Public Management ways of working, which means less possibility to design programmes based on the needs identified by local peacebuilders, less flexibility in programming due to pre-set criteria for success in an elaborate results framework, and tender processes that are not amenable to locally-led peacebuilding.

However, during the past five years in particular, an increasing number of bilateral donors have developed ‘departments’ or programmes with the aim of exploring and potentially supporting innovative funding mechanisms and support modalities for locally-led peacebuilding. These include bilateral donor initiatives such as USAID’s Local Works program, launched in 2015, which aims to drive innovation and experimentation in locally-led development, or the UK FCDO’s ‘Shifting the Power’; a project that ran between 2015-2017 which funded partnerships with 55 local and national NGOs aiming at shifting the balance of power to a more locally-led humanitarian response system in Bangladesh, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Pakistan. In country-offices of bilateral donor agencies as well as among embassies, there are several examples of innovative support structures including how Global Affairs Canada in Mali currently are leading a coordination mechanism between international and national actors where the space is co-owned rather than internationally dominated. Another example being how the Swedish and Norwegian MFAs have committed to providing long term support and funding in the peace process in Colombia. So far these systems innovations have not been able to create broader systems transformation in and of themselves and while recognising their important contributions they should be seen as potentials for change rather than change itself.

4.1.2 Multilateral institutions

Multilateral institutions, be it the United Nations or the European Union, are likewise critical upstream actors who hold significant power and autonomy, however their mandates are determined largely by the bilateral donors that fund them and the host countries they negotiate

agreements of support with. They are thus often indirectly, and increasingly influenced by the same challenges of the bilateral donors including a focus on upward accountability, limited flexibility, and programming and reporting requirements not conducive for local peacebuilders. Likewise, alignment with the host government of the conflict affected country often increases the barriers for multilateral institutions in supporting local peacebuilding actors. They also sometimes face restraints on which local actors they can work with and where. This is a particularly pressing concern in conflict zones where many locally-led peacebuilding civil society actors may not be considered aligned with the government in power's aspirations for the peacebuilding process or its longer-term implications.

It is important to recognise that these multilateral institutions vary significantly in their ways of working and governance structures. They often have rigid ways of working through their practices and structures which can greatly inhibit their ability to learn, adapt and respond to needs of locally-led peacebuilding. On the other hand, they have an infrastructure and access to information that can provide key understandings of the interests and needs of locally-led peacebuilding. Simultaneously, multilateral actors hold significant responsibilities over fund management for peacebuilding, with the UNDP being the key UN agency to undertake this work, many times also on behalf of other UN agencies and bilateral donors.

” The trend of ODA channelling through multilaterals is estimated to continue to increase. This means that the ways of working of multilateral institutions in providing an enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding remains important.

In 2018, multilateral organisations were the main channel of ‘delivery’ for peacebuilding ODA, with an increase from 22 percent in 2009 to 37 percent by 2018.⁷⁴ The proportion of this funding that reaches different local actors in peacebuilding is unknown as such information is currently not documented (as is the case for all OECD-DAC donor institutions and intermediaries). However, as UN funding is to a lesser extent aimed at supporting civil society and to a larger extent aimed at supporting on the one hand the operations of UN agencies in-country and on the other hand state institutions, there is likely to be less funding for local civil society actors as a consequence. This trend of ODA channelling through multilaterals is estimated to continue to increase. This means that the ways of working of multilateral institutions in providing an enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding remains important. In part it is predicted to be spurred on by funder dynamics as a result of the COVID-19 crisis, as bilateral donors look for rapid ways to disburse funds and seek options that meet their restricted fund management capacities. As with bilateral donor institutions, part of the funding for peacebuilding is channelled through central (HQ led) funding mechanisms while another part is channelled through country offices.

Examples of systems innovation in ways of working to support locally-led peacebuilding include funding mechanisms for civil society (as local civil society is often not the main target group for UN organisations). Prominent practices that run from an HQ level include the Youth Promotion Initiative (YPI), the Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund (WPHF) and the Gender Promotion Initiative (GPI) of the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF). UNPBF expanded its scope in 2016 to include proposals from civil society with outreach expanded beyond the UN entities, in order to increase collaboration with and direct funding to civil society in the Global South. The WPHF has also specifically brought forward innovations including the the Rapid Response Window (RRW) on Women's Participation in Peace Processes which seeks to addresses technical and logistical barriers faced by women and local civil society organizations in participating meaningfully in peace processes. There are additionally several civil society targeted funds being tested within an overall framework of UNPBF implementation at country-level, including within the framework of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund and the 'Promoting Peacebuilding through Small Grants Initiatives' launched by UNPBF in Guinea-Bissau which provides community-level youth and women's groups direct access to small funds to address obstacles to building peace in their communities.

4.1.3 Private foundations

Private foundations have a somewhat different character in the global peacebuilding system in comparison to the bilateral and multilateral donors. While providing as a sector relatively little funding to peacebuilding relative to their total share of funding for development, they are often more explicitly value-driven and operate with and hold fewer institutional incentives to maintain structures that can have a negative influence on locally-led peacebuilders when compared to their multilateral or bilateral donor peers. Funding from private foundations however is limited as an analysis of 2018 private funding specifically noted that peace and security grant making represented just 0.9 percent (376.8 million USD) of the \$33 billion provided by foundations,⁷⁵ with a recent survey of 435 philanthropic funders also showing that only 18 percent of these funders invest in peace.⁷⁶ In addition, funding for specifically locally-led peacebuilding has also been relatively low with the largest 1,000 private foundation in the United States, between 2011 and 2015, providing USD 35 billion in international grants, however with only 12 percent going directly to local organisations that were based in the country where programmes were implemented.⁷⁷ It should however be recognised that there is no indication that this is lower than the numbers of bilateral and multilateral donors if efforts among these institutions had been made to document this relative distribution of funds. As indicated earlier, this is not part of the information recorded and shared through the OECD-DAC recording of ODA or other publicly available data.

Despite these past trends in the philanthropic community, there are indications of a shifting of norms. A new generation

of dedicated private foundations with mandates that commit themselves to exploring new modalities of funding for locally-led peacebuilding have begun embracing a systems change approach to their goals for change.⁷⁸ A trend of increasing flexibility and a desire to test limits and time frames of traditional donor grantee partnerships has been exemplified specifically during the COVID-19 crisis by many private foundations in the peacebuilding and development space.⁷⁹ The flexibility and innovative ways of working by private foundations presents intriguing possibilities for influencing larger donors to develop modalities that places locally-led peacebuilding at the core. This can contribute to prompting a shift in ways of managing grants, selecting intermediaries, and ensuring certain types of partnership approaches throughout the chain of support. It should however be noted that the influencing power of private foundations over both bilateral and multilateral donors with regards to systems change for locally-led peacebuilding is generally less than the influencing power among bilateral donors themselves. This is partly due to the small funds they provide for peacebuilding, and the fact that they rarely provide direct funds to multilateral institutions.

” **The flexibility and innovative ways of working by private foundations presents intriguing possibilities for influencing larger donors to develop modalities that places locally-led peacebuilding at the core.**

Overall trends in funding of private philanthropy to development and peacebuilding for example as a consequence of COVID-19 remain unclear, however medium-term trends of funding are expected to track alongside that of bilateral donors. While several foundations have expressed their continued commitment to meet existing funding relations, reductions in endowments coupled with an expected economic downturn linked to the COVID-19 crisis is likely to also impact funding for peacebuilding.

