DOING MORE WITH LESS
A NEW TOOLKIT FOR INTEGRATION POLICY

Integration Futures Working Group

By Meghan Benton and Alexandra Embiricos
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For more on the Integration Futures Working Group, visit: www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/integration-futures-working-group.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2015–16 migration crisis thrust immigrant integration into the spotlight in many parts of Europe. Large numbers of immigrants and refugees arrived in need of support settling in to their new societies. Many had limited literacy and had experienced trauma, with possible mental health consequences. The great diversity of the new arrivals’ origins and skill levels also intensified pressures on public services, with heightened need for translation into languages less commonly spoken in Europe and for ways to support people further from the labour market. At the same time, an increase in anti-immigrant rhetoric in political debates—spurred by rising populist and anti-immigrant parties—has constrained political and financial investments in these newcomers.

Integration policymakers from across Europe explored these and other challenges at a Migration Policy Institute Europe roundtable in March 2018 entitled Rethinking Integration Governance: Leadership and Skills to Manage Complex Integration Portfolios. Participants shared both concerns and insights on how the future skillset of integration officials might evolve. One of the main themes of the meeting was that integration policymakers are operating in less than ideal circumstances. Many found themselves in the awkward position of working in a policy area constantly in the media but lacking the political gravitas and big budgets of other policy domains.

To do more with less, integration policymakers can borrow leading-edge practices from other policy areas and from emerging lessons on government innovation.

Among the challenges that integration policymakers face is navigating a constant stream of information in what is—in most European countries—a relatively new policy area, where strong evidence of what works is often lacking. Homing in on the most relevant and reliable information, and making decisions accordingly, is a difficult task. They must also manage increasingly complex and multilayered partnerships with colleagues across government, at regional and city levels, and with nongovernmental partners, requiring them to adapt to different organisational cultures, norms, and systems of accountability and targets. And, of course, integration policymakers must be able to make the case to both colleagues and sceptical publics for investing in vulnerable groups in a way that both minimises public backlash (for instance, by highlighting newcomers’ potential economic contributions) yet manages expectations (for instance, by not promising that all newcomers will find work).

To do more with less, integration policymakers can borrow leading-edge practices from other policy areas and from emerging lessons on government innovation. A number of untapped resources could be better exploited to craft holistic approaches to addressing complex needs, use technology to better pinpoint problems, get buy-in for preventative programming, and develop new solutions through research-driven insights. These include:

- **Using behavioural insights to test interventions that deliver more ‘bang for the buck’**. Unlike traditional policy levers such as regulation and information, behavioural insights or ‘nudge approaches’, draw on insights from social sciences and behavioural economics to design public services that support people to make positive choices. While some tried-and-tested behavioural interventions with relevance to integration policy—such as techniques to improve the representation of minorities in the public sector—could be extrapolated to other countries and settings, most of the potential is still untapped. One of the most promising areas in this regard is reducing segregation in schools and supporting young people to develop empathy and reduce prejudice.

- **Exploring innovative financing models such as social impact bonds to fund unpopular or preventative policies**. Social impact bonds—a financing measure that brings together government, private-sector investors, and third-party service provider—are designed to fund high-risk or innovative social projects without short-term payoffs, especially where spending is allocated to unpopular groups
(e.g., for the rehabilitation of prisoners). Because the government only pays back the private-sector investment if certain outcomes are achieved, this tool could attract new resources and ideas to address integration challenges.

- **Redesigning online and offline public services to improve newcomers’ access.** Most services were designed around the ‘average’ user, and few governments have done the hard work of re-evaluating them to ensure they meet the increasingly diverse needs of the populations they target. Since growing numbers of people—including migrants and refugees—access services online, it is important to make sure that web portals are user-friendly and seamless.

- **Developing foresight skills to plan for challenges around the corner.** With the possibility of another migration crisis around the corner, European governments would do well to strengthen their resilience to future challenges. Yet it can be hard to know where to start. Foresight methods are well established in other policy areas but have not been used extensively in migration.

- **Conducting cost-benefit analyses to improve decision-making and strengthen the case for investments.** The costs of misguided investments in integration programming could be significant, including greater social exclusion or poverty among the children of recent immigrants and refugees. Emerging economic modelling methods can look beyond the immediate costs and savings of programmes to examine the social returns on investments, including to community health and wellbeing.

- **Strengthening evaluation and understanding of what constitutes good evidence.** Integration policy lags behind other policy areas that have seen an evidence revolution. There are numerous opportunities to capitalise on the 2015–16 migration crisis by commissioning evaluations of integration outcomes. At the same time, it is imperative for policymakers to improve their understanding of what constitutes high-quality evidence, how it can be used, and how to best make decisions in its absence.

Taken together, these approaches form the basis of a smarter toolkit for integration policymakers. A new approach to integration policy is not about new tools alone; it also requires a more collaborative approach to problem-solving, drawing on relationships with the private-sector and civil partners, as well as the whole of government.

I. **INTRODUCTION**

The European migration crisis of 2015–16 exposed a massive lack of preparedness for dealing with large-scale immigration inflows, resulting in overwhelmed reception systems and overburdened public services in many EU countries. As countries begin to catch their breath following a lull in migration and consider how to strengthen communities, they must fundamentally change the way they think about—and strive to achieve—integration. Yet in many corners of Europe, policymakers are facing less-than-ideal circumstances. Few governments have the spare resources for radical, experimental, or generous social policies. Meanwhile, a hardening of attitudes toward disadvantaged groups of all stripes, alongside rising populism and nativism, has both made integration a higher-profile issue and reduced public support for investments in it.† Integration policymakers are facing the challenge of doing their jobs in a context where political actors are increasingly questioning the role of migrants in society and integration writ large.

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While countries may lack the public and political mandate to make large investments in integration, the economic and social imperative to do so could not be stronger. Many of the newcomers who arrived in 2015 and 2016 are still struggling to penetrate Europe’s high-skilled labour markets. The shrinking number of low- and middle-skilled jobs—in part because of digitisation and automation—suggests that economic integration will get harder, not easier. The migration crisis also resulted in an increase in people in legal limbo, specifically asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected but who cannot be returned to their origin countries. Without thoughtful interventions, the lasting scars of the migration crisis could include intergenerational poverty; rising crime, homelessness, and social exclusion; greater segregation across all spheres of life; and larger numbers of people in the shadowy economic and legal margins of society—all of which would further erode social cohesion. This, in turn, could further fuel public outrage and distrust regarding governments’ ability to manage the pace of social change, making it harder for policymakers to introduce the tough policies that would prevent these conditions from persisting. In short, countries need to act now to contain the damage.

Many of the newcomers who arrived in 2015 and 2016 are still struggling to penetrate Europe’s high-skilled labour markets.

Against this bleak backdrop, there are fledgling signs of hope and new opportunities, including policy innovations from other fields that integration policymakers could learn from. Whole-of-government approaches are now de rigueur across many subfields of social policy, and well-established processes may offer important lessons for integration. Public services from education to health have shown how borrowing insights from behavioural economics and psychology experiments (through the field of behavioural insights or ‘nudge’ policy) can lead small investments to yield big returns. And a host of new actors—from tech multinationals to social enterprises and start-ups—are interested in lending their bright ideas and diverse approaches to integration challenges, which could ultimately stimulate more innovative and creative thinking among public servants. While many of these tools have not been systematically tested in integration policymaking, they could ultimately lay the groundwork for a new approach to strengthening community cohesion—one that is cost effective.

This report draws on policymaker insights shared during a Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI Europe) roundtable in March 2018 entitled Rethinking Integration Governance: Leadership and Skills to Manage Complex Integration Portfolios. The report summarises discussions on how integration policymakers can do more with less when faced with the challenge of fostering smart, strategic integration policy with limited resources. It takes stock of the current approach to integration taken by many European countries, and then describes tools and processes to better identify, understand, and address cross-cutting social and integration problems. It finishes by evaluating broader, systemic changes that are needed to deliver on the promise that these tools offer.

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3 ‘Behavioural insights’ is an approach to designing policies and interventions, often initially on the basis of pilots and experiments, that draws on evidence from psychology, behavioural economics, and other social sciences. It is sometimes known as the ‘nudge’ approach because the idea is to encourage people to make better choices for themselves and the societies in which they live. For an overview of how behavioural insights could be applied to integration policy, see Meghan Benton, Antonio Silva, and Will Somerville, Applying Behavioural Insights to Support Immigrant Integration and Social Cohesion (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2018), [www.migrationpolicy.org/research/behavioral-insights-immigrant-integration-social-cohesion](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/behavioral-insights-immigrant-integration-social-cohesion).
II. WHY INTEGRATION POLICYMAKING NEEDS AN UPDATE

Unlike traditional policy fields such as education and health, which have a clear scope and boundaries, integration spans multiple policy areas. Almost every ministry and department at each level of government is responsible in some way for the lives of immigrants, whether through housing, planning, and infrastructure at municipal and local government levels, or education, employment, and security policy at regional and national levels. How governments articulate their integration strategy and distribute responsibilities across departments therefore depends on how widely or narrowly they define integration, as well as on decisions about which policy area(s) to group integration with. Since responsibility for integration has been frequently moved across departments in many EU countries, it suffers from something of an identity crisis; officials working on integration policy have had to adapt to constantly changing priorities and definitions of success.

Prior to the migration crisis, a degree of consensus had emerged—especially in European policy circles—that ‘mainstreaming’ and a whole-of-government approach would ensure that policies were appropriately joined up across government ministries. But efforts in this direction were undermined by widespread misunderstanding about what mainstreaming means in practice. While some understood it to mean strengthening public services by updating them to meet the needs of diverse populations, it was also used to justify downgrading integration issues and reducing budgets for immigrant-specific services. The task of ensuring that all public services are fit for diverse and mobile populations—both long-standing and newly arrived—remains unfinished in all European countries.

Since responsibility for integration has been frequently moved across departments in many EU countries, it suffers from something of an identity crisis.

The migration crisis threw the dysfunctions of integration policy into sharp relief. Against the backdrop of large numbers of new arrivals and rising anti-migrant populism, policymakers faced pressure to get integration right and put new ideas on the table, even as integration—almost by definition, since it refers to the process by which newcomers settle in—rarely yields immediate success stories.

In particular, integration policymakers grappled to keep up with five main developments:

- The scale of the challenge. The fast-changing pace and profile of arrivals made anticipating needs and planning difficult. While the large numbers of asylum seekers to Germany in 2015 made the most headlines, smaller countries also received large numbers relative to their population, in many cases concentrated in specific localities. Rising demand resulted in oversubscribed services and delays in accessing language and training programmes. For policymakers, the scale of the challenge also

4 Several countries have seen institutional responsibility for integration change multiple times, often reflecting a desire to align or promote certain policy goals. For example, in 2007, the Netherlands moved integration policy from the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment to the Ministry of Interior to emulate the Canadian approach of targeting selected immigrant entrants to secure better integration outcomes (it has since been moved into the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs).


6 Ibid.

eroded the capacity for learning and institutional memory, as staff members—some relative newcomers to the field—found themselves pulled into urgent new roles. High turnover came at a cost, since much cooperation in the field of integration policy is based on personal relationships.

- **Rising diversity of origins, educational backgrounds, family size, and legal status.** Arrivals since 2014 have greater linguistic diversity than their predecessors. Since it is easier to meet language needs once groups reach a critical mass, this poses challenges for translation and interpretation services. Larger families, as well as a rising number of men arriving alone, created new housing needs in countries such as Germany where most social housing was designed for family units of two to four, exacerbating existing housing bottlenecks. These trends both underscored the importance of rethinking public services for diversity (a mainstreaming approach) and revealed its limitations, given the proliferation of groups with very specific sets of needs.

- **Difficult political and governance context.** The past several years have seen rising animosity toward immigrants across Europe, where publics dissatisfied with government management of migration challenges have shifted their support towards smaller and less established parties. The scale of the challenge also created some multilevel governance frictions. While large cities absorbed the lion’s share of newcomers, many smaller and rural destinations found themselves disproportionately affected, especially as countries introduced new dispersal laws. For instance, in Sweden, a 2016 law made the distribution of asylum seekers among municipalities mandatory.

- **Proliferation of actors engaged in integration issues.** One of the side effects of the high political profile of integration has been a host of new actors getting involved in refugee protection—almost overnight. For instance, during a private-sector roundtable held on the sidelines of the United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants in New York in September 2016, 51 U.S. companies pledged to contribute $650 million to organisations supporting refugees around the world. Meanwhile, 18,000 technologists and social enterprises have signed up to join the Techfugees network and expressed their desire to offer ‘tech for good’ to support refugees. In Europe, numerous employers have offered traineeships and mentoring programmes. And in Germany, almost half of the population was at one point engaged in supporting refugees. This engagement has been something of a double-edged sword: it has brought increased energy, but also increased complexity.

Given these trends, numerous policies were introduced without the space and time for piloting and evaluation. There is growing awareness that traditional measures of integration, such as employment rates, fail to account for the multifaceted nature of the process by which newcomers settle in to a new society. Moreover, for vulnerable groups such as refugees experiencing trauma, socially isolated women, and older newcomers, it has become clear that labour-market participation is not a realistic pathway to success, at least in the short term. Thus, the crisis swiftly outgrew existing metrics for studying the pace and success of integration.

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The changing role of integration policymakers

The trends outlined above have had dramatic and well-documented effects at the macro level. Less often noted is how the role of integration policymakers has changed. Participants at the March 2018 MPI Europe meeting shared both concerns and insights on how the future skillset of integration officials might evolve. While participants described how the migration crisis had raised awareness and, in some cases, increased budgets, others saw the increased attention as a mixed blessing; one attendee said, ‘We have moved from the position that nobody knows about us to where nobody likes us.’ As another put it: ‘You will never win an Oscar for integration.’

Participants also described the considerable and rising demands placed on integration policymakers. Key skills and assets include:15

- **Networking.** Working collaboratively with multiple actors across sectors means integration policymakers need to be able to adapt to organisational cultures, build strategic alliances with other policymakers who may have a different set of behaviours and norms, and translate their goals to align with various accountability targets, budgets, and performance indicators. The process of ‘mainstreaming’ integration into service design across policy areas requires a delicate touch and diplomacy, and can be fraught with difficulty. As described by one meeting participant, ‘Integration policymaking is a balancing act of being sufficiently involved but not stepping on too many toes.’

- **Learning mindset.** Integration policymakers must navigate a constant stream of information from a variety of sources, including civil society, academia, and government ministries such as education, labour, and housing. Understanding this complex policy area requires strong, fact-driven knowledge and analytical skills, and an ability to both translate evidence into practice and to extrapolate general principles from a few concrete examples. As one participant observed, ‘One-third of your time should be dedicated to making sure you know what you are talking about.’

- **Communication.** Defining success in integration is notoriously difficult; integration takes time, and what works depends on the context and community. Finding a way to highlight successes in this context can be difficult; for instance, governments could choose to focus on closing gaps between migrants and natives, or describe how long it takes a newcomer to succeed in the labour market—while these describe the same raw facts, they would likely be spun differently by the media. Also, integration policymakers need to have a clear sense of what success looks like in order to pursue relationships across government; otherwise, as one participant put it, ‘We are knocking on the doors of these different ministries, but we don’t have answers on what works.’ Given that failures cannot be completely avoided, especially in a rapidly evolving policy area, crafting messages of success is vital to maintain public support and foster cooperation across government ministries. But communications of success should not overpromise, lest they create unrealistic expectations or feelings that mixed outcomes are being swept under the rug. As one participant said, ‘A key quality is the ability to be a storyteller: that creates external support for the venture.’

- **Innovation.** Promoting a culture of creativity in the public sector—more known for caution than disruptive innovation—can be a delicate balancing act. Bringing together new methods and skills to tackle complex social problems requires a degree of creativity and the willingness to try out new ideas. This innovation mindset may not be a natural instinct for many civil servants, who face the additional barrier of restrictive government structures and siloes. Building a working culture that embraces experimentation requires strong leadership and a willingness to take risks—but with care and forethought, given what is at stake when the numbers of newcomers are high, as they have been in recent years.

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15 This summarises the discussion in the Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI Europe) Integration Futures Working Group meeting, ‘Rethinking Integration Governance Leadership and Skills to Manage Complex Integration Portfolios’, Brussels, 4 March 2018.


- **Humility.** Although integration policymakers are increasingly required to be jacks-of-all-trades, an individual cannot do everything. Learning to effectively prioritise competing demands is essential. Governments also need to create space to accept failure and manage expectations regarding what is possible.

In addition to the barriers to reform seen across the public sector, integration policymakers face numerous obstacles that flow from the complexity of their policy area. Since the governance of integration has undergone frequent change, people who work in this area can suffer from change fatigue. And the impetus for short-term thinking (and action) may be especially forceful in an area where the public often demands quick fixes, and the rise of populism has reconfigured electoral incentives. All told, the pressure to do much more with less is clear evidence of the need for new tools and tactics in integration policymaking.