Some private foundations have mandates that allow them to both fund and implement activities. This generally creates more flexibility and power in modalities of working and types of initiatives to support, however the mixing of relations of collaboration and power is sometimes difficult to navigate in for the foundations themselves and for those who engage with them. Additionally, it sometimes gives less space for diverting from the interests of the foundation and unfolding the potential of partners. This is however not particularly different from their bilateral donor counterparts where some are more hands-on than others with the same consequences.

One such initiative both funded and implemented by Humanity United, a private foundation, is the long-term multi-partner project ‘Vestibule de la Paix’. With the aim of supporting a community based and locally-led approach to peacebuilding in Mali, Humanity United works alongside

the Institut Malien de Recherche-Action pour la Paix (IMRAP), Interpeace and the Institute of Development Studies, engaging with communities in the north, center and south of Mali to take forward local solutions to violence. These experiences are then channelled into conversations with the Malian government and key international players to see how they could shift their practices to harness the power and agency of local actors to build lasting peace.

Another initiative showcasing how private foundations tend to be more flexible and show willingness to test new types of modalities can be exemplified by the African Visionary Fund. Building on their network of trusted partners across Africa, the Fund gives donors access to a wide range of locally-led organisations to which they already distribute unrestricted, multi-year small and medium sized grants. This in turn provides a solution to donors who have the resources and wish to invest more in locally-led peacebuilding, but lack the capacity to manage small and medium-sized grants.

4.1.4 Multi-mandated and peacebuilding international NGOs

INGOs with a peacebuilding mandate hold one of the most critical roles in the chain of support for locally-led peacebuilding, playing a dynamic intermediary role holding close relationships both with local peacebuilders and larger donors. Both multi-mandated INGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children or CARE, as well as peacebuilding INGOs such as Search for Common Ground, Conciliation Resources, International Alert or Saferworld, are some of the best placed actors to understand the specific needs of locally-led peacebuilding and yet are often limited in their role to accommodate the needs of locally-led peacebuilding. This is in large part due to the requirements in funding modalities set out by bilateral donors as well as institutionalised ways of working as highlighted by recent discussions on localisation. INGOs have also been highly visible players in global discussions on localisation following the Grand Bargain and World Humanitarian Summit commitments in 2016. They have been active in pursuing and piloting new modalities and initiatives, however, continue to hold existential challenges to moving from rhetoric to action, from policy to operations and to leverage the principles of ‘localisation’ to creating systems and practices of support that truly reflect impactful change.⁸⁰

At this specific time, many peacebuilding INGOs are deeply challenged in their financial sustainability, a trend that has long existed even prior to the COVID-19 crisis.⁸¹ International peacebuilding organisations however are undoubtedly experiencing funding deficits in the short-, medium-, and long-term as a consequence of COVID-19, struggling with the significant reduction in both private donations and in new grant opportunities. Such trends have been well documented in a recent Alliance for Peacebuilding survey, which shows that they grapple with,

"diminished funding opportunities, quick turnaround on demanding programme adaptations, and shifting to a virtual reality, all at the same time".⁸² The INGOs are however not nearly as badly hurt by the crisis as local peacebuilding organisations who often times have no equity to sustain them through crisis, and are reliant on being able to implement peacebuilding activities in communities in order to release the funding they have been promised.⁸³

” While actively pursuing and piloting new modalities and initiatives, INGOs continue to hold existential challenges to moving from rhetoric to action.

The fact that the COVID-19 crisis has created a situation where INGOs have not been able to engage directly at national and community level has on the one hand provided more space for local peacebuilders to take the lead, but it has in some cases left them more vulnerable to state-driven infringement on their ‘civic space’. Approaching the point of ‘re-engaging’ with partners in conflict affected countries, it may be a good time to reconsider their role.

Although the BLM movement and internal soul searching among INGOs have created space for discussions on ‘decolonising aid’, the survival mode that they are currently in is not helping them, at least in the short term, to drive a sector-wide change process to transform the way of working to create a more enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding. It is relevant to consider at what point momentum for change will override the internal challenges and disincentives for more radical transformation of the roles and ways of working of INGOs across the field, and how the peacebuilding INGOs may be able to lead the broader INGO sector and beyond is driving a shift in power and toward new ways of collaboration.

4.1.5 Global and regional networks

Networks in the field of peacebuilding hold varying levels of legitimacy and representation in relation to local peacebuilders, with many Global North based networks finding challenges in this regard. Some have representatives from and are focused primarily on one particular context or liaison with a particular institution, while other networks aspire to strong local orientation and leadership such as Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS), or Women’s Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL). Interestingly, it is typically the networks and alliances that do not have global legitimacy and representation which most explicitly advocate for locally-led peacebuilding. One such example is the Peace and Security Funders Group (PSFG), a network of foundations and philanthropists advocating for how peacebuilding results are strongest when local peacebuilders define problems and solutions, and determine outcomes, goals and timelines. Through their Locally-Led Peacebuilding Working Group, PSFG have amongst others launched a set of ‘Guiding Principles for

Funding Locally-Led Peacebuilding’, exhibiting funder best practices.⁸⁴

It can be questioned whether such networks have the ability to influence the broader field in this regard, and whether some of those that have a less explicit agenda on locally-led peacebuilding but are more successful in integrating ways of working that address power inequalities and pursue dignified collaboration, have more potential to facilitate change. An alliance can of course be fully legitimate even it does not have diverse representation if it does not aspire to represent more diverse voices than what it holds within its own representation.

Among the fully locally-led networks are Alliance for Empowered Partnerships (A4EP), Women’s Learning Partnership and NEAR Network. These networks consist of CSOs from the Global South which are rooted in local communities and share a common goal of promoting fair, equitable and dignified partnerships in the current aid system. While working to ensure genuine local participation at all levels of the development and humanitarian system, they identify mostly with the development field and are therefore not specifically anchored to the peacebuilding field. Regional networks such as West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) or the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) on the other hand, along with other regional mediation networks such as Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa), the Arab Women Mediators Network - League of Arab States, the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network and Women Mediators across the Commonwealth are mainly focused on peacebuilding in their regional context and supporting one another in this effort.

” There is currently no global alliance with a sole focus on facilitating systems change for locally-led peacebuilding.

There is a tendency for the Global North led alliances and networks to focus more on advocacy for change and for the Global South led alliances to focus more on sharing, mentoring, and accompaniment. Generally, alliances and networks are less likely to receive funding from international donors and have fairly small organisational structures which is probably linked to the fact that actors that focus on systems change have limited access to funding. They work on long-term change processes that aspire to create results that are more difficult to document.

There is currently no global alliance with a sole focus on facilitating systems change for locally-led peacebuilding. This fragmentation could potentially be addressed by establishing a global convening network bringing together entities currently working with or aspiring to make a shift to focusing on facilitating systems change for locally-led peacebuilding.

4.1.6 National NGOs

Like INGOs, larger national NGOs hold a unique role as being particularly well-placed to support sub-national and community-based organisations and actors. However, they continue to increasingly operate in environments of shrinking civic space and are challenged in securing funding, a dynamic that can foster competition. These larger national organisations are often particularly effective in supporting a connecting of different tracks in peace processes as well as navigating in the donor space while maintaining strong linkages to locally-led peacebuilding.

” National NGOs often find themselves having to compete with INGOs for funding as well as visibility.

National NGOs are vulnerable to shifts as dictated by donors upstream changes in the chain of influence, with the majority of their funding being project-based. In addition, they often find themselves having to compete with INGOs for funding as well as visibility in general, a trend that continues to cause significant challenges to the long-term sustainability and independence of such national NGOs. In the COVID-19 crisis they have been strained by lack of access to local communities, a deficit in funds due to cancellation of activities and lacking opportunities to get new grants, alongside the frequent slowdown and halting of peace processes.