### III. NEW TOOLS

The migration crisis demonstrated that integration policymakers must begin to plan for the challenges around the corner if they are to avoid being constantly on the back foot. But this makes innovation more difficult. This section explores some promising tools and approaches from other policy areas and assesses their utility for integration policy.

#### A. Designing low-cost interventions based on ‘behavioural insights’

Other policy fields have demonstrated the potential of behavioural insights (sometimes called ‘nudges’) — a new approach to evidence-based policymaking that draws on cognitive science, psychology, anthropology, and economics to encourage people to make better choices for themselves and the societies in which they live. The aim is to make public services more cost-efficient, effective, and user friendly. Since public services—from education and employment to housing and health—tend to be designed for a ‘typical’ service user, they sometimes employ outdated or misguided assumptions about how people will respond to interventions. By contrast, a behavioural approach rigorously tests how policy interventions affect different groups and adapts public services to ensure they work for users with varying preferences and needs. For instance, experiments informed by behavioural insights have tested how tweaking the wording on a job application for new police officers can help minority applicants perform well.¹⁶

Potential interventions are trialled and tested using methods such as randomised control trials (RCTs) to determine what works and what does not before deciding what initiatives should be scaled. Some of the most impressive examples from other policy areas include encouraging people to pay taxes on time by informing them that others in their area have already done so (such messages are estimated to have brought forward

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¹⁶ One experiment involving an application test for a UK police force examined how using different prompts with candidates from different backgrounds before they took the test affected pass rates. By rewording the reminder email to applicants before the test to make it more welcoming and adding a line asking candidates to consider what becoming a police officer would mean to them and their community, the intervention increased pass rates for minorities. See Elizabeth Linos, Joanne Reinhard, and Simon Ruda, ‘Levelling the Playing Field in Police Recruitment: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Test Performance’, Public Administration Review 95, no. 4 (December 2017): 943–56.
Fostering social cohesion. Evidence from psychology offers a guide for how to build the sorts of characteristics or skills that help people live in diverse societies, such as developing a ‘growth mindset’ that is open to change and does not see people as fixed entities. A host of possible experiments in social cohesion could be trialled in school classrooms, for example, to blur the lines between in-groups and out-groups (see Box 1). These could help young people understand one another’s perspectives and develop empathy.

Narrowing the gaps between immigrant groups and the broader population. Behavioural insights analyses make clear that jobseekers may be facing a high ‘cognitive load’ (pressures on decision-making as a result of the stresses of poverty and unemployment), and thus may not be able to make optimal or long-term decisions about how to invest their time in looking for work or training. These findings may be especially pertinent for newly arrived migrants and refugees. As governments try to improve participation in training and employment, including through integration contracts that outline the obligations and entitlements of newly arrived immigrants, they could look to behavioural insights for tools other than sanctions to improve compliance with training or job-seeking commitments, which have the potential to be more effective.

Addressing low take-up of public services, voter registration, and citizenship. Behavioural insights have been used in a number of countries to improve take-up of public services, citizenship, and voter registration. Making digital services as user friendly as possible and using text messages and other reminders can improve usage of services (as has been done to boost participation in preventative

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20 For instance, one randomised control trial (RCT) explored the impact of encouraging a ‘growth mindset’ by teaching a class of children that everyone has the potential to change. The goal was to encourage understanding of others’ perspectives and help reduce discrimination. A month after the intervention, the children who were taught these skills showed a reduction in aggression and retaliation by almost 40 per cent, and a more than 300 per cent increase in ‘prosocial behaviour’ (actions designed to help others). See David Scott Yeager, Kali H. Trzesniewski, and Carol S. Dweck, ‘An Implicit Theories of Personality Intervention Reduces Adolescent Aggression in Response to Victimization and Exclusion’, Child Development 84, no. 3 (May 2013): 970–88.


23 The Behavioural Insights Team ran a trial with the UK Department for Work and Pensions and Public Employment Service (Jobcentre Plus) to redesign the benefits and job search process. Advisors pushed jobseekers to conduct a greater number of job searches rather than just fulfilling minimum requirements. The results included a five-point increase in jobseekers finding employment/leaving benefits, and improvements in staff happiness. A larger-scale trial found smaller but still positive effects. See Behavioural Insights Team, The Behavioural Insights Team: Update Report 2013–2015.
health check-ups),\textsuperscript{24} which could ultimately save countries money in the long run. Efforts to encourage citizenship acquisition are among the most advanced; a trial currently running in New York State offers eligible applicants the chance to win a voucher to cover the costs of naturalisation, doubling application rates.\textsuperscript{25} Trials in London are using the citizenship acquisition process to encourage applicants to be active members of society as volunteers, voters, and blood donors.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Box 1. Five ideas for experiments to promote social cohesion: A behavioural approach}

\textbf{1. Perspective-taking and empathy.} Experiments have shown that encouraging people to consider someone else’s experiences can reduce stereotypes and break down barriers. Applications to integration policy could include teaching young people about how societies change over time. For instance, Indian immigrants to the United Kingdom, who often worked as shopkeepers in prior decades, are now well represented in the medical and legal professions. Or virtual reality could be used to introduce young people to how others (including immigrants) experience life, following on from experiments that have used this technology to show participants what it is like to be disabled or colour-blind.

\textbf{2. Encouraging people to identify their similarities.} Doing so, experiments have found, can reduce focus on differences. For instance, 15- and 16-year-olds working with the National Citizen Service in the United Kingdom expressed higher levels of trust during ‘icebreakers’ (i.e., group conversations) that focused on team members’ similarities than those that focused on their differences, including strengths and weaknesses. An application that might reduce segregation in schools would be to publish data on school diversity that focus on shared characteristics within neighbourhoods instead of on different ethnic or socioeconomic backgrounds.

\textbf{3. Promoting social mixing.} Extensive research has shown that increased contact between groups can reduce conflict and prejudice. Efforts to foster social mixing could include designing nudges (e.g., free food or snacks) to encourage students to sit in different seats at lunchtime, to reduce the likelihood they will only socialise with those from the same racial or ethnic background. Students could also be encouraged to discuss things they have in common with peers they have not yet spoken with. While increasing direct contact between groups has the greatest effect, even indirect contact can have positive effects—this could include immersion exercises that encourage students to ‘walk in each other’s shoes’ or immersive theatre, where the audience moves around and can interact with actors and settings.

\textbf{4. Using competitive play to strengthen bonds and promote cooperation.} Evidence suggests that competition between groups can strengthen bonds within groups and promote cooperation. For instance, students might be assigned to teams based on random characteristics (e.g., red or green t-shirts) to promote bonding within newly formed, multietnic groups. This approach is based on the reality that, while in-group bias cannot be eradicated, people often identify with multiple, overlapping groups.

\textbf{5. Cooperative learning to foster social connections.} When groups of students from different backgrounds teach and learn from one another, this can promote positive interethnic attitudes and intergroup friendships. Cooperative learning activities could bring together students from segregated schools to learn collaboratively. In Northern Ireland, for example, shared education programmes for pupils from Catholic and Protestant schools encouraged cross-group friendships and greater trust.


\textsuperscript{24} An intervention in the United States found that texting low-income individuals who had not seen a primary care physician to say they had been selected for a free check-up had greater results than informing them that they were entitled to a check-up or prompting them to ‘take care of yourself so you can take care of the ones you love’. See Behavioral Insights Team North America, \textit{Behavioral Insights for Cities} (New York: Behavioral Insights Team North America, 2016), \url{www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications/behavioral-insights-for-making-cities-better/}.

\textsuperscript{25} Immigration Policy Lab, ‘Lifting Barriers to Citizenship’ (policy brief, Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford, CA, January 2018), \url{www.immigrationlab.org/project/equal-access-citizenship/}.

\textsuperscript{26} Greater London Authority, \textit{All of Us: The Mayor’s Strategy for Social Integration} (London: Greater London Authority, 2018), 44, \url{www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/social_integration_strategy.pdf}. 
While these possibilities are highly promising, the potential of behavioural insights to promote integration has not been rigorously assessed. When it comes to integration, it is difficult to identify concrete outcomes that can be measured in a reasonable timeframe, a process core to the behavioural approach. Developing measurable indicators for ‘soft’ outcomes such as community cohesion and feelings of belonging associated with positive integration could, in theory, allow RCTs to evaluate the success of interventions on a societal level.27

Another challenge is knowing where to start, especially in a situation of limited funding. Moreover, because the application of behavioural insights crosses government policy areas, it is difficult to know who should lead these types of initiatives. Yet even if the exact path is unclear, the relative low cost of many behavioural interventions suggests that the approach is worth investing in, especially because even small changes (such as a 5 to 7 per cent increase in service take-up or positive attitudes) can result in significant savings and positive benefits when scaled up. Since the approach is experimental and evidence based, it recommends that interventions start with small trials that are robustly evaluated before being scaled up, instead of introducing untested, structural reforms from the onset.

B. Funding the unpopular: Innovative financing models

Social impact bonds (SIBs) can help bring in external funding for programmes that might otherwise struggle to attract the necessary financial or political capital, either because their results take a long time to materialise or because they benefit politically unpopular groups, including migrants and refugees.

Such an approach is especially promising in the current fiscal climate, where innovative social projects that are high risk and do not promise short-term payoffs rarely get prioritised. SIBs remove the risk of such investments by requiring governments to pay only if certain results are achieved, in what is sometimes called the ‘payment-by-results’ model. SIBs have been used to attract investment in efforts to overcome some of the thorniest social challenges. One high-profile example involves Peterborough prison in the United Kingdom, where the reoffence rate of adult male offenders who served a relatively short sentence was reduced by 9 per cent overall compared to a control group by providing ‘through-the-gate’ and post-release support in the form of case workers who assessed their support needs and planned rehabilitation activities.28

SIBs remove the risk of such investments by requiring governments to pay only if certain results are achieved.

To work, SIBs require clear definitions of success and benchmarks to assess progress along the lifecycle of the project. Because the business model is based on demonstrating impact, projects are required to report on outcomes, such as employment rates, as opposed to outputs, such as number of participants graduating from the programme. This has several benefits, including demanding greater impact measurement and data gathering from the implementing partners on the ground. Another key strength of SIBs is their structure, which by design involves strong multistakeholder partnerships. Often, these public-private partnerships are composed of several contracting partners, which can include the service provider (e.g., a nongovernmental organisation, or NGO), an initial investor that provides up-front capital (e.g., a private sector company), an outcomes payer

27 The Behavioural Insights Team uses a questionnaire to measure social indicators of integration, which can be given to participants at various stages in the trial. The questionnaire provides a benchmark to compare results of the RCT, such as changes in perception of others before and after an intervention.

(e.g., government), and an independent evaluator that measures the impact and outcomes of the intervention. Thus, this model encourages collaboration between diverse partners that might not usually interact. If the project is successful, the investor is reimbursed (usually by the government); if not, the investor will lose some or all of their capital.

Thus far, only a few SIBs have addressed integration, even though the model shows considerable promise in this policy area. Examples include, in Belgium, the ‘DUO for a JOB’ SIB, which matched mentors (most of them recent retirees) with young migrants who had arrived within the past five years. In 2017, 74 per cent of the 648 ‘duos’ resulted in a positive outcome, including a short-term or permanent contract, traineeship, or further studies. In Finland, a SIB for the employment of immigrants piloted in 2016 and trialled for three years is expected to support the integration of at least 2,000 migrants through the provision of training and job-matching assistance.

While the model appears promising for integration, several challenges could undermine its effectiveness if not successfully managed. First, it is important to define success and how it will be measured. Key social indicators, such as professional networks or a sense of belonging, are critical but more difficult to measure than narrow employment indicators that provide only a small snapshot of one aspect of integration. Second, all partners must manage risk. If a project fails to achieve desirable outcomes the investor can lose some or all of their capital. Private investors in particular might find it difficult to risk their returns on investment, given much is untested in integration. Third, SIBs’ complex partnerships demand considerable time and human resources. Innovative yet inexperienced social enterprises would quickly be overwhelmed by overinvestment, and service providers often experience a steep learning curve. Governments could consider issuing multiple contracts dealing with similar social issues under the same SIB, allowing for smaller portions of money to be intelligently invested in earlier stage projects.

Governments interested in using SIBs should therefore start by analysing their application across areas of integration policy, focusing on those where it is especially critical to transfer financial risk or where it is difficult to make the case for up-front investment and prevention. In the process it is important to consider whether social service providers have the capacity to adapt to the demands of financing tied to results, and whether other financing mechanisms have been considered.

35 Gustafsson-Wright and Boggild-Jones, ‘Paying for Social Outcomes’.
C. Designing services around user needs

Governments could improve the efficiency and effectiveness of services by streamlining the user experience and pathways between different services. If newly arrived immigrants find it difficult to navigate services and find the right sources of support, this can generate problems and costs further down the line. In one classic example, newcomers unsure of how to register to see a doctor end up in the emergency room for an illness that would have been otherwise straightforward to treat. Other barriers to services can create social costs; for instance, migrants unsure of how the waste and recycling system works may end up upsetting their neighbours by inadvertently breaking local social norms. Or people may fall through the net as they transition from targeted services for new arrivals to mainstream services.

If newly arrived immigrants find it difficult to navigate services and find the right sources of support, this can generate problems and costs further down the line.

Efforts to improve access to services fall into a number of categories:

- **Co-location under one roof.** The gold standard here is Portugal’s National Immigrant Support Centres (CNAI), which bring together eight government agencies into a one-stop shop. These centres offer a range of advice on migrant issues, run interpretation services, offer ‘sociocultural mediators’ who explain processes in a linguistically and culturally appropriate way, and provide community development work. Offering such services in close proximity has been shown to improve uptake and user experience, to enable providers to speak to one another, share information, and create more efficient processes. This model draws on a long tradition of co-located centres that serve the broader population, for instance, by bringing together health services, job training, child welfare, housing assistance, and domestic violence services in rural areas.

- **Two-generation programmes.** This variant of co-located services has emerged in the United States and is based on the recognition that the success of children depends on the wellbeing and stability of their parents and families. Since immigrant parents often prioritise their children’s education, linking services for children and other family members can act as a route to address their needs. Initiatives that follow this model may combine child care and health services for children with basic language and literacy for adults, alongside cultural orientation, physical and mental health, housing needs, parenting support, and workforce training and support. Elements of successful programmes include bilingual staff with sensitivities to home languages and cultures, support building the social capital of immigrant families (for instance, peer support networks for new mothers), a holistic needs assessment (including through home visits), and strong relationships with immigrant associations.

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38 An external evaluation of the CNAI found that users were overwhelmingly satisfied and that they found the quality of service at the CNAI higher than during other encounters with similar institutions. See Maria Abranches, *Evaluation of National Immigrant Support Centres—Portugal* (Lisbon: International Organisation for Migration, 2007).


Since access to some benefits and services may be restricted to certain family members (specially in mixed-status families), programmes have to be creative in the way they ‘braid’ funding together from multiple sources.\(^{42}\)

### Improving transitions between services

When certain vulnerable or underserved communities move between statuses, they can lose access to certain services. For instance, when asylum seekers are granted refugee status in the United Kingdom, they move from government accommodation in the asylum system to mainstream benefits and accommodation systems, but the period of transition takes four weeks; refugee families not receiving the right support are at risk of becoming homeless during this four-week period. The Behavioural Insights Team in London is investigating the use of small nudges to encourage refugees to register for housing and services, such as by clarifying the communications they receive, automatically booking interviews with job and benefits systems, and setting up housing system appointments.\(^{43}\)

### Employing design principles

Human-centred design principles seek to understand the complex needs of various target groups when designing services. For instance, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration commissioned an analysis of how people from different nationalities, ages, and life stages experienced immigration services, based on complaints and intensive case studies, to identify blockages, bottlenecks, and frustrations in the user experience.\(^{44}\) Similarly, the U.S. government digital service 18F spoke to dozens of people who had been through the naturalisation process and interviewed frontline officials and other staff to help the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) update their naturalisation form to make it easier to follow, and to create a benefit-finding tool to help individuals see what programmes and resources they are eligible for.\(^{45}\) Efforts that follow good design principles often involve changes to the wording, format, and touchpoints that people come into contact with, based on evidence on how people use services.

### Providing information in multiple languages and/or formats

A similar approach is to simplify information or make it available in multiple forms. The UK Government Digital Service has a goal of rewriting all government digital communications for a reading age of 9, considered the lowest level at which it is still possible to convey complex information.\(^{46}\) Such an approach is likely to help migrants and refugees with limited English language proficiency, but a more direct approach is to translate government websites into multiple languages.\(^{47}\) To reach people with limited literacy, storyboards and pictures are another option. For instance, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees redesigned all of its documents on the asylum process to explain the process to people with limited or no language proficiency or literacy.\(^{48}\)

In a digitised world where many migrants and refugees rely on the internet and social media for information, designing services around user needs has to involve a heavy focus on digital services—not just the design of websites, but the ease of online applications, the accessibility of online information through smartphones, and the provision of information through social media. At the same time, it is important to understand that an individual’s proficiency in using a smartphone to contact family and friends through Facebook or WhatsApp

\(^{42}\) Ibid.