4.1.7 Sub-national and community-based peacebuilding organisations

Sub-national and community-based peacebuilding organisations often have deep local networks, legitimacy and long-term relationships with conflict affected communities and politically sensitive actors and have the capacity to address peacebuilding needs in a holistic manner. However, they lack easy access to funding and struggle to meet the requirements of donors. Local peacebuilders are currently strained by a lack of funding, uncertainty of their future, need to adapt programmes to the current context, inadequate digital capacities, and basic survival and subsistence challenges caused by multiple pressures on their sources of income.

Community-based peacebuilding NGOs develop many innovative ways of obtaining support for their work. Some of these are specifically funding-oriented,⁸⁵ while others look to learning and mentoring as well as in-kind support for operational dimensions. An example of in-kind support was demonstrated by the Kenyan NGO, Haki Centre, as they offered office facilities to a smaller local NGO who had lost their original office due to funding cuts because of shifting funding following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

” Community-based peacebuilding NGOs develop innovative ways of obtaining support for their work.

Figure 3: Interlinkages between key actors in the global peacebuilding system





Figure 4: Key actors in the national peacebuilding system



4.2 The global peacebuilding system

The actors in Figure 3 do not exist in isolation of one another. The dynamics and relationships between the different sets of actors that comprise the global peacebuilding system are complex. A ‘chain’ of actors, placed within institutions and organisations with the mandate to support local peacebuilding, can either positively or negatively influence local agency and power in peacebuilding. Each of these actors play a role and have an impact on the space within which other actors within the ‘chain’ can influence the space for local actors. The ‘chain’ is not one-directional, nor is it one-dimensional. But the power relations of the chain are highly influential on the space for agency at any level of the chain, both in terms of formal power relations (chains of delegation, chains of accountability, etc.), and in terms of informal power structures and relations.

This ‘chain of influence’ framing signifies how we see that every link in the chains of action, from the support local peacebuilders receive in their local contexts, to intermediary INGOs, national governments, to bilateral and multilateral donors, has the potential to either serve

as a barrier or a vehicle to create an enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding. A global perspective is thus essential to address the complexity of the inter-linkages and the potential barriers in every step of the process to improve the global peacebuilding system’s capability to meet local peacebuilders’ needs and create more enabling spaces for local leadership.

While the basic assumption is that the global peacebuilding system is not working as well as it could in its support to local actors and in the power inequalities it holds, this does not assume that international institutions have no role to play in peacebuilding or in support to local actors in peacebuilding. The point is to explore how international actors can play a positive role in support to local leadership in peacebuilding, and to identify ways that the international institutions should transform themselves to be able to provide the right kind of support and engage in new types of reciprocal and dignified relations. While it is relevant to focus on the national context as the core of the analysis in which local peacebuilders are operating (see figure 4), it is equally important to understand how

the multiple actors are influenced in their work at local level by the broader global peacebuilding system and how it functions.

4.3 Change agents and institutional entities

In the above we have focused on institutional entities and not the people within these entities. This however gives a misleading impression that people and their actions are not important. They are. It is important to understand the importance of change agents within and outside institutional entities to understand how change happens. Change agents are people working to support peacebuilding who see the potential for doing better. Sometimes their voices are not heard and their ideas for change not put into practice. But sometimes they develop innovations within the systems they operate in that strengthen support to locally-led peacebuilding. Some have named change agents ‘rule breakers’,⁸⁶ as they are navigating within and circumventing organisational rules and procedures that are not enabling locally-led peacebuilding. Generally, the international institutions mentioned above carry disincentives for and resilience to change. It is more likely that change agents will be successful in facilitating change if they come together, sharing their frustrations with the current dysfunctionalities or feelings of being compromised by not being able to elicit change. While it is necessary to be willing to invest political capital when change agents stand up to dysfunctional ways of working, there is less risk associated with doing this together in networks of change agents.

” **It is more likely that change agents will be successful in facilitating change if they come together.**

There are many actors in the international system who aim to support peacebuilding but may be resistant to change or may not think it is possible. Other sceptics of this change agenda can be donor constituencies, that is the general public and politicians in donor countries. Their role in feeding the negative trend towards upward accountability and a focus on donor priorities rather than local priorities is significant, constraining the space for locally-led peacebuilding. There is currently little space and power for change agents from conflict affected countries to have a ‘voice’ in changing the international system. While not aligned with its general aspirations, the way of working of international institutions routinely marginalise the expertise that resides in local communities. Their life experience makes them conflict experts, and the seeds of good peacebuilding initiatives reside in this experience.

The more that these people are involved, the more likely it is that peacebuilding interventions are going to sustainably address peacebuilding challenges.

It may be surprising to take a human centred approach to systems change in particular when talking about transforming systems that consist of multiple institutions such as the UN, bilateral donor agencies, INGOs, national NGOs, governments, among other actors. This is not a small task. But systems consist of people, and systems change is about changing structures, practices, and norms. Even structural change needs people to understand the system complexities, the leverage points for change, and it needs people to take comprehensive and multi-layered action to innovate and transform systems through emergent processes. Complementarity between change agents can be found both among the institutions they represent and their specific characteristics and role in the system.

” **How best to create a conducive space for collaboration and genuine complementarity that provides adequate and relevant support for local actors to lead efforts to build sustainable peace?**

Chapter 5: Analysis of approaches, complementarities, and ways of working

The following section provides an analysis of different approaches to systems change that enables locally-led peacebuilding, and how they are conceptually linked and can complement one another. In identifying approaches to systems change, we want to underscore that the success in facilitating change as an organisation lies in the ‘how’ as much as in the ‘what’. The ‘how’ in facilitating systems change concerns both the approach to pursuing change outside of the organisation, and the approach to pursuing change, and ‘walking the talk’, inside the organisation itself. While section 5.2 focuses on external change, section 5.3 zooms in on ‘ways of working’ internally in a change agent organisation. The latter is equally important as the former.

5.1 The Dragonfly Model - a conceptual overview of approaches to change

Below we provide an overview of different approaches to supporting locally-led peacebuilding and facilitating systems change that can impact the space for locally-led peacebuilding across the globe thus enhancing the sustainability of peacebuilding. The focus here is on the global peacebuilding system and the role of international actors in facilitating change. This means that we will focus on the two ‘lower’ wings of the Dragonfly (see figure 5)


and less on the systems dynamics specifically pertaining to the national context. Essentially, we hold the question: what can international actors do to help create a more enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding?

” The Dragonfly Model presents a way of understanding the peacebuilding systems within which locally-led peacebuilding is embedded.

The Dragonfly Model⁸⁷ presents a way of understanding the peacebuilding systems within which locally-led peacebuilding is embedded. It shows how different systems are interconnected, and how they are moving between the current situation to a reimagined reality, at a time when the global context is in flux and the space for local peacebuilding is changing. Each wing of the dragonfly illustrates one important dimension of understanding change in strengthening locally-led peacebuilding, and each ‘layer’ of the wing, nested into the other layers, hold important insights on different approaches to change that can be seen as complementary.

As illustrated in Chapter 4, the **national** peacebuilding system is embedded within the **global** peacebuilding system, however in the Dragonfly Model they are

Figure 5: The Dragonfly for locally-led peacebuilding (left) – and the focus of this analysis in blue (right)




illustrated separately but interrelated. This is done as such as it has proven useful to recognise that different roles and dynamics are in place among actors within each of these systems. There are for example differences in the way country offices as opposed to headquarter offices operate and relate to other actors within the system. Also, the process of changing the **current** peacebuilding system and the process of **reimagining** an alternative peacebuilding system are illustrated separately although the two processes in the best of circumstances cross-fertilise one another. One sets the direction and the other sustains momentum and steady speed; as is the case of the dragonfly in its natural surroundings. Some actors are more oriented towards changing the current global peacebuilding system while others are oriented towards reimagining a different peacebuilding system.

The 'nested paradigm for locally-led peacebuilding' explains how we see the link between direct support to locally-led peacebuilding and systems change efforts. It shows how efforts to understand and respond to the concrete needs of local peacebuilders are integrated or nested within broader systems change efforts. This should be understood as a dual directional process where it is equally important to ensure that systems change efforts are linked to and built on the concrete needs of local peacebuilders. Likewise, it is important to ensure that direct support to locally-led peacebuilding should aspire to change the broader systems that influence and potentially support locally-led peacebuilding.

Each dragonfly wing is inspired by the 'nested paradigm' coined by Máire Dugan and further developed by John Paul Lederach. In the 'nested paradigm' of the Dragonfly Model (see figure 6), the inner circle represents locally-led peacebuilding and the needs of local peacebuilders. Locally-led peacebuilding is embedded in relationships and spaces for collaboration between local peacebuilders and other actors who support and influence locally-led peacebuilding which again is embedded in the structures, practices and attitudes within the peacebuilding and development system at national and global level, which again is embedded in broader societal structures and norms. Through this model we can understand the challenges and opportunities related to change at each of these levels as they relate to locally-led peacebuilding. All of the levels need to be addressed in order to strengthen locally-led peacebuilding in sustainable ways, but each actor or change agent may work on only one or few dimensions. It is vital to hold the notion of seeking complementarity between different change efforts within a broader systems transformation effort across all levels.

” The 'nested paradigm for locally-led peacebuilding' explains how we see the link between direct support to locally-led peacebuilding and systems change efforts.

Figure 6:
Locally-led peacebuilding 'nested' in the global peacebuilding system – One wing of the dragonfly



5.2 Approaches to supporting locally-led peacebuilding⁸⁸

In the following section we will elaborate on the different ways of working in support of locally-led peacebuilding within each of the four layers of the nested paradigm. We will give examples of how these ways of working have been pursued in various efforts to either directly support locally-led peacebuilding (the inner circles) or pursuing systems change in support of locally-led peacebuilding (the outer circles). We will not address the fourth circle as we consider it less likely that the audience for this report will engage in change efforts beyond the global peacebuilding and development system. This does not however indicate that we consider broader societal change less important than the other dimensions. In this section we have consolidated examples of efforts aimed at changing the current way of working with efforts aimed at reimagining the peacebuilding system.

The sub-sections below are structured around key dimensions that characterise the way of working on locally-led peacebuilding, and how these dimensions can be addressed in different ways. This section provides examples of good practices and will offer considerations on ways of working that are relevant to consider within each of the circles, and which ways of working funders may employ in their own modality of working and in identifying partners and grantees. Again, this framework carries less of a potential for assessing which approaches are better than others, and more of a potential for identifying what may be appropriate for a given actor and for establishing complementarities with other change agents.

Insights on complementarities between different change efforts are integrated in the sections below, although it should be noted that the change potential in seeking complementarities is underestimated, and the systems dynamics that one particular change initiative addresses may be insufficiently understood. It is relevant to revisit the notion emphasised in Chapter 4 of the global peacebuilding system, and the fact that diverse actors within the institutions that form a ‘chain of influence’ on locally-led peacebuilding interlink in their ability to either enable or inhibit a conducive space for locally-led peacebuilding. One example is an effort to develop local accountability mechanisms to replace or supplement donor-related (upward) accountability measures such as streamlined results-based management frameworks and preset indicators of success. If this is not done in a way that involves the entire system of accountability within and between organisations, it may be counter-productive rather than a vehicle for change. One example of this may be a situation where a country office INGO representative comes up with an innovative way of ensuring local accountability, while the HQ of the same INGO is in the process of developing a new results-based framework that is entirely donor-driven. Local actors may be asked

to engage in a local accountability mechanism where they document learnings and results, however if the MEAL people at all levels are not involved, they may in fact not have the power to create necessary adaptations in a programme. They may not have real decision-making power because other parts of the institution are not accommodating this way of working. In this case, lack of systems thinking and complementarities between change efforts in different parts of the system not only inhibit change but are counter-productive to local ownership and a conducive partnership approach.

5.2.1 Approaches to direct support to local peacebuilding

Funding provided by a bilateral or multilateral donor at country level to a national (capital-based) NGO or an INGO with a country office is a classic example of support to local peacebuilding NGOs. The ‘intermediary’ INGO (in relation to local peacebuilders) will typically then engage in partnerships with locally-based organisations. The types of support and partnerships of ‘intermediaries’ (e.g. INGOs or other agencies who receive funding from donors and use this funding in support of local organisations) vary from one in which the local organisation is in the lead to one where the local organisation merely implements activities developed by the INGO. When local peacebuilders solely act as implementers, their leadership, knowledge, and insights may be undermined, and they are often funded only to implement activities that North-based partners proceed to report to a donor in-country and/or at headquarter level. In addition, it is deemed problematic how donors increasingly have begun to solicit funding through open tendering processes, allowing consultancies without well proven partnership approaches to take on development and peacebuilding efforts in which local peacebuilders engage as ‘service providers’.

” Provision of core funding to trusted local actors will provide more flexibility for the local partners in accommodating changing peacebuilding conditions and needs.

By contrast, the local peacebuilder will often set the terms of the engagement, identify the vision, areas of engagement and develop the concrete activities when supported in an equitable partnership-like manner. In best practice cases, this would entail long-term partnerships with a degree of core funding and support for strategic and organisational development. It should however be noted that the nature of collaboration will still be defined by the funder as the power relations cannot be removed from the equation. In this case, challenges related to structural power inequalities are generally best navigated if recognised rather than being hidden and ignored.

An approach which creates an environment of more equitable partnerships between funders and local peacebuilders is through provision of core funding to trusted local actors. This will provide more flexibility for the local partners in accommodating changing peacebuilding conditions and needs, and less time for reporting and adhering to predefined accountability mechanisms. Challenges to this approach is that it is human resource demanding and requires that the funder holds a strong capacity not only in managing funds, but also in providing a supportive environment for partners that work under difficult conditions in conflict affected contexts. While many funders aspire to this kind of support, especially private foundations, they often face obstacles within their own structures in providing this type of support. Core funding support to local partners is also particularly challenging for bilateral or multilateral donors to take on, due in large part to the existing technocratic structures, accountability requirements, and capacity constraints.

While the overall structure of support within international institutions is resistant to change and requires a strategic systems change approach, it is possible for those, who are part of the 'chain of influence' in relation to local peacebuilding (see figure 4), to innovate practices that address the systemic challenges of the global peacebuilding system and to allow for a more equitable

and enabling relation to local peacebuilders. This could include introducing structural changes such as local accountability mechanisms, co-developing conflict analysis processes that inform programming or testing a reciprocal due diligence process between funder and grantee. In this context, we consider it to be systems innovation relating to the inner circle of the nested paradigm when they are not intended to generate broader systems change.

“ Innovative practices that address the systemic challenges of the global peacebuilding system could include local accountability mechanisms, and reciprocal due diligence processes between funder and grantee.