\(^{44}\) For instance, they found that one-third of users had difficulties dealing with written text. As a result, they identified some design principles that would shape all future information. See Anders Kjeseth Valdersnes, 'Guiding Principles for Immigration Services', Livework Studio, accessed 5 November 2018, [www.liveworkstudio.com/client-cases/udi_guiding-principles-for-immigration-services/](http://www.liveworkstudio.com/client-cases/udi_guiding-principles-for-immigration-services/).


\(^{47}\) The German Credential Recognition portal is a best-in-class example.

\(^{48}\) German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), ‘Asylum and Refugee Protection’, accessed 5 November 2018, [www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/asyl/index_node.html](http://www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/asyl/index_node.html).
does not mean that someone will be able to claim their benefits online, or that they have reliable access to data or Wi-Fi. Understanding the various ways that digital exclusion and lack of digital proficiency can interact to create blockages and barriers to services is key.49

Technologists and officials who work in digital services often make the point that the process of digitisation has to involve a redesign of the whole service, thinking through both its online and offline elements. For instance, governments that wish to assess how open the process of registering children for school is to migrants and refugees might wish to interview a sample of migrant parents on their experiences of this process, including which service providers they interacted with, where they sought information, and all forms of contact (phone, web, personal meetings, letters) that they used in their ‘user journey’.50 Moreover, redesigning offline and online services together can identify opportunities for greater efficiencies. For instance, in health services, apps and digital tools are being developed that help people prepare for doctors’ appointments as a way to make better use of the time people have with service providers.51 In general, the rising diversity of populations points to the need for more rigorous testing of how migrants and refugees behave as service users.

D. Planning for future challenges: Foresight methods

With seismic changes to labour markets on the horizon, ageing populations and rising welfare costs in Europe, climate change, geopolitical unrest, and demographic change in Africa, it has become more important than ever to plan for future challenges and consider the implications of various scenarios for migration and integration policy.

Futures or ‘foresight’ methods such as horizon scanning and scenario planning have long been used to help governments understand emerging trends and better plan for the future.52 Foresight methods identify emerging issues, explore how external drivers of change are shaping different systems, develop scenarios to explore what new challenges may emerge, and then develop and test strategies and policies to see if they are resilient across a range of features.53 This approach is not about predicting the future but encouraging policymakers to think outside their usual sphere of reference and mode of working.54

These scenario exercises have been instrumental in driving through important change, as when a group of prominent politicians, academics, and business leaders discussed how to negotiate the transition to democracy in post-apartheid South Africa, which was critical in brokering political compromise.55 But while foresight is a common part of policy and planning in international relations, defence, and environmental policy, there

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53 Participant discussion during the ‘Rethinking Integration Governance’ meeting.


are few examples in migration or integration. Foresight exercises in other policy areas often intersect with migration and integration issues, such as those that have explored the future of welfare systems, identity, governance, skills policy, globalisation, and the future of Europe, but they have rarely focused on migration or integration alone.

Policymakers interested in pursuing futures methods in these areas should be clear about whether the goal is diagnosing underexamined challenges and planning for potential risks, or identifying new solutions and approaches. For instance, the European Commission’s 2017 white paper on scenarios for the future of Europe was criticised by some as an alternative to articulating a clear vision. If futures reports are seen as tokenistic rather than serving a real purpose, they will struggle to get buy-in among key audiences.

Another key parameter is the time period in question. Horizon scanning can be extremely helpful in managing risks. But the longer out that policymakers wish to plan, the greater the uncertainty. Beyond two to three years, it becomes difficult to make predictions. However, this is precisely the timeframe that could be most advantageous for helping them move beyond their usual planning processes, which tend to be tied to electoral cycles.

Horizon scanning can be extremely helpful in managing risks. But the longer out that policymakers wish to plan, the greater the uncertainty.

Finally, the question of which actors should lead and engage with this exercise can make the difference between success and failure. Officials responsible for everyday integration challenges may be under pressure to prioritise short-term challenges, rather than plan for long-term risks. As a result, there might be a case for creating independent roles or bodies that perform a foresight function, and for ensuring that these are insulated from the political world. However, architects of foresight exercises need to ensure that those who will be consumers of the final product (i.e., policymakers) will also own the process, to some extent. Conducting a foresight exercise provides an opportunity to bring together people from different ministries with those from outside government who have specific expertise. By contrast, outsourcing to consultants and then bringing in government only at the final stages will have less impact. It is important to gather the right experts around the table, which may be especially complex in migration and integration policy, which depends on so many


60 Discussion at a foresight workshop during a Integration Futures Working Group roundtable.

different fields, from terrorism and global instability to labour markets and communities. Participants will need to bridge expertise that is thematic, regional, and methodological. Ultimately, it is important to get buy-in from and explain to participants the value of a foresight exercise, as well as to have senior leadership guiding the process.

E. Assessing the social returns on investments: Cost-benefit analysis

Many Western European countries have dramatically ramped up spending on integration, in the hope that it will help the large numbers of recent arrivals find work and settle into their new societies. But very little is known about where best to target these investments. Few governments have good data on what constitutes value for money in integration since investments rarely pay off right away. Moreover, very few evaluations of policies can prove causality (i.e., that certain outcomes are the result of a specific intervention), and even high-quality evaluations generally only look at the short-term effects of policies. Given that integration takes time, as do many of the benefits of integration programmes, policymakers may struggle to prioritise investments. In fact, they may find it difficult to make the case for investments at all, especially in light of rising animosity toward migrants and spending on their needs. As one participant in the March 2018 MPI Europe roundtable put it, ‘We have to explain that the cost of integration is less than the cost of nonintegration.’

Few governments have good data on what constitutes value for money in integration since investments rarely pay off right away.

Doing so is no easy task, but it may be possible. Other policy areas, such as health or criminal justice, have seen a revolution in evidence (marked by greater emphasis on high-quality evaluation) and in the ways that this evidence is used (including a greater emphasis on value for money and cost-benefit analysis). There are now established methods for predicting the likely cost savings associated with a particular programme. In particular, these economic modelling methods look beyond the fiscal benefits of a programme (i.e., money saved in taxes) to quantify long-term effects by translating the social benefit of, for example, reducing crime or improving public health into a monetary figure. These techniques are especially promising for refugee and migrant integration, since integration takes a long time and the greatest potential costs of not intervening are thought to be persistent social exclusion and intergenerational disadvantage—that is, investment goes much further than just the cost of supporting newcomers who are out of work.

62 The difficulties of planning for migration are clearly illustrated by an OECD report that predates the migration crisis: OECD, *The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries*.


64 Participant comments during the ‘Rethinking Integration Governance’ meeting.
Such methods allow researchers to model the likely long-term outcomes of interventions—even in the absence of robust evaluation evidence on such interventions, which may be brand new. In other words, it allows decisionmakers to say: if a training programme has its desired effect, policymakers can expect that for every X euros of investment, they will receive a Y-euro return over a 30-year time period.

MPI Europe has recently scoped the potential for economic modelling that would look at the long-term and social effects of labour-market integration programmes, beyond mere tax income and public spending. There are four basic steps to such an analysis: (1) including a social-welfare function that specifies how to count people’s interests and whose interests to include, (2) working out a wide set of immediate outcomes that could plausibly be attributed to the programme—such as job quality and skills acquisition—even if they are based on predictions rather than evidence, (3) modelling the causal connection between such initial outcomes and broader social effects, and (4) establishing the monetary value of the total socioeconomic impact. Done right, such an exercise could help policymakers reassure sceptical publics and the ministries that hold the purse strings that it is worth investing in integration. For example, this kind of modelling would find a way to operationalise the point that migrants’ integration merits investment to avoid greater long-run costs (such as social exclusion or criminality in subsequent generations).

While this approach shows considerable promise, it is currently limited by the weak evidence on integration. The MPI Europe methodology recommends using existing ‘causal mechanisms’—literature on how the immediate outcomes of interventions might ultimately affect other social goals—as the basis of the economic modelling. But since very little of this literature is specific to immigrants, let alone refugees, right now any economic model would have to handle considerable uncertainty. Any cost-benefit analysis should therefore be accompanied by efforts to improve the quality of evidence on integration policy as a way to improve the robustness of estimates (see Section III.F.).

However, this is not to say that the exercise of thinking through the possible social returns on investment is pointless. Just the process of articulating the desired and possible effects of an intervention, especially when based on rigorous evidence, could lead to better outcomes in the long run. In particular, such an exercise could help clarify the time period in which policymakers might expect to see a payoff from a particular investment, which could guide them as they manage public expectations of integration policy.