Several new and innovative support structures have emerged over the past years including modalities based on private enterprises or broader public engagement and movements. While these are highly important for the local peacebuilders who engage in them, they are not mainstream across the system as more than 90 percent of financial support to local peacebuilders originate from bilateral donors. While important to develop new and innovative modalities of support that better meet the needs of local peacebuilders, it is also vital to acknowledge that change in the short and medium term should focus

Examples of promising practices of direct support to local peacebuilding:

International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) - Innovative Peace Fund (IPF)

An independent, multi-donor, global grant making mechanism wholly dedicated to providing financial support and technical assistance to women-led peacebuilding organisations in countries affected by violent conflict, extremism and militarism. Through the IPF, ICAN offers a solution to donors who have the resources but lack the capacity to manage small- and medium-sized grants.

Everyday Peace Indicators (EPI)

A research approach connecting local knowledge with broader development and peacebuilding initiatives by asking community members to identify their own measures of peace. It investigates alternative, bottom-up indicators of peace and how such bottom-up information can be meaningfully integrated into policy processes. The EPI approach is based on the premise that local communities are best placed to identify changes in their own circumstances, rather than relying on external 'experts' to identify indicators for them.

Co-Impact – Local Coalition Accelerator (LCA)

A new platform to support building the capacity of local, community-based organisations to meaningfully participate in larger-scale systems change, and to directly access the significant multi- and bilateral financing that is currently channelled nearly exclusively through UN or INGO vehicles.

on transforming the way these support structures enable locally-led peacebuilding as well. Find above a selection of promising approaches related to providing direct support to local peacebuilding.

5.2.2 Approaches to strengthening relations among actors in the global peacebuilding system

Fostering relationships that enables a space for trust-building, learning and adaptation, innovation and complementarities, creates a more conducive environment to build peace. Systems change requires the space that is created between change agents to evolve into broader movements for change. As the global peacebuilding system currently works, it upholds power inequalities between international, national, and local peacebuilders. Approaches for systems change with a relational focus must therefore be oriented towards addressing these power inequalities and creating conducive spaces for collaboration in specific conflict affected contexts and simultaneously address the underlying systemic inequalities embedded in structures, practices, and attitudes.

There are multiple approaches to supporting locally-led national and international networks and platforms aimed

at strengthening locally-led peacebuilding. In South Sudan for instance, a donor-led conflict sensitivity mechanism has been ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are based on local knowledge. As previously mentioned, the Canadian representation in Mali has led a coordination mechanism between international and national actors where the space was co-owned rather than internationally dominated. These approaches strengthen the relation between international and local actors in conflict affected contexts.

A key dimension to consider when supporting networks is the degree to which the space is defined by international actors and is imbued with power inequalities, whether it is led by local peacebuilders, or whether it is co-created by the different actors engaging. The Life and Peace Institute has coined the terms 'invited' and 'claimed' spaces to signify the first and second options. We have added the 'co-created' space as the third option, as it is important that all change agents can come into the space with their full potential. Our experience shows that it is possible to address power inequalities as part of the process rather than by leaving these inequalities outside the space. Examples of 'invited' spaces are international conferences where the terms of engagement are defined by international actors organising the event. Examples of 'claimed spaces' can be when Global South based NGOs create their own networks or platforms for learning, sharing

Examples of promising practices of spaces and platforms strengthening relations between peacebuilding actors:

Nexus

A platform for locally-led change that aspires to pioneer a paradigm-shift and a locally-driven agenda for change by building partnerships between communities, civil society and the public and private sectors in Somalia. It aims to advance a new community-driven model of partnership that can promote the growth of peaceful, thriving, and empowered communities in Somalia and Somaliland, and implement integrated and sustainable interventions across the triple nexus of humanitarian, development and peace efforts.

Mindanao Peaceweavers

A convergence of peace advocates representing the broadest network of peace constituency in Mindanao cutting across NGOs, academia, religious, human rights groups, peoples organisations and grassroots communities in advancing a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Mindanao, Philippines.

Women for Peace and Good Governance (WPGG) - Sri Lanka

The focus of WPGG is to promote women's leadership at the grassroots level by promoting, coaching, and mentoring women who wish to get involved in local politics. To date, the organisation remains informal in spirit, allowing it to stay flexible and focused.

The network includes over 200 women's societies allowing it to reach villages and to work with women on the ground and showcases how networks do not necessarily need to be formalised in order to be effective in building peace.

and collectively voicing their agenda. An example of a 'co-created space' can be a session within an international conference where local and international actors co-create an alternative way of engaging, or it can be a reimagining process co-created by diverse change agents with local peacebuilders at the centre of engagement.

At national level, approaches aimed at strengthening relations and collaboration among local actors are also applied. For instance, in the region of Montes de Maria in Colombia, the regional platform for reconciliation convenes a multitude of peacebuilding and human rights actors with different perspectives on the conflicts. In South Sudan, the Unyoke Foundation accompanies networks of young peacebuilders in their efforts. These approaches can inspire network development also at regional level.

In addition, there are 'trans-local' networks, both formal and more informal in nature, that promote learning and collaboration between local peacebuilders from different conflict affected contexts, including the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS), the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) as well as the Women's Alliance for

Security Leadership (WASL). Other types of approaches that focus on building trans-local networks take the form of electronic platforms that create a space for local peacebuilders to learn from and support one another including how best to continue pursuing peacebuilding during the COVID-19 crisis, such as the electronic platform 'Corona Crisis and Local Peacebuilding' facilitated by Conducive Space for Peace, or ConnexUs by Search for Common Ground.

Networks of change agents can be both informal and formal and may develop in ways that look structured like a spiderweb or unstructured like the universe. Important though is that they enhance the potential of people in facilitating change, and that they provide space for the human potential for creativity, imagination and strategic thinking among people with diverse perspectives.

Examples of promising practices of approaches to transforming institutions:

Life and Peace Institute - Inclusive Peace in Practice: Linking Local Insights and Global Policy (2018-2022)

This initiative sees its impact stemming from its ability to test new models for new relationships and shifting power dynamics between those 'on the ground' and decision makers and financiers 'above'. This initiative specifically sees a series of 'vectors' that are areas/processes/channels moments where dysfunctionalities manifest and where possible opportunities may lie to break with the current system. The six vectors identified are 'participation; evidence and expertise; locations and space; frameworks; language; and collaboration and financing'.

"Stopping As Success: Transitioning to Locally Led Development" with USAID, CDA Collaborative Learning, Peace Direct and Search for Common Ground

This initiative aims to provide positive examples and guidance for how international development actors can foster locally-led development through successful and responsible transitions out of projects or relationships with partners.

Principles for Peace (P4P)

A global participatory initiative to develop a new set of principles, standards and norms that will fundamentally reshape how peace processes are structured, sequenced and actualised. Their approach leverages research, participatory consultations and public engagement to fundamentally rethink and reframe the current narrow, exclusionary and flawed ways in which peace processes are understood. It is an ambitious and transformative collective endeavour that aims to bridge the gap between policy and action, anchored in a bottom-up process to amplify the voices of those whose destiny and lives are shaped by conflict and peace processes.

5.2.3 Approaches to transforming institutions to enable locally-led peacebuilding

While not intending to claim that one level of the nested paradigm is more important than others in systems change efforts, the third circle focusing on the sub-system or in this case, systems change in the global peacebuilding system, should undoubtedly be considered an essential part of catalysing change. Efforts in other circles of the nested paradigm on locally-led peacebuilding must link their change efforts to the third circle in order to facilitate transformational change. If part of the change requires a shift in international institutions, this cannot be done without working with these institutions and considering their potential for change.

Organisations engaging in direct support to local peacebuilders may have experienced ‘good practices’ of how collaboration can unfold, and they may be able to advocate for or reproduce this when engaging with others. The logic of this type of direct support aspiring to facilitate systems change would thus be through concrete experience that can potentially be reproduced, scaled and employed as impetus for a broader transformation process. Organisations which have been involved with such early development engagements since the 1970-90s, providing long-term support based on global solidarity and activism, are now however increasingly being undermined by changes elicited by among others New Public Management.

” **There is little evidence that policies or principles translate easily into new structures and practices and even less so to normative change.**

Developing documentation of best practices for partnership engagement as Conciliation Resources has done, or accompaniment of local peacebuilders in their engagement with policy makers as done by Peace Direct and Independent Diplomat, are other ways of translating concrete partnership experiences to broader systems change. Additional recent initiatives in the multilateral space such as the UN Community Engagement Guidelines on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace offer another more technocratic approach to pursuing partnership change through policies. There is however a tendency to accept policy engagement as one of the important change paths without scrutinising the link between policy change and structural change, the link between structural or procedural change and changes in organisational practices, and the link between this and long-term changes in attitudes and norms.

We argue for the need to apply a comprehensive approach to change that does not limit itself to policy engagement in relation to the global peacebuilding system. Approaches to systems change that address structures, practices, norms, and attitudes are long-term, strategic endeavours, and entails both efforts to disrupt the institutions and existing ways of working from the outside and efforts to accompany institutions in their change process from the inside. There is little evidence that policies or principles translate easily into new structures and practices and even less so to normative change. In fact, roughly the same set of principles for how to work in a way that promotes sustainable peace has been developed in multiple settings during the past 10 years, including through the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) and the Sustaining Peace agenda of UN Secretary General Guterres.

” **We argue for viewing systems change through a lens that grasps its complexity, and instead of calling one approach out as better than another, creates space for complementarity and learning among the various change agents and change efforts.**

Although change in the global peacebuilding system is likely to be facilitated by peacebuilders who see the need for change, there are elements of the change process that require insights into technocratic conditions for institutional procedures such as accountability mechanisms and funding modalities, while other dimensions of change entail a broader attitudinal change process that must be able to address issues of power and dignity. Again, we argue for viewing systems change through a lens that grasps its complexity, and instead of calling one approach out as better than another, creates space for complementarity and learning among the various change agents engaged in the transformation process.

5.2.4 Addressing broader societal challenges such as racism and inequality

The fourth and outer circle of the nested paradigm encompasses the broader system that surrounds the global peacebuilding system. This includes the societal structures and norms that create the foundation and conditions within which the global peacebuilding system operates, and either enables or creates barriers for local peacebuilding. This also sets the conditions for sustainable transformative change. Approaches to addressing these challenges include the rise of social movements aiming

to counteract negative global trends such as racism, colonialism, and populism, or broader New Public Management that leads to a dehumanisation of people and structures. Furthermore, the global peacebuilding system is affected by challenges such as deteriorating global cohesion and geopolitical shifts. Although these trends highly affects how the global peacebuilding system functions and is able to provide an enabling space for local peacebuilding, it is beyond the scope of this publication to point to relevant approaches to facilitate transformation at this level.

5.2.5 Comprehensive cross-layer approaches

There are only few actors that focus specifically on systems change to enable locally-led peacebuilding in a way that cuts across the layers of the nested paradigm and seeks both to facilitate change in the current way of working and to create the foundation for reimagining how best to meet the needs of local peacebuilders. Conducive Space for Peace (CSP) was established in 2016 with this specific purpose. Examples of other organisations that pursue this type of approach are Humanity United (HU), Life and Peace Institute (LPI) and Peace Direct (PD). CSP, PD, and HU founded a collaborative initiative, Shift Power for Peace (SP4P), that seeks to shift power and agency to local change agents building peace in their own communities. The collaborative initiative emerged in 2019 and has among other things produced publications on local peacebuilding, established a digital inclusion for peace initiative, and launched a ‘reimagining peacebuilding’ process in 2021.

“ While many INGOs convene meetings, dialogues and seminars on locally-led peacebuilding, there are few organisations that go beyond this.

Related to the cross-layer approaches applied by SP4P is the Inclusive Peace in Practice (IPIP) initiative of LPI. This four-year project financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) takes a strong inclusion perspective, and specifically aims to unpack key challenges and ways forward to address the implementation gap of key policies and frameworks to enable local leadership in peacebuilding. The initiative operates at multiple ‘levels’ of the nested paradigm. It works to promote more inclusive practices in local to global dialogue and engagement with local peacebuilders within the global system of peacebuilding while also working in country contexts developing and testing new models of partnerships.⁸⁹

While many INGOs convene meetings, dialogues and seminars on locally-led peacebuilding, there are few organisations beyond the above that create space for longer-term processes of engagement among potential change agents. The comprehensive approach to convening in this space requires linking different types of change efforts and change agents in order to seek complementarities. Convening is thus not only about bringing a group of people together in a specific place, whether physical or virtual, it is also about creating multiple spaces for coming together in decentral rather than central locations, and it is about contributing to network weaving among change agents. This type of ‘holding space’ may be broader than the term ‘convening’ can accommodate.

5.3 Ways of working

The goal of this part of the analysis is to understand what internal ways of working can enable an organisation to ‘walk the talk’ in providing relevant support to locally-led peacebuilding and in being a catalyst for systems change. We will explore what it means – and what it may look like – to have a locally-led ethos embedded in all facets of an organisation. While we have in previous sections looked at the current trends, approaches and best practices in the field/across the system of support to locally-led peacebuilding, here we flesh out further reflections on our understanding that supporting locally-led peacebuilding is not just limited to external ways of operating (e.g. funding modalities) but an ethos that cuts across every aspect of an organisation, including how one organises internally. Therefore, we will in this section take a deeper dive into the internal ways of working and how a locally-led ethos can be embedded in both the attitudes, structures, and processes of an organisation. This section is an offering of reflections on what we are learning however we also recognise our own limitations and space for continued learning and growth as an organisation in our journey to fully embrace and champion these values in internal attitudes, practices and structures.

5.3.1 Why do internal ways of working matter?

Organisations across the field are not always fully attuned to the extent to which they are reproducing rather than addressing systemic challenges of inequality and in the way they work. It is better understood which practices and procedures are important to support locally-led peacebuilding, but there is at times less focus on what matters in terms of internal organisational characteristics. Many are attempting to solve problems that have been created by systemic inequality, while relying on strategies and business models embedded in those very systems.

While vision statements and objectives suggest that we are working for a different future, a brief glance at how decisions are made, who sits on governance boards, who holds most influence, how success is measured, and how risk is viewed, reveals how many are enmeshed in the status quo.

” **Many organisations are attempting to solve problems that have been created by systemic inequality, while relying on strategies and business models embedded in those very systems.**

Supporting locally-led peacebuilding cannot be done in a vacuum. These practices must also be reflected in governance structures, boards, staffing, decision-making but also in human interaction, values, how we do co-creation, facilitate meetings, communicate etc. This is essential in order to holistically realise the mission of enabling locally-led peacebuilding.

These are not new discussions and the need for addressing issues of diversity, representation, inclusion, knowledge generation, decision-making, and power resurfaces from time to time. Currently, the Black Lives Matter movement has given the international community, and the aid sector more broadly, a renewed momentum to examine more introspectively issues such as institutional and structural racism and the underlying power dynamics in internal as well as external ways of working. It is important to recognise the extent to which inequality in our internal systems affect our ability to promote and support locally-led peacebuilding and what we should be doing to change it. To be a catalyst for change requires legitimacy, and legitimacy is in part obtained through walking the talk and upholding the values of the change pursued.