F. Understanding what works: An evidence revolution in integration policy?

Very few evaluations of integration efforts are robust enough to prove that differences in outcomes were caused by the intervention. While a handful of RCTs—often described as the gold standard of evaluation—have been carried out in the integration field, most of these are limited to pilot studies or experiments inves-

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65 Meghan Benton and Paul Diegert, *A Needed Evidence Revolution: Using Cost-Benefit Analysis to Improve Refugee Integration Programming* (Brussels: MPI Europe, 2018), www.migrationpolicy.org/research/cost-benefit-analysis-refugee-integration-programming. For instance, this methodology recommends exploring how investments in labour-market-integration programmes for new arrivals might ultimately affect the second generation. Researchers can model how parental skills development and work affect children, and then calculate what these effects could mean for children’s lifetime earnings. It can also begin to put a value on social cohesion, by modelling the relationship between integration outcomes and reducing crime or neighbourhood segregation. The ultimate metric of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), a technique used in cost-benefit analysis in health policy, can translate many of these social benefits into a financial figure. This can lead to an economic analysis more in line with what the public actually cares about.

66 These include how people build social networks, the relationship between unemployment and wage scarring (whereby workers experience long-term costs to their wages), and how parental stress and poverty affect children’s earnings. Ibid.
tigating how small changes in the provision of public services affect outcomes. Moreover, there is a significant lack of longitudinal evidence on long-term integration dynamics. In some countries, resistance to more data collection and indicators in the area of integration may reflect a perception that the European Commission is checking up on EU Member States.

For instance, an evaluation of intensive counselling and coaching in the Public Employment Service (PES) in Sweden assigned participants into either treatment (intensive coaching) or control (regular introduction programmes) groups and found that intensive coaching increased the chance of employment. The study assessed measures such as intensive counselling and coaching by PES caseworkers to see whether these improve the employment prospects of new immigrants in Sweden. A pilot introduction program was implemented from October 2006 to June 2008. Within the nine participating municipalities, new immigrants were randomly assigned into either treatment or control groups. The introduction programmes targeted immigrants who had been granted permanent residency on humanitarian grounds and their families. At the end of the observation period, the treatment group showed a higher relative likelihood of regular employment, by almost 6 percentage points (at 20 per cent compared to 14 per cent). See Pernilla Andersson Joona and Lena Nekby, ‘Intensive Coaching of New Immigrants: An Evaluation Based on Random Program Assignment’, *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 114, no. 2 (2012): 575–600. Another trial examined the impact of early registration with the PES. See Pernilla Andersson Joona and Lena Nekby, ‘TIPping the Scales towards Greater Employment Chances? Evaluation of a Trial Introduction Program (TIP) for Newly-Arrived Immigrants Based on Random Program Assignment’ (discussion paper 4072, IZA Institute of Labour Economics, Bonn, Germany, March 2009), www.iza.org/publications/dp/4072/tipping-the-scales-towards-greater-employment-chances-evaluation-of-a-trial-introduction-program-tip-for-newly-arrived-immigrants-based-on-random-program-assignment.


The 2015–16 migration crisis attracted new interest from think tanks, foundations, academics, and young researchers interested in contributing to the evidence base for integration outcomes. However, these actors do not necessarily know where to invest. The crisis generated some natural experiments that researchers could leverage to fill some of these gaps. For instance, if particular regions were required to accept a certain portion of refugees,\textsuperscript{70} and this allocation was random, researchers could examine variation in the outcomes of refugees in different localities. Policies introduced on a national level at the height of the flows could allow researchers to compare outcomes for cohorts with similar demographics that arrived before and after the change. And the different treatment of asylum seekers from different countries (for instance, where certain services were offered to asylum seekers from countries with a high recognition rate and denied to those from elsewhere) could create a de facto control group, as could delayed access to services in places where they were oversubscribed.\textsuperscript{71}

Governments could help academics invest in high-quality research in these areas. They could also support these efforts by making administrative data freely available. Meanwhile, civil-society organisations could consider creating a platform for greater coordination and collaboration in the field of refugee evaluation, including by encouraging PhD students and early career researchers towards high-value research questions such as those that pertain to intergenerational dynamics.

Finally, there may be scope for creating a ‘clearing house’ of evidence on what works in integration policy. This could be modelled on the What Works Centres in the United Kingdom, which synthesise existing evidence, translate it into a format that policymakers can act on, disseminate it to the wider field, support practitioners and service providers in how to use it, and support the production of primary evidence. These centres were set up to imbue social policy with the same high standards of evidence as exists in medical services. For instance, in education policy alone, the centres have compiled more than 10,000 studies, and conducted more than a hundred of their own large-scale RCTs, in the past five years.\textsuperscript{72} Evidence collected by the centres has already been used to make big policy decisions; for instance, more than 22,000 police officers in London are being issued with body cameras because evidence indicates that such cameras can reduce allegations against the police by a third party and support the prosecution of violent crimes.\textsuperscript{73}

In the interim, policymakers could rely on systematic assessments of the quality of evidence before proceeding with policy changes, basing decisions on more comprehensive evidence of where the gaps lie. Senior officials could also support training programmes for junior colleagues on how to understand the quality of evidence.

### IV. MANAGING COMPLEX PARTNERSHIPS IN A NEW MIGRATION LANDSCAPE

The 2015–16 migration crisis generated huge cross-sectoral interest in the integration of arriving refugees and asylum seekers. Those engaging with integration activities expanded from traditional actors such as govern-

\textsuperscript{70} The German model is a near example of random allocation. Each of Germany's Länder is allocated a certain number of asylum seekers according to the ‘EASY System’, a quota system that takes into account factors including tax revenue and number of inhabitants. However, the decision about which individual asylum seekers are allocated to which Länder is not always random, as those with special needs and vulnerabilities may be directed to a Land with a specialised reception facility, or those from a specific origin region may be settled in an area with translators to accommodate their language needs. See BAMF, ‘Initial Distribution of Asylum Seekers (EASY)’, accessed 13 December 2018, [www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsyl/Erstverteilung/erstverteilung-node.html](http://www.bamf.de/EN/Fluechtlingsschutz/AblaufAsyl/Erstverteilung/erstverteilung-node.html); Deutsche Welle, ‘North-Rhine Westphalia Minister Demands “Equal Distribution” of North African Refugees’, Deutsche Welle, 26 January 2016, [www.dw.com/en/north-rhine-westphalia-minister-demands-equal-distribution-of-north-african-refugees/a-19006066](http://www.dw.com/en/north-rhine-westphalia-minister-demands-equal-distribution-of-north-african-refugees/a-19006066).

\textsuperscript{71} Benton and Diegert, A Needed Evidence Revolution.


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
ments and NGOs, to include the private sector, social enterprises, and civil-society initiatives. Representative of the private sector such as Volkswagen have pledged ‘Refugee Aid’ commitments from emergency assistance to monetary donations;\(^7^4\) civil-society groups and social enterprises have initiated new projects to promote refugee integration, and individuals have volunteered in large numbers during and in the years following the crisis.

This has resulted in the need to manage increasingly complex partnerships and portfolios within a shifting landscape of new actors with varying skill sets and knowledge of migration and integration. For example, a tech company may have thorough knowledge of the skills required for that sector, but less understanding of the challenges refugees face, such as the importance of securing a stable legal status or adequate housing that would enable them to participate more fully in upskilling initiatives or vocational training. Alternatively, self-organised civil-society initiatives may have a good grasp of the social challenges faced by refugees adapting to new societies, but lack knowledge of how to engage with the private sector, foundations, or governments to secure funding.

The evolving role of integration policymakers could include managing relations between the widening field of integration actors, with the aims of ensuring that best practices are effectively gathered and shared, and that partnerships between government and other actors are facilitated.

A. Managing partnerships with nongovernmental actors

As governments increasingly invest in or conduct joint integration projects with nontraditional actors, policymakers must navigate an expanding array of complex relationships outside the policy circle. Such partnerships risk being derailed by differing professional cultures, standards, and power dynamics. For example, a profit-driven company and a grassroots NGO may speak different languages when it comes to defining success. One may focus on data-driven growth targets, the other on the social impact within communities. Meanwhile, governments may struggle to gain the trust and enlist the support of NGOs and activists, particularly when working on politically divisive topics. Partnerships involving actors from different professional backgrounds and outlooks need to develop a shared language with mutually defined expectations.

Such partnerships risk being derailed by differing professional cultures, standards, and power dynamics.

Getting the balance right requires an understanding of which constellations of cross-sectoral partnerships can serve which aims. Certain partnerships are better placed to achieve some goals than others: if scaling up a proven, successful project is the aim, governments, foundations, or the private sector can invest capital either upfront or incrementally, depending on the size and administrative capacity of the organisation, the professional experience and background of staff, and the ability to deliver measurable outcomes. Alternatively, if stimulating new innovations is the aim, then smaller incremental funding accompanied by greater mentoring and peer support could be considered.

Several models have already been tested for various combinations, involving two or more partners working on integration topics. Each variant of a ‘hybrid partnership’ presents its own set of challenges based on the professional experience and perspectives of the actors. For example, the private sector can invest new capital, and is increasingly offering donations in-kind (e.g., Airbnb\(^7^5\) rooms or Coursera\(^7^6\) services for refugees), but

companies often lack the knowledge of when, how, and where to invest for the best impact, and initiatives may end up being small in scale or missing poorly defined or unrealistic targets.

On the other hand, civil-society organisations and social enterprises working on migrant inclusion are often small and thus flexible enough to adjust to changing needs, as identified through their unique vantage point working side by side with—or even being co-created by—refugees and migrants. However, such small-scale and often localised initiatives can lack the resources and expertise to scale, or even simply sustain, their activities or to measure their impact.

Of the wide array of social initiatives that developed novel or innovative approaches to coping with the inclusion challenges brought about by the 2015–16 migration crisis, many ultimately did not succeed. The danger of too much innovation is that it generates shiny new ‘solutions’ with comparatively little impact. For example, while technology brings the opportunity to effect change at a large scale, a culture of ‘failing fast’ could find vulnerable refugees reliant on a service that disappears from one day to the next.77

The danger of too much innovation is that it generates shiny new ‘solutions’ with comparatively little impact.

To achieve lasting impact, partnerships need to play on the strengths of stakeholders and help foster communication between actors from different organisational cultures. Done right, partnerships can allow policymakers to ‘outsource’ the risky and costly early stages of project ideation and prototyping. This can be done in several ways, from pioneering new funding mechanisms to investing in civil-society projects (such as social impact bonds, as discussed in Section III. B.) to brokering partnerships between social entrepreneurs and NGOs with greater contextual knowledge.

1. Private sector

Models for private-sector engagement in integration are varied and include:

- **In-kind or financial support for civil society.** Since 2015, the private sector has supported a range of civil-society organisations. Examples include tech companies giving office space, laptops, or cash donations to tech start-ups working on refugee integration. For example, the German social enterprise CodeDoor, which offers scholarships to train refugees to enter the labour market as coders, was given free use of office space by Salesforce as part of its corporate social responsibility strategy.78 This support model provides crucial initial investment in an organisation’s operations; however, it often falls short of the longer-term support needed to ensure the sustainability of an organisation, and operations could cease if support were withdrawn.

- **Mentoring partnerships.** Instead of hardware, office space, or financial donations, private companies can dedicate employees’ time to mentoring refugees with a desire to work in the same sector. Social enterprises focused on labour-market integration often create ‘buddy programmes’. Many civil-society organisations in Germany have adopted this model, including the Digital Career Institute, where a 12-month course includes mentoring and site visits to companies.79


- **Vocational training and apprenticeships.** Large companies such as those involved in car manufacturing, telecommunications, or industry can participate in vocational training courses for refugees in alignment with government accreditation requirements to train refugees to enter the workforce. This enables newcomers to gain valuable in-country skills, facilitate networking and language skills, and increase knowledge of workplace culture in their host countries. For example, the German Federal Employment Agency has coordinated with the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees to develop vocational language training, offered in cooperation with employers and trade unions, ideally on the job.\(^80\) Sweden offers unaccompanied minors apprenticeships through its integration programme.\(^81\) Both the Swedish and German models are government-funded examples of joint public-private programming.

- **Investing in innovative funding models.** Private companies are uniquely placed as partners and investors in innovative financing models (e.g., SIBs or payment-by-results) to support refugee inclusion. Such models outsource the risk from government, and successful investments are paid back in full.

- **Sustainability-driven partnerships.** These longer-term partnerships involve a more hands-on approach and can include larger and sustained investment of capital and in-kind donations combined with mentoring, peer support, knowledge exchange, and administrative support. One best practice is a model operated by the Portuguese High Commission for Migration, whereby civilian-led social projects that support newcomers’ integration can apply to the government for micro-grants, but first they must be partnered with a larger NGO. Established NGO partners provide administrative and financial support while creating a professional learning environment that encourages the sharing of knowledge and best practices. Simultaneously, the NGO benefits from an in-house innovation hub. This kind of synergy reduces the repetition of activities among projects and encourages organisations to break out of their siloes.\(^82\)

As governments consider how to get the greatest value from private-sector partnerships, an important question will be how to maintain support even as public interest in integration issues fades. One option is to seek to create lasting partnerships instead of programmes. The Bristol Mayor’s Office recently signed a memorandum of understanding with a community foundation and the Bristol and Bath Regional Capital CIC, a social investment company, to work out the best way for local businesses to contribute to social goals, including refugee integration, by pooling their corporate social responsibility funds to deliver greater impact.\(^83\)

2. **Civil society**

Civil-society actors—including social enterprises, NGOs, and civic-led projects for integration—have long been vital partners in refugee support on the ground. Understanding the needs of their projects can increase their impact. Although the following are not hard-and-fast rules, they provide an overview of how to overcome the main challenges facing social enterprises:

- **Encourage sustainability though mentoring.** Mentoring could greatly increase the impact of young organisations and their development, facilitating a rapid learning curve and an ability to improve and scale services and attract funding. Many social projects working to support refugees’ inclu-

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\(^81\) Konle-Seidl, *Integration of Refugees in Austria, Germany, and Sweden.*

\(^82\) Pedro Calado, Portuguese High Commissioner for Migration, speaking at the ‘Hello Europe!’ Migration Policy Conference, Brussels, 7 June 2018.

\(^83\) Susan Fratzke, MPI Policy Analyst, interview with Edward Rowberry, Chief Executive, Bristol and Bath Regional Capital CIC, 12 April 2017.
sion are in prototype or early consolidation phases, often lacking key management or administrative skills and human resources. Mentoring could be offered by larger companies, NGOs, or governments, greatly improving baseline services and increasing the likelihood of a sustainable integration project.

- **Measure impact.** Young social projects would benefit from collecting and analysing data on their work more systematically. Many fail to measure impact altogether. Without adequate measurement tools, or indicators that can reliably be compared against a given standard, much knowledge on ‘what works’ for integration is being lost. This is an area where government, academics, and other actors could help.

- **Make accessing capital easier and more understandable.** Small organisations generally struggle with lack of initial funding and subsequent high rates of staff turnover. This can decrease the quality of the services provided and lead to valuable knowledge being lost. Helping small organisations understand how to access start-up capital increases the likelihood that an innovative best practice will get off the ground. And capital, importantly, involves more than money: grant schemes such as the European Social Innovation Competition provide project feedback and mentoring. Additionally, small-scale ‘innovation grants’ funded by governments, private companies, or foundations can plug a hole in the initial research and start-up phases.

Again, governments will need to move beyond seeing civil-society actors as mere delivery partners and enlist them in strategic thinking and problem-solving on integration issues. One particular challenge will be bringing these stakeholders into key meetings, since taking time out of running day-to-day operations is especially costly for small organisations.

### B. Supporting coordination structures to build a ‘whole-of-government’ approach: The next phase of mainstreaming

Whole-of-government approaches can promote greater efficiency and policy coherence, reduce waste and duplication of work, and enable different departments to combine resources to tackle problems earlier. ‘Whole-of-government’ approaches are well-suited to areas that (1) are cross-cutting across government, sometimes known as ‘wicked’ problems, or (2) demand a long-term strategic solution, such as climate change or global terrorism. Integration fulfils both of these criteria. Almost all integration challenges—from retraining new-comers whose skills are not in demand in the local labour market to providing early support for families at risk of social exclusion—cross several policy portfolios and play out over a long period, making them especially ripe for a preventative, strategic approach.