” **To be a catalyst for change requires legitimacy, and legitimacy is in part obtained through walking the talk and upholding the values in the change pursued.**

5.3.2 How to walk the talk

What does it mean to have a locally-led ethos and what can it look like in practice? An ethos forms the guiding beliefs of a person, community, or organisation, which in turn, builds the codes or ethics that guides one in its behaviour. Therefore, we will start by looking at some of the values that may inspire, support and reaffirm the direction for an organisation to promote, build and foster an enabling environment for locally-led peacebuilding:

- **Diversity:** Here defined as the presence of different characteristics in a group of people, such as in boards, staff etc. These characteristics could be everything that makes people unique, such as skills, experiences and personality traits, along with the things that shape identities (e.g. race, age, gender, religion, sexual orientation, cultural background).
- **Equity:** Here defined as the ability to promote justice, impartiality and fairness within procedures, processes, and in the distribution of resources. Ensure that these are aligned with the goal of everyone holding a fair and just opportunity to participate in and influence processes that may affect their lives. Equity also matters in relation to power, such as in giving equal value to different types of knowledge, experience, resources, and capacities. Working in pursuit of equity means holding an explicit focus on removing barriers that create or contribute to inequality, internally as well as externally.
- **Inclusion:** Here defined as the degree to which diverse individuals are able to participate fully in various processes and decision-making in an organisation. Inclusion matters in terms of the procedures that an organisation implements which may contribute to integrate everyone in the workplace, making sure that different voices are heard and that people feel respected and valued for who they are and the different contributions they offer.
- **Trust:** Here defined as having a firm belief in the reliability, ability, or strength of a person or group of people. Trust matters in terms of practicing respect for people you work with, exposing one's vulnerabilities and committing to shared risks, or risk-willingness, which in turn builds sustainable relations and reciprocity. Practicing trust within an organisation means providing the space for each individual and/or group to make their own decisions, to respect these and be guided by them. Practicing trust in relation to other organisations for example means to lessen rigid accountability measures and offer funding without guaranteed results.

However, values are most meaningful when they are demonstrated by an organisation's ability to put these values into action at all levels, including in its internal ways of organising. As such, the ways in which an organisation is able to demonstrate these values in practice will in turn impact an organisation along the dimensions of accountability, integrity and legitimacy. **Accountability** through a recognition for the ability to account for its actions and accept responsibility for them. **Integrity** through a recognition for the ability to be accountable, responsible, truthful and consistent in its actions in line with core values. **Legitimacy** through a recognition for the ability to 'walk the talk', having the values institutionalised and operationalised in its ways of working.

5.3.3 Translating values into practice

The following section is an exploration of what putting these values into practice may look like at various organisational levels. Specifically, we will look into the following aspects: Strategy design, decision-making and governance, human resource management and organisational policies, and partnerships.

Strategy

A strategy is used to set the priorities and goals of an organisation and the measures that an organisation must take to achieve them. An organisation with a locally-led ethos must ensure that their strategy is informed by the people they intend to support and that the suggested measures are relevant for the needs that will be addressed. Relevant questions to consider may include:

- Does your organisation have a statement on how you support locally-led peacebuilding? If so, how has your organisation operationalised the statement internally?
- How do you identify your key focus areas? How can these be changed to reflect the priorities of the people you support?

Governance

If an organisation is to realise its ambition to promote and support locally-led peacebuilding and put into practice the values that underpins this ethos, their governance structures need to reflect these principles. This means that board and management positions must be adequately diverse and representative of the people the organisation is working with. For many organisations, this remains an unfulfilled aspiration, often spoken of but seldom realised, sometimes due to national legislation. Organisations should consider looking at ways of formally entrenching inclusiveness and respect for diversity in their systems of governance, ensuring that it entails more than mere recognition of formal equality and going beyond mere tokenism.⁹⁰ Relevant questions to consider may include:

- What is the make-up of the governance bodies of the organization? To what extent do boards adequately reflect their values, or the experience and diversity of those they aspire to serve?

Decision-making and feedback-systems

How decisions are made and what informs these decisions have an impact of the accountability of an organisation. To be truly accountable to all stakeholders, organisations should practice inclusive and responsive decision-making. This also means being open to asking for and responding to feedback. Relevant questions to consider may include:

- Who makes decisions, on what basis are they made, and how transparent are decision-making structures and processes?

Human resource management and organisational policies

Human resource management plays a vital role in creating an organisational culture that reflects the values of an organisation. This includes recruitment processes, onboarding, performance management, salary systems, as well as the organisational policies that are in place. Organisational policies guide staff towards certain attitudes and behaviours. Examples that can help organisations more meaningfully integrate values are Project FAIR (Fairness in Aid Remuneration⁹¹) and DEI (Diversity, Equity, Inclusion) tools such as Advancing DEI in Philanthropy (such as D5⁹²). Relevant questions to consider may include:

- What hiring practices are employed to improve diversity within the organisation?
- How are hiring practices, leadership structures, feedback and complaint mechanisms being in support of locally-led peacebuilding?
- What HR policies are employed to ensure safe complaint mechanisms?
- Whose voice and context do policies reflect? Including codes of conduct, PSHEA, anti-corruption, HR, salary policies etc. What unconscious biases are implicit within them? And in what ways might internal policies be reinforcing and reproducing inequalities, despite best intentions?
- Does the organisation have a whistleblower mechanism? A feedback mechanism?

Partnerships

The partnership approach of an organisation must reflect both informal and formal dimensions relating to the process of engagement including decision-making and conflict resolution mechanisms. Many organisations have partnership approaches that are guided by human rights-based approach (HRBA) thus emphasising participation, non-discrimination, transparency, and accountability. Some have tools to understand dynamics in the partnership relation and on that basis develop more equitable ways of collaborating, for instance the Power Awareness Tool⁹³ or the Equity Index.⁹⁴ Relevant questions to consider may include:

- Has your organisation asked local organisations/peacebuilders how they would like to be supported, and how they think your organisation could help address their needs?
- How do the organisations focus areas, duration of grants, modality of reporting, indicators and deliverables required, communication demands, and partnership approach reflect your commitment to supporting locally-led peacebuilding? How can these be better aligned with the priorities, needs and reality of national and community-based organisations?
- What strategies do you use that would enable equitable partnerships?

The internal ways of working are equally important as the external ways of working and are intrinsically linked. A transformative change process will need to consider and pursue both avenues for change, and accompaniment of key institutions in the peacebuilding field in their internal ways of accommodating diversity and addressing power inequalities can be equally relevant and effective for creating a more enabling space for locally-led peacebuilding globally as engaging.

Chapter 6: Call to Action

Drawing on the analysis, we wish to provide some concluding remarks by offering a call to action with the following key insights on how peacebuilding actors from across the global system can better facilitate systems change for locally-led peacebuilding. By providing a snapshot review of approaches to support of locally-led peacebuilding, we hope to have expanded the scope for strategic dialogue on the multiple entry points for change, and the imperative and potential to create complementarities between different approaches and

entry points in order to better enable a shift of power to locally-led peacebuilding. The world is in flux as is the global peacebuilding system, in part as a consequence of COVID-19. With momentum for change gaining ground, we call on our peers and the broader community of change agents to seize this moment. This is a call to action in which we grasp the complexity of systems change while relying on the foundational understanding that people are at the core of any change process and change begins from where each of us stands.