In the past few years, a host of whole-of-government policies have been introduced, to varying degrees of permanence, at the European, national, and regional levels. For instance, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs, and Inclusion created a task force on integration to foster collaboration across different bodies, including the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and the Directorate-General for Education and Culture. An Interservice Group on Integration was created in the European Commission. And the Urban Agenda is working with local and regional authorities on issues such as the integration of migrants and refugees. Some of these new initiatives have allowed governments to send a message about coordinated action, building on the momentum of successful strategies, and creating a ‘welcoming’ brand that is identifiable, memorable, and effective. For instance, in the first four years after the Austrian government released its National Action Plan for Integration, a survey found that the share of

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respondents who felt that integration was working ‘well’ or ‘very well’ in Austria increased from 31 per cent to 49 per cent.\textsuperscript{85}

But to effect lasting change, whole-of-government strategies need to go beyond the level of mere rhetoric and set common strategic priorities that all stakeholders have an incentive to work toward. To adjust to the new reality of integration policy, these approaches will need to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Balance targeted and mainstream policies.} The migration crisis revealed the limitations of trying to address integration issues with mainstream-only policies, without making the necessary adaptations to ensure that these are appropriate to serve diverse needs. Moreover, certain groups of vulnerable newcomers (such as women or refugees experiencing trauma) clearly require sensitive, targeted programming. Commentators have recently called for ‘targeted universalism’ as a balance between a targeted and universalist approach to ensure that groups historically excluded can benefit from special support.\textsuperscript{86} An immigrant background is but one category of difference that can affect a person’s opportunities within society. Taking the concept of mainstreaming seriously means thinking more holistically about how categories of difference intersect with and compound disadvantages such as lower socioeconomic status, uncertain legal status, limited literacy and language proficiency, and physical and mental disabilities.

  \item \textbf{Agree on shared accountability measures.} Whole-of-government strategies work when all the stakeholders share a diagnosis of the problem and its causes.\textsuperscript{87} As a result, these strategies require strong leadership and clear lines of accountability and performance management that reward collaboration rather than focusing on one’s own patch. For instance, in Canada, government departments and agencies are required to report on progress in departmental performance reports; programme activities can be assigned to only one government outcome area, but strategic outcomes can be assigned to multiple agencies. Similarly, Finland has a unified performance measurement system for all ministries and agencies.\textsuperscript{88} While numerous integration indicators have been developed in recent years, their main role has been to enable comparisons between countries, rather than to push forward progress within countries as part of a whole-of-government approach. Further, many such indicators have limitations, since they aim to develop metrics that can easily fit very different legal and political contexts.\textsuperscript{89}
\end{itemize}

To support accountability within government, strong leadership is needed to hold other policy areas outside of integration to account. For example, the holistic framework of the New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Strategy features several indicators of success related to the themes of self-sufficiency, housing, education, health


\textsuperscript{86} Ursula Wright, Hayling Price, and Ebele Anidi, ‘Creating Consensus with Targeted Universalism’, FSG, 23 October 2018, \url{www.fsg.org/blog/creating-consensus-targeted-universalism}.

\textsuperscript{87} Lisa Kennedy, Anne Colgan, and Nuala Doherty, \textit{A Primer on Implementing Whole of Government Approaches} (Dublin: Centre for Effective Services, 2014), \url{www.effectiveservices.org/downloads/CES_Whole_of_Government_Approaches.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89} The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) evaluates how open countries are to migrants and refugees but through the rather narrow framework of legislation, rather than policy outcomes. Similarly, the Zaragoza indicators promote the use of standardised EU metrics, but half of the policymakers who responded to a survey said they did not use them (and a third said they did not use indicators at all to monitor outcomes). See European Court of Auditors, ‘The Integration of Migrants from Outside the EU’ (briefing paper, European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg, May 2018), \url{www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/Briefing_paper_Integration_migrants/Briefing_paper_Integration_migrants_EN.pdf}.
and wellbeing, and participation.\textsuperscript{90} The strategy encompasses a predeparture programme in which refugees are guided through the resettlement challenges they can expect to face; an orientation programme that links targeted and mainstream services during refugees’ initial resettlement; and efforts to promote the sharing of information among service providers and refugee community leaders.\textsuperscript{91} One challenge is to align the priorities of various efforts, since progress in one area does not necessarily mean progress in another. For instance, where urban centres are short of housing, newly arrived refugees may need to be housed in rural or peripheral areas, yet suitable jobs for these newcomers may be more difficult to find in these areas.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Integration policymaking has a higher profile than ever before. While in some countries, this higher profile has come with an associated bump in budgets, integration policy still lacks the high profile and financial mandate of more mainstream policy areas, and spending has struggled to keep up with the dramatic increase in scale of need. Many integration policymakers find themselves pulled in multiple directions by colleagues in different ministries and by a proliferation of nongovernmental partners wanting to help. Meanwhile, integration challenges have deepened and become more complex, emphasising the need for a holistic approach to cross-cutting challenges.

The question of how integration policymakers can navigate these challenges with limited budgets is therefore a tricky one. The public sector can support efficiency in many ways, including by, for example, enabling economies of flow (e.g., policymakers can get something right the first time by working on the basis of a rich evidence base); economies of organisation (e.g., managing partners better); and economies of scale (e.g., joining forces with other interested partners to achieve mutually aligned goals). In addition, integration policymakers need to invest in interventions that can deliver the most ‘bang for the buck’.

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To capitalise on these and other opportunities, policymakers may make use of a host of new tools outside the traditional wheelhouse of integration policy. While these may take time to permeate the public sector, which tends to be afraid of failure, policymakers could start small. Ideas include:

- \textit{Piloting one or two experiments using behavioural insights.} The opportunities offered by behavioural insights are extensive and far-reaching, but policymakers may rightly want to tread carefully when it comes to investing in this new approach, even though the cost of such initiatives tends to be low. European governments could consider collaborating to support experiments in particular areas—such as how to reduce segregation in classrooms—that hold particular promise.

\textsuperscript{90} The seven indicators are: increased proportion of working-age refugees in paid employment; reduced proportion of working-age refugees receiving unemployment-related benefits (self-sufficiency); refugees’ use of health services; refugees’ access to mental health services; proportion of refugee children receiving immunisations (health and wellbeing); proportion of refugee school leavers attaining NCEA level 2 after five years or more in the education system (education); and a reduction in the proportion of refugees receiving housing assistance (housing).


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- **Exploring the opportunities social impact bonds hold for investing in preventative policies.** SIBs are well suited to integration policies since they can be used to fund unpopular and/or preventative programming. But their potential for integration is largely untested, and while they offer a low-risk approach for governments, attracting the right partners (including, crucially, funders) and managing relationships with them requires strong leadership.

- **Engaging design agencies to map how well mainstream services fit the populations they serve.** Public services are rarely designed to meet the disparate needs of all users—a daunting challenge that is increasingly possible to address thanks to the seismic digital changes seen in recent years. It may be prudent to explore more systematically how users are interacting with public services. For instance, online forms or websites that were designed years ago may pose unintended barriers for non-native speakers. A host of public-sector design agencies have emerged in recent years, staffed by bright millennials, that could help government agencies redesign their service portals at low cost. And this need not be a top-down, wholesale effort, but can be done piece by piece. Another promising strategy is to bring in temporary fellows working in technology and other areas, following the Code for America\(^2\) or 18F model. This is a way to bring in tech talent (which may otherwise be prohibitively costly for government) on a short-term basis, but it is important that tech experts be complemented with experts in user-centred service design.

- **Working to improve evidence and evaluation in integration policy.** Governments need to ensure that integration policymakers understand what constitutes good evidence, and how to proceed in its absence. For instance, they could support departmental training on integration evidence, or support a collaborative ‘clearing house’ of evidence for what works in integration policy.

Given the scale of the challenge, it is unlikely that governments will be able to resolve all integration problems on their own. There is a growing consensus on the need to recognise and respond to opportunities and challenges as early as possible—and with the long view in mind. Policymakers need to focus many minds on solving integration challenges by creating lasting partnerships, both across government and with nontraditional actors.

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\(^2\) Code for America advocates the use of digital technology to deliver government service, based on a user-centred approach. Professionals in the technology industry can work on specific projects that bridge a gap in service provision between government and public needs, such as making access to government social security benefits easier. See Code for America, ‘The Integrated Benefits Initiative’, accessed 13 December 2018, [www.codeforamerica.org/what/integrated-benefits](http://www.codeforamerica.org/what/integrated-benefits).
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Migration Policy Institute Europe, established in Brussels in 2011, is a non-profit, independent research institute that aims to provide a better understanding of migration in Europe and thus promote effective policymaking. Building upon the experience and resources of the Migration Policy Institute, which operates internationally, MPI Europe provides authoritative research and practical policy design to governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders who seek more effective management of immigration, immigrant integration, and asylum systems as well as successful outcomes for newcomers, families of immigrant background, and receiving communities throughout Europe. MPI Europe also provides a forum for the exchange of information on migration and immigrant integration practices within the European Union and Europe more generally.

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