Systemic challenges and obstacles to change

INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES: Most funding to locally-led peacebuilding comes from bilateral agencies where challenges such as access for local peacebuilders is limited; flexibility, predictability, and long-term engagement is rare; local knowledge is often perceived to be subordinate to international knowledge; and power to set priorities and get support for these priorities poses a struggle. These ways of working need to change but cannot be expected to change rapidly.

Call to Action: There is a need to change the structures, practices, and attitudes that sustain these challenges.

BROADER SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES: Systemic hurdles to change include institutional incentive structures that do not favour diverting from mainstream and New Public Management-inspired ways of working; increasing pressure from donor constituencies to secure that international engagement serves the interests of the donor country and is measurable according to donor standards; as well as insufficient global learning structures and processes of accountability to adapt based on learnings.

Call to Action: There is a need to address both the internal and external dynamics influencing the possibility for change and focus on multiple aspects of the system including the operational dimensions of international institutions and the political pressures from nationalist donor constituencies.

Changing institutional ways of working

SUSTAINED ENGAGEMENT FOR CHANGE: Systems change is a complex endeavour, and changing norms and structures takes time, warrants a long-term perspective not least as it involves complex government and inter-governmental institutions that are embedded in complex systems and geopolitical contexts. The fact that the global peacebuilding system is changing underscores the fact that long-term and sustained engagement is needed.

Call to Action: In order to address this need, some funders have begun innovating and testing longer-term timeframes for support to actors engaged in systems change, however this must be pursued not as a one-off innovation effort but rather as a long-term and sustained way of working.

WALKING THE TALK: Changing the broader system will rely on change also within organisations and institutions. The organisational ways of working that are not enabling locally-led peacebuilding must be revisited, and leaders of organisations including peacebuilding INGOs must prepare their organisations for change. The COVID-19 crisis has shaken the foundation for many organisations and created uncertainty among staff, however, this presents both opportunities and challenges.

Call to Action: Transforming organisations to be better fit for supporting locally-led peacebuilding will require self-reflection on how structures, practices and attitudes can be adapted and changed. And it requires daring to take concrete steps to elicit change – beyond the mounting talk about ‘decolonising aid’ among peers.

Pursuing change that has a real impact for locally-led peacebuilding

MOVING BEYOND LESSONS LEARNED:

Although there are multiple initiatives popping up which innovate new ways of working to support locally-led peacebuilding, these initiatives do not significantly influence the general way of working in the global peacebuilding system. Isolated best practices do little to add up to systems change at a broader scale even within the same conflict affected context. Systems change does not happen merely by example. Even when best practices are conveyed in international or national fora, they rarely lead to broader systems transformation.

Call to Action: There is a need to rethink strategies of how lessons learned on promising practices can inspire broader systems change.

MOVING BEYOND POLICY CHANGE:

While policy development is an important dimension of any global and organisational change process, it does not in and of itself produce change, neither the broad political policies nor the operational policies within institutions. There have been a number of policy development processes during the past 10 years that have outlined existing systemic challenges and the need for change, and many have produced quite similar principles and policy guidance notes. However, they did not elicit significant change in structures, practices, and attitudes; and they did not produce a significantly more enabling environment for locally-led peacebuilding in the mainstream avenues for support to local actors.

Call to Action: It is necessary to focus on systems change efforts beyond policy engagement which would imply more long-term and accompanying engagement.

New frontiers for change

REIMAGINING THE GLOBAL PEACEBUILDING

SYSTEM: With the world in flux and power dynamics being challenged, there is increasing momentum for change in the global peacebuilding system. While changes in the current international ways of working are pertinent, it can also be a good time to explore more radical change including alternative structures for global collaboration and support to local peacebuilding.

Call to Action: The time is ripe to pursue processes to reimagine the peacebuilding system, developing new principles for how to support locally-led peacebuilding, and operationalising these reimagined change visions and principles within the existing structures as well as in new types of structures.

SENSE-MAKING IN A GLOBAL SYSTEM IN

FLUX: It is vital to take into account the global trends that are currently influencing the broader system of peacebuilding support as well as the structures, practices and norms that enables or inhibits change at this critical time. A rise in populism within public constituencies coupled with increasing bureaucratic rigidity in donor countries, leads to challenges at both global and local levels. With the rise of digitalisation and information technology, ongoing challenges related to climate change and COVID-19, and the rise of social movements contesting racism and outdated aid structures, there are numerous trends that influence the sphere for change.

Call to Action: The challenges and opportunities it creates, requires sustained analysis, sensing and sense-making, as well as strategic reflection, navigating in uncertainty, and emergent adaptive action.

Collaborating to drive change

COMPLEMENTARITIES AND COLLECTIVE

ACTION: There is an increasing number of actors, organisations and networks focusing on the need to create a more enabling environment for locally-led peacebuilding. The fact that different actors have different approaches to change creates the potential for complementarity within a systems change process that is complex and multifaceted. The Dragonfly Model as outlined in this report offers a way to understand and seek complementarity among change efforts.

Call to Action: There is a need to actively seek complementarity among multiple actors pursuing different approaches and seeking change through diverse leverage points.

GLOBAL CONVENING SPACES FOR LOCALLY-LED PEACEBUILDING:

While there are alliances, platforms, and networks that focus on locally-led peacebuilding, none are currently explicitly focusing on systems change for locally-led peacebuilding. Also, only few of the existing alliances, platforms and networks have a global orientation and representation. In light of the need for complementarity between diverse approaches, it is important to create and convene spaces and bring actors into a joint conversation.

Call to Action: The role and importance of global alliances and platforms in pursuing the agenda of locally-led peacebuilding should be explored further to enable the unfolding of these spaces to shape the agenda and influence those who need to take action to enable locally-led peacebuilding.

CHANGE AGENTS AT THE CORE OF SYSTEMS

CHANGE: Change agents, within and among institutions, organisations and networks, are the key drivers for change. There is a heavy focus on changing institutions and rightly so, however, changing the current international system of support can only happen if driven and nurtured by people from within. Change is more likely to emerge from the ability to support and connect change agents who hold the ambition to create systems change; and to create a space for innovation, cross-fertilisation, complementarity and joint action. Change agents for systems change have many names: rule-breakers, internal co-conspirators, activists, disrupters, systems change companions, network weavers, and so on. Most of them have systems change for locally-led peacebuilding as one of their implicit or explicit change goals. The change agents are all important with their different capacities and potentials to facilitate change.

Call to Action: The main aim for those of us taking on a catalytic role in supporting broader systems change is therefore to create space for change agents to unfold their potential for systems change, individually and collectively.

Endnotes

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- 92 The [Power Awareness Tool](#) by Partos has been designed to make power imbalances more visible, enabling partners to analyse and reflect on power relations. The assumption is that if partners have a better understanding of the way power works in the partnership, they will be in a better position to work towards shifting power in accordance with their shared principles.
- 93 [The Equity Index](#) is a UK social enterprise advocating for greater equity across the international development sector. They aim to measure and track the multiple dimensions of equity in the internal and external workings of UK development organisations to influence meaningful change in their policies, practices, and partnerships. This includes racial and gender equity, equity in knowledge production, in funding, in collaborations and more.

About Conductive Space for Peace

Conductive Space for Peace is an international peacebuilding organisation based in Denmark. We work as a connector in facilitating systemic transformation of the global peacebuilding system by shifting the power to local peacebuilders.

www.conductivespace.org

About Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH

The Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH is one of the major European foundations associated with a private company. It works in the areas of health, education, and global issues. With its charitable activities, it contributes to the development of viable solutions to social challenges.

